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Overview of Research 
Two key questions underpin the research presented here. Firstly, how does altered higher 
order awareness contribute to hypnotic experience? Secondly, how do meditation and 
hypnosis differ in terms of the role of higher order awareness? These questions are 
addressed here in the form of four papers. In the first paper I review the literatures of 
hypnosis and meditation in order to consider the similarities and differences between 
meditation and hypnosis in terms of the role of attentional skill and the neural 
underpinnings of each. I then draw conclusions regarding the contrasting role of higher 
order awareness and metacognition in meditation and hypnosis. Paper two explores higher 
order awareness in hypnosis by comparing the effects of alcohol, compared to placebo, on 
hypnotisability and associated frontal lobe executive functioning. Paper three compares 
meditation and hypnosis by investigating differences in higher order thoughts, mindfulness, 
absorption and perceptual encoding style as revealed by self-report measures. The final 
paper takes a broader look at higher order awareness and its relation to the experience of 
agency and involuntariness in hypnotic suggestion using a Libet type paradigm. 
 
 
1 
 
Background and Introduction to the Research Questions 
Hypnosis is an intriguing phenomenon. Our usual experience is of feeling in control of our 
own willed actions and of experiencing an accurate perception of reality. These are the two 
key features of experience that hypnosis alters. An example of involuntariness in hypnosis 
is the rigid arm suggestion, in which it is suggested to a subject that their arm is stiff and 
rigid, as though tightly splinted. Successful responding to this task requires that the subject 
is unable to bend their arm without considerable effort, despite trying hard to do so (in most 
cases, but see Comey & Kirsch (1999) for a discussion of individual differences in the 
degree of effort made.) How can they simultaneously stiffen their arm and remain so 
unaware that they themselves are doing so that they cannot bend it? This is the ‘classical 
suggestion effect’, as identified by Weitzenhoffer (1980). Another key feature of hypnotic 
experience is the belief in an alternatively suggested reality, such as perceiving (or strongly 
imagining; see Comey & Kirsch, 1999) only two balls when three are presented in full view 
(a suggestion in the Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility; Bowers, 
1993). A subject successfully responding to this suggestion will honestly deny the existence 
of the third ball. So striking and bizarre are the apparent effects of hypnotic suggestion that 
they have been attributed either to faking or to dramatic shifts in first order states. By 
contrast, meditation, which has frequently been compared with hypnosis (e.g. Holroyd, 
2008) aims to increase the practitioner’s sense of self-agency (Shaw, Gromala & Song, 
2010) and enhance the accuracy of perception (e.g. Goleman & Schwartz, 1976; 
Kamalashila, 2012). 
 In this chapter I will firstly describe what hypnosis is, how it is measured, and 
argue that hypnosis is not a case of ‘faking it’. Next, I will emphasise the role of 
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metacognition and associated brain regions in hypnotic experience, demonstrating that 
hypnotic responding does not necessarily require any alterations in first order mental states. 
Finally, I will discuss how meditation can be used to explore awareness of one’s mental 
states in hypnosis. 
 
What is hypnosis; is it real, and how does it happen?  
Hypnosis is a change in subjective perception of sense of agency/involuntariness in 
response to situational demands, such as being given suggestions by another person, ‘the 
hypnotist’.  Kihlstrom describes these experiences as being “associated with a degree of 
subjective conviction bordering on delusion, and an experienced involuntariness bordering 
on compulsion” (Kihlstrom, 2008, p. 21). An individual’s susceptibility to such hypnotic 
responses is very stable, with test-retest reliability over twenty-five to thirty years of about 
.75 (Piccione, Hilgard & Zimbardo, 1989). Around 10% of the population are highly 
susceptible to hypnosis (known as ‘highs’), responding to most hypnotic suggestions in a 
standard scale of hypnotic susceptibility (e.g. the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility, Form A  - HGSHS:A; Shor & Orne, 1962) and the Waterloo Stanford Group 
Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, FORM C - WGSC; Bowers, 1993); roughly 10% are low 
susceptible (‘lows’), responding to none or only very few suggestions, and the remainder 
are moderately susceptible (mediums), somewhere in-between highs and lows.  
But are those who claim to be responding to hypnotic suggestions really 
experiencing conviction bordering on delusion or involuntariness bordering on 
compulsion? Or are they simply simulating what they believe hypnotic experience to be? 
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Several studies have distinguished highs from simulators. For example, Kirsch et al (1989) 
found that highs, unlike simulators, who were faking, continued to respond to suggestions 
even when the experimenter had left the room. Additionally, highs pass lie detector tests 
whereas fakers do not (Kinnunen et al, 1994). Furthermore, neuroimaging data differentiate 
true hypnotic responders from simulators, with highs showing activation in brain regions 
consistent with true experience of the suggestion and simulators showing differential 
patterns of neural activation (Oakley 2008; Ward et al 2003). Having established that 
hypnosis is indeed a real phenomenon, we can go on to consider other theories.  
The cold control theory of hypnosis (Dienes & Perner, 2007) draws out a common 
theme from the two normally contrasting major approaches to hypnosis: the socio-cognitive 
approach (e.g. Spanos, 1986) which describes hypnotic responding in terms of everyday 
psychological principles and the dissociation approach (e.g. Hilgard, 1977; Woody & 
Bowers, 1994), which explains hypnosis as the result of dissociation between executive 
control and the contention scheduling (habit) system. Both of these approaches can be 
interpreted in terms of alterations in metacognition
 
(cognition about cognition; see Beran, 
Brandl, Perner, & Proust, 2012, for a recent review).  
Specifically, cold control theory posits that hypnotic responding represents the 
experience of performing an action without being aware of the intention to do so. For 
example, in a situation labelled as ‘hypnotic’, demand characteristics can lead one to have 
expectations about how they will respond when given a hypnotic suggestion, and these 
expectations can directly trigger the hypnotic response, as in the placebo effect (Kirsch, 
1985). Alternatively, demand characteristics and expectations may lead to a lack of 
awareness of intentions so that one’s actions are falsely attributed to hypnosis, a failure of 
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metacognition. According to dissociation theories, control and monitoring processes are 
fractionated, so that one stream is controlling actions and the other, which has separated 
off, is unaware of the controlling stream, and thus the behavioural source is misattributed to 
an external source.  
 
Neural concomitants of metacognition 
Metacognition has been variously linked to the mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC). Lau & Passingham (2006) determined two masking conditions in which people 
could discriminate two different shapes. The difference was in whether people were 
consciously aware of seeing the shape or if they felt that they were just guessing. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) revealed that the brain region that 
differentiated reports of guessing versus awareness of seeing the shape was the left DLPFC. 
Rounis et al (2010) created condition in which subjects’ first order perceptions of seeing 
were equivalent. When they applied repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to 
the DLPFC, subjects’ awareness of seeing was disrupted. The DLPFC has also been 
associated with a lack of awareness when subjects are administered alcohol, which is 
known to impair the region (Wendt & Risberg, 2001). Sayette, Reichle & Schooler (2006) 
found that subjects tended to mind-wander more when they were given alcohol. 
Furthermore, while subjects’ reported more mind-wandering episodes when probed, they 
reported fewer self-caught mind-wandering episodes, suggesting that although they were 
more prone to zoning out, they were less aware of when they were doing so, i.e. they were 
metacognitively impaired.  
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 If hypnotic responding arises from deficits in metacognition, then disrupting the 
DLPFC should increase hypnotic susceptibility. Dienes & Hutton (2012) tested this 
hypothesis by applying rTMS to the left mid-DLPFC and the vertex (a sham site used as a 
control) in a blind study. Subjects were given suggestions to experience magnetic hands, 
arm levitation, rigid arm and taste hallucination and were asked to rate the strength of their 
experience on a 6 point scale (0-5). Results showed that rTMS increased subjective 
hypnotic responding by on average a third of a rating point, providing support for the role 
of metacognition in hypnosis. 
 
Meditation, Metacognition and Hypnosis 
Having considered that reduced metacognition might play a role in hypnotic responding, 
we could also consider meditation, which is said to involve training in metacognitive skills, 
such as mindfulness (e.g. Teasdale, 1999; Thompson, 2006; Wallace, 1999). Although 
meditation has been frequently compared with hypnosis, (e.g. Holroyd, 2008), the role of 
metacognition seems to be a distinguishing factor. Several studies have shown that 
meditation practice increases mindfulness, as measured by self-report scales (e.g. Shapiro, 
Oman and Thoresen, 2008; Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmüller, Kleinknecht & Schmidt, 
2006; Zeidan, Gordon, Merchant & Goolkasian, 2010). Self-report scales may not be very 
convincing, as there will be pressure on people who have been practicing for years to be 
mindful to say, to others or themselves, that they are mindful.  However, there are other 
indications. Zeidan, et al (2010) also demonstrated that meditation training improves 
metacognition. Subjects were... In another study, meditators were able to reduce the attentional 
blink (Slagter, Lutz, Geichar, Francis, Nieuwenhuis, Davis and Davidson, 2007), bringing a 
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normally unconscious process to consciousness, an apparent feat of metacognition. 
Although there are many claims that meditation increases mindfulness and metacognition, 
there is a paucity of empirical literature to support this theory, and it remains to be seen 
whether or not meditation and hypnosis can indeed be distinguished on the basis of 
differences in higher order awareness. 
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Summary of Research Questions Addressed in the Four Papers 
 
Paper 1: The Contrasting Role of Higher Order Awareness of Higher Order 
Awareness in    Hypnosis and Meditation 
Meditation and hypnosis have been compared on numerous occasions over the past few 
decades (e.g. Delmonte, 1984; Heide, Wadlington and Lundy, 1980; Holroyd, 2003; 
Lifshitz, Campbell & Raz, 2012; Van Nuys, 1973; Yapko, 2011), yet it remains to be 
concluded precisely what the core differences and similarities are. For example, both 
meditation and hypnosis have been associated with high levels of absorption (e.g. Wilson 
and Barber, 1983; Davidson & Goleman, 1977), imaginative capacity (e.g. Lynn & Rhue, 
1986; Spanos & Barber, 1974) and altered states of consciousness (e.g. Hilgard, 1977; 
Gruzelier, 1988, but see Kirsch & Lynn, 1995), and both can be used for self-regulation, for 
example, pain management (e.g. Derbyshire, Whalley and Oakley, 2009; Kabat-Zinn, 
Davidson and Houshmand, 1985). Paper 1 is a review of meditation and hypnosis, in which 
we consider these overlapping constructs, as well as the core differences. Essentially, we 
conclude that, while meditation and hypnosis are comparable in their applications to pain, 
stress and other clinical uses, they appear to differ fundamentally in the mechanisms by 
which these aims are achieved: hypnosis can be viewed as a form of self-deception in 
which a reduction of higher order awareness is experienced, whereas the primary goal of 
meditation is see through deluded mental states, i.e. to increase higher order awareness. 
However, there remain a number of potential methodological confounds such as demand 
characteristics within both meditative and hypnotic contexts. Furthermore, there is need for 
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precise definition of the terms meditation and hypnosis whenever they are experimentally 
investigated, because a number of phenomena are referred to by the same names, as we 
discuss. 
 
Paper 2: Alcohol Increases Hypnotic Susceptibility 
There are two broad normally-opposing approaches to the role of the frontal lobes in 
hypnotic responding. One approach suggests that hypnotic responding occurs as a result of 
a state of ‘hypofrontality’ (Dietrich, 2003), either through frontal lobe exhaustion following 
intensive concentration during an induction process (Gruzelier, 1998) or through 
dissociation of the supervisory attentional system (executive system) from the contention 
scheduling (habit) system (Woody & Bowers, 1994; see Woody & Sadler, 2008, for a 
review of dissociation theories).  
Other approaches posit that frontal lobe executive functioning is required in order 
for hypnotic suggestions to be successfully performed. For example, Hilgard’s neo-
dissociation theory requires that the ‘executive ego’ is split into two streams, one which is 
unaware of the other (the ‘hidden observer’) but that nonetheless each of these streams 
remains independently intact (Hilgard, 1977). Several studies have suggested that executive 
functioning is required to overcome persistent first-order mental states of pain (Crawford, 
Knebel & Vendemia, 1998) and to overcome pre-potent responses (e.g. Bertrand and 
Spanos, 1985; Raz et al, 2002; Spanos et al, 1982).   
Cold control theory (Dienes & Perner, 2008) highlights the role of metacognition in 
these different theories. The theory postulates that hypnotic subjects are able to strategically 
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avoid higher order thoughts (HOTs) of intending. Some studies have located the mid dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) as a likely candidate as the ‘seat of metacognition’ 
(Fleming, Weil, Nagy et al, 2010; Lau & Passingham, 2006; Rounis et al, 2010). It is 
known that alcohol impairs the DLPFC (Wendt and Risberg, 2001). Sayette et al (2006) 
also found that subjects were more prone to mind-wandering without being aware that they 
were doing so following alcohol administration. Dienes & Hutton (2012) recently found 
that administering repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to the region 
increased hypnotic responding and so we administered alcohol or a placebo to medium 
susceptible participants in an attempt to test the above theories by diminishing 
metacognition via the effects of alcohol on this region. 
After giving subjects alcohol or a placebo, we carried out manipulation checks to 
ensure that subjects in the alcohol condition had received enough to impair their frontal 
lobe functioning. We gave each subject a series of hypnotic suggestions, and found that 
alcohol increased the subjective responses of those who had received alcohol, compared to 
those who had received a placebo, and this effect persisted above and beyond the effects of 
response expectancy, which also influenced the subjective responses of both groups of 
subjects. 
The findings from this study support theories that postulate a deficit in frontal lobe 
functioning in hypnotic responding. However, we cannot conclude strongly regarding the 
role of metacognition, as alcohol affects a large region of the frontal lobes aside from the 
DLPFC (Kähkönen et al, 2003), and so in future we would need to test the effects of 
alcohol on hypnotic suggestibility while also measuring metacognition/higher order 
awareness. 
10 
 
Paper 3: The Contrasting Role of Higher order Awareness in Hypnosis and 
Meditation 
The cold control theory of hypnosis (Dienes & Perner, 2007; Dienes, 2012) emphasises the 
role of metacognition in hypnosis. Specifically, it postulates that hypnosis arises from a 
strategic lack of metacognition, i.e. an avoidance of higher order thoughts (HOTs), 
particularly of intending.  If this is true, then highs should report having fewer HOTs than 
lows. Meditation, in contrast to hypnosis, can be viewed as a form of training in 
metacognitive skills, such as mindfulness (e.g. Teasdale, 1999). We therefore predicted that 
meditators would have greater higher order awareness than highs and that on this basis they 
should be relatively unsusceptible to hypnosis. As predicted, meditators were less 
hypnotisable than non-meditators, a difference that could not be explained by expectancies 
or attitudes towards hypnosis.  
In order to investigate the differences in hypnotisability we gave highs, lows and 
meditators a task that involved either attending to or trying to ignore a sequence of images 
while looking directly at them. We probed subjects at random intervals over a 15 minute 
period and asked them to report whether they were conscious of seeing the image or zoning 
out, and whether or not they had been aware of zoning out if this had been the case. We 
obtained several measures from this task: HOT coupling, which was the total number of 
HOTs reported across the ignore and attend conditions; meta-awareness, which was the 
proportion of zoning out incidences for which the subject was aware that they had been 
zoning out; HOT control, which was the number of times they were able to ignore the 
image in the ignore condition plus attend to them in the attend condition; meditation, which 
was the degree to which they were able to attend to the images in the attend condition and 
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ironic control, which was the number of times subjects were able to avoid HOTs of the 
image in the ignore condition. 
Meditators had greater levels of HOTs (HOT coupling) than lows and highs and 
were poorer at ironic control, as though their mindfulness practice rendered them less able 
to avoid HOTs about the world. (Of course, we don’t know if the meditation practice was 
responsible, or the sort of person who takes up or sticks with meditation.) A Bayes factor 
analysis indicated that HOT coupling and meta-awareness may mediate the differences 
between meditators and non-meditators, although our data were insensitive and more is 
needed to further investigate this possibility. 
 This question of the effects of differences in higher order awareness was also 
considered from a different angle. Subjects completed self-report measures of mindfulness, 
perceptual encoding style, absorption, thought suppression and cognitive failures, as well as 
the relationships between these constructs. Two factors emerged: internal absorption and 
external awareness. The findings indicated that higher hypnotisability was related to more 
internally absorbed cognitive style associated with a greater tendency to more automatic 
top-down processing, while lows and meditators were more mindful than highs had a more 
external perceptual encoding style, related to a slower, bottom-up processing style.  
In sum, the findings from this study indicate that differences in hypnotic 
suggestibility could be accounted for, at least in part, by differences in higher order 
awareness of the world or by first order perceptual encoding styles. However, further data 
needs to be collected and additional variables, such as individual differences in dissociation 
(see Terhune et al, 2001) could be explored simultaneously. 
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Paper 4: Awareness of Action in Hypnosis and Meditation 
Disruptions in self-agency are a core feature of hypnotic suggestions, which are typically 
experienced as being involuntary. It has already been demonstrated that hypnotically 
suggested ideomotor movements are experienced as being more similar to passive than to 
normal (non-hypnotically suggested) voluntary actions (e.g. Blakemore et al, 2003; 
Haggard et al, 2004), yet previous studies have only used moderate to highly suggestible 
individuals and so it is not possible to distinguish genuine hypnotic effects from demand 
characteristics. 
            In order to address this issue, low hypnotisable subjects were used as simulators in 
this study. We compared highs’ and lows (simulators) and meditators’ errors of judgment 
of the time at which they actually made a finger movement passively, voluntarily or 
following a hypnotic suggestion. We also compared meditators, as they have shown 
differences from highs and lows in various measures (see papers 1 and 3). 
We replicated Haggard et al’s (2004) findings that highs’ experienced hypnotically 
suggested movements as occurring later and as being more involuntary, than normal active 
movements. The differences in highs’ judgment errors compared to simulating lows’ also 
suggested that this effect is genuine and not a result of demand characteristics. We were 
unable to draw firm conclusions with regard to meditators and are planning to collect more 
data.  
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Abstract 
Meditation and hypnosis might be regarded as involving similar processes and skills. For 
example, both meditation and hypnosis are associated with high levels of absorption and 
imaginative capacity, and both can be used for self-regulation. Research has also shown 
that meditation improves attentional functioning, and that hypnotic response can involve 
attentional strategies. However, we argue that hypnosis and mindfulness meditation are 
essentially different.  Crucially, hypnotic experience results from a lack of awareness of 
mental states (specifically, of intentions); by contrast, mindfulness meditation aims to 
develop accurate meta-awareness. Hypnosis is a form of self-deception; meditation a way 
of getting to know your mind. We discuss the empirical relation of both meditation and 
hypnosis to higher order awareness of mental states, and suggest further research.  
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Introduction 
Comparisons are frequently made between hypnosis and meditation (e.g. Delmonte, 
1984; Holroyd, 2003; Van Nuys, 1973; Yapko, 2011). Both typically involve some 
physical relaxation, for example; however deep relaxation is not a necessary nor even a 
necessarily helpful component of either (e.g. Banyai and Hilgard, 1976; Hanh and Nquyen, 
2006). So care is needed to disentangle contingent similarities from core ones, and we will 
attempt in this review to do so. Both hypnosis and meditation are involved in self 
regulation - but self regulation can be performed in different, even opposing, ways. In this 
review, we highlight similarities and differences between meditation and hypnosis, arguing 
that they are essentially different. First we indicate what is meant by hypnosis and 
meditation. Then we consider the relation between the two implied by different theories of 
hypnosis, in terms of the role of executive systems (attention and metacognition) in 
hypnosis according to those theories. Next, we consider the empirical evidence for the role 
of attention and metacognition in each of meditation and hypnosis. Finally, we consider 
evidence more directly relating meditation and hypnosis. We will argue that at their core, 
meditation and hypnosis are opposites. 
 
What is hypnosis? 
The word hypnosis can either refer to a state that follows a hypnotic induction (cf. 
Barnier and Nash 2008); or else to the suggested distortions of perception or sense of 
involuntariness that some people can create according to the requirements of the situation 
(e.g. Dienes, 2012).  In the first sense, hypnosis is a state, a way of being; in the second, it 
is a way of doing (responding to suggestions). Hypnosis as a state could be just a particular 
16 
 
pattern of phenomenology (attention absorbed inwards or outwards, time going faster or 
slower, self-talk increased or decreased, and so on; see e.g. Pekala and Kumar, 2007), or, in 
addition, according to some theories, a global change in how information is processed that 
causally affects response to suggestions (e.g. impairment of the executive system; Jamieson 
and Woody, 2007). Responding hypnotically involves a specific motor or cognitive action 
accompanied by an altered sense of volition or reality. For example, a person can hold their 
hands out, imagine they are magnets and feel their hands move together seemingly by 
themselves. The act of the hands moving together is mundane; what makes it hypnotic is 
the sense that it happens by itself. Or a person can, on request, change the colour of an 
object from say red to green, with the hallucinated colour seeming external and real. 
Imagining an object in a counterfactual colour is mundane; what makes the cognitive act 
hypnotic is the sense of reality that accompanies the act of imagination. These acts 
constitute hypnotic responding whether or not the person is in a hypnotic state.  It is 
important to bear the distinction between acts and states in mind in comparing hypnosis to 
meditation:  Putative hypnotic and meditative states can be compared; or else hypnotic and 
meditative actions can be compared. Nonetheless, the two uses are related. For example, on 
“state” theories of hypnosis, if an induced state did not increase response to hypnotic 
suggestion even slightly, the state would not be a hypnotic state.  Conversely, on “non-state 
theories” of hypnosis, the state is itself just a response to a suggestion (to experience that 
state, however it is conceived by the subject). Researchers have not settled on a consistent 
use of the word ‘hypnosis’ (Kirsch et al, 2011) and the word ‘meditation’ can also be used 
to encompass a wide range of practices (Lutz, Dunne and Davidson, 2007).   
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 Typically, hypnotic suggestibility is measured by giving subjects a hypnotic 
induction then giving a series of suggestions. The more suggestions a person passes, the 
more hypnotisable they are. Several predictors of hypnotisability have been found, 
including response expectancy (Kirsch & Braffman, 1999; Raz, 2006), absorption (Wilson 
& Barber, 1983; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), fantasy proneness (Wilson and Barber, 1982) 
and imaginative involvement (Spanos & Barber, 1974). While significant correlations have 
been found, they are often only moderate, with reliable correlations between hypnosis and 
absorption typically around 0.2 - 0.3 (Kihlstrom, 2003), for example, and are often smaller 
when hypnotisabilty and putative correlates are tested in a different context (e.g. Council, 
Kirsch & Hafner, 1986, but see Nadon, Hoyt, Register & Kihlstrom, 1991). The most 
reliable and replicable correlate of suggestibility after an induction is responding to 
suggestions without being given a hypnotic induction (around 0.7, e.g. Hilgard & Tart, 
1966; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999).  
Thus, hypnotic responding can be distinguished from a special altered state of 
hypnosis (see Raz, 2011, for discussion). Although some do claim that hypnosis is a state 
(e.g. Crawford, 1994), there is no established theory of a hypnotic state or states.  For 
example, while hypnotic induction has the potential to slightly enhance hypnotic 
suggestibility and produce a stronger neural response than without an induction 
(Derbyshire, Whalley & Oakley, 2009)
1
, an induction is not necessary for highs to 
successfully respond to hypnotic suggestions (Kirsch & Braffman, 2001).  Raz et al (2006) 
found that although highs were able to reduce Stroop interference following hypnotic 
suggestion for printed words to become meaningless, a hypnotic induction made no real 
                                                          
1
Although note recent as yet unpublished data from the same lab found a stronger neural response for 
suggestion without an induction rather than with it, Derbyshire, personal communication, 6 June 2012 
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difference to the effect.  McGeown et al (2012) found that highs were able to successfully 
drain or add colour from a coloured or grayscale stimulus with and without hypnotic 
induction, whereas lows were unable to perform the suggestion in either condition. 
Subjective ratings of hypnotic depth correlated with activation in the colour processing 
region (i.e. left fusiform) in the colour adding condition and in frontal and parietal regions 
(associated with recruitment of attentional resources) in the draining condition. However, 
the enhancement seen following hypnotic induction was slight, and highs were able to 
effectively perform the suggestion even without any hypnotic induction or feeling that they 
were in any way in a hypnotic state. In sum, there is a hypnotic way of acting (acting 
cognitively or behaviourally such that the sense of reality or volition is distorted according 
to task requirements) that can occur either in or out of a hypnotic state. 
 
What is meditation? 
Meditation can be described as a complex family of training practices in attention, 
emotional regulation (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne & Davidson, 2008) and metacognitive 
awareness (Thompson, 2006), which (aim to) contribute to the development of a more 
veridical experience of the world. Meditation practice in the shorter term, in particular 
mindfulness-based training, is also used (as hypnosis is) for the treatment of stress (Miller, 
Fletcher & Kabat-Zinn, 1995), depression (Ramel, Goldin, Carmona & McQuaid 2004; 
Teasdale et al, 2000), addiction (Bowen et al, 2006) and pain management (Kabat-Zinn, 
Davidson & Houshmand, 1985). Just as hypnotic responding can be distinguished from a 
hypnotic state, meditative (mindful) activity might be viewed as distinct from a meditative 
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state. Such mindful activities can be everyday occurrences, so long as one is fully present 
and aware of the sensations of the action. For example walking, making tea, eating a raisin 
or cleaning one’s teeth can be performed mindfully. (Mindfully eating a raisin is an 
exercise in mindfulness based stress reduction courses; Kabat-Zinn, Segal, Williams, & 
Teasdale 2002.) 
It is important to distinguish between the various styles of meditation, particularly 
as some of the terms used in modern psychology and neuroscience are the same as those 
translated from Buddhist texts, but refer to different constructs (Lutz et al, 2007). There is 
no single clear and simple definition of meditation as there are many types from different 
traditions (including those from different religions, as well as within Buddhism). However, 
Lutz et al (2007) have drawn out some fundamental assumptions that can be made about 
meditation as a whole. First of all, meditation practices must be learned. They are designed 
to inhibit undesirable traits (e.g. negative cognitive or emotional patterns) and enhance or 
cultivate desirable ones (e.g. non-reactivity). Many meditation practices achieve these by 
focusing on an aspect of one’s experience, commonly the breath. Other practices involve 
developing an open and non-judgmental awareness of one’s emotions and cognitions and/or 
cultivating particular thoughts of feelings, such as those of compassion.  Following on from 
this, it can be predicted that meditation will produce specific states. Indeed, evidence has 
shown that compassion meditation leads to improvements in affective regulation (Lutz, 
Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone & Davidson, 2008) and other studies have demonstrated 
superior attentional performance in meditators than controls and novice meditators (e.g. 
Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005; Slagter, Lutz, Geichar, Francis, 
Nieuwenhuis, Davis & Davidson, 2007). Another feature of meditation practice is that 
improvements can be seen over time and are reflected in changes in the brain. For example, 
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structural differences have been seen in experienced meditators, who had greater cortical 
thickness in the right anterior insula (associated with interoception; Critchley, Wiens, 
Rotshtein, Öhman & Dolan, 2004, integration of cognition and emotion and adaptive 
decision-making, Damasio, 1996) than controls (Lazar, Kerr, Wasserman, Gray, Greve, 
Treadway, et al 2005). Crucially, cortical thickness in the insular cortex was correlated with 
cumulative meditation experience. Practice effects can be also seen in the aforementioned 
improved attentional performance of experienced meditators. Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz, 
Schaefer, Levinson & Davidson (2007) reported greater activation in the insula and in 
frontal parietal regions during concentration meditation. These areas are involved in 
sustained attention and monitoring and making attentional adjustments (Vincent, Kahn, 
Snyder, Raichle & Buckne, 2006; Eckert, Menon, Walczak, Ahlstrom, Denslow, Horwitz & 
Dubno, 2009). In meditation such monitoring is used to detect and signal mental 
drowsiness or over-excitability, which lead to a loss of concentration. 
For the purposes of investigation and comparison of meditation types, three main 
categories (focused attention, open monitoring and lovingkindness) have been described by 
Lutz et al, drawing on practices within the Buddhist traditions (2007; 2008; see Box 1). 
One prevalent meditation technique, which is used across Buddhist and other religious or 
spiritual traditions is focusing one’s attention on the breath.  This practice initially involves 
focusing on the breath to develop śamatha (concentration/sustained attention and resilience 
to distracting thoughts and emotions) and vipaśyanā, which refers to the clarity of 
perceiving the nature of that which is being attended.  Śamatha may be practiced with a 
range of attentional objects other than the breath (shapes, colours, body parts, etc) in order 
to develop a calm sustained attention. Similarly, vipaśyanā involves a range of practices to 
see how phenomena (including mental states) come and go, and how certain ones tend to 
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lead to certain others.  The practitioner, through continually checking where the mind is 
focused (self-monitoring), begins to develop samprajanya, which can be translated as meta-
awareness (Lutz, Dunne and Davidson, 2007) or ‘clear knowing’ (Anālayo, 2010). Meta-
awareness, and specifically mindfulness, is a common component across all different 
meditation styles. Mindfulness can be defined as the practice of bringing awareness to the 
present moment with non-judgmental acceptance (Brown and Ryan, 2003). In sum, 
meditation fundamentally involves the development of attentional and metacognitive 
processes.  Intriguingly, such processes have also been fundamental to the main theories of 
hypnosis. 
 
Theoretical relation of hypnosis to meditation 
Theories of hypnosis can be classified according to the role of executive system in 
hypnosis, i.e. with that system responsible for metacognition and attentional regulation. 
Metacognition refers to processes that monitor or control thoughts and attention 
(Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner, 2000): Cognition about cognition (see Box 2). Some 
theories of hypnosis postulate a disturbance in executive systems, others an enhancement. 
Given that meditation involves special attentional and metacognitive abilities, theories of 
hypnosis that postulate impaired attentional or metacognitive processing suggest hypnosis 
is the opposite from meditation. Theories that postulate that hypnosis involves no special 
attentional or metacognitive abilities suggest hypnosis is orthogonal to meditation. Finally, 
overlap is suggested by theories that postulate hypnosis also involves special attentional 
abilities. 
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Several theories have explained hypnosis in terms of a deficit in frontal lobe 
executive function. According to Hilgard’s neo-dissociation theory (1977) the ‘executive 
ego’ is split in two conscious streams, one which controls the hypnotic responses, and the 
other which is unaware of this control. In dissociated control theory (Woody and Bowers, 
1994) hypnosis is described as a weakening of frontal lobe function so that the supervisory 
attentional system (i.e. executive system, Norman and Shallice, 1986) is rendered  unable to 
control behaviour, which is thus controlled by the contention scheduling or habit system 
(hence the feeling of involuntariness). Hence, behaviour is directly triggered by hypnotic 
suggestion. Gruzelier’s (1998) neurophysiological theory also explains hypnosis in terms of 
diminished attentional abilities.  The purported greater attentional abilities of highs leads to 
a highly concentrated state, which causes exhaustion of the frontal lobes and thus leads to 
inhibition of executive frontal lobe functioning that contributes toward hypnotic response 
and experience. These theories imply hypnosis is not conducive to mindfulness; responding 
hypnotically essentially involves a lack of mindfulness. 
Socio-cognitive theories (e.g. Sarbin and Coe, 1972; Spanos, 1986, 1991) do not 
postulate any deficit in attention regulation; in fact, hypnotic responses are explained in 
terms of attentional and other strategies (for example, hypnotic pain relief may be produced 
partly by distraction). By the same token, above-average attentional abilities are not used to 
explain hypnotic response either;  hypnotic behaviour is seen as being fundamentally 
similar to other more mundane forms of social behaviour, with anyone capable of 
producing hypnotic responses if they have the right expectations, beliefs, purposes, and 
attributions. Although hypnosis may involve neither enhanced nor diminished attentional 
abilities on this account, it does involve an attributional error, a failure of metacognition, in 
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attributing one’s actions not to oneself but to the hypnotist or a special hypnotic state. Once 
again, these theories postulate an inherent contradiction between responding hypnotically 
and being mindful. 
 In contrast to the above accounts, Crawford (1994) suggests that highs are able to 
respond hypnotically due to their superior sustained attentional abilities.  Relatedly, James 
Braid, the person who coined the term hypnosis, claimed that successful hypnotic response 
occurs because highs maintain a persistent uncontradicted image of the required result (a 
theory revived by Baars, 1998). According to this theory, hypnotic response involves 
especially good attentional and inhibitory abilities. Actions happen automatically by 
sustained thoughts about the actions, and there is no inherent contradiction with 
mindfulness. 
In sum, theoretically, the role of attentional ability in producing hypnotic response 
is controversial. We will consider the actual evidence for a role of attention in hypnotic 
response below.  But a theme common to some of the theories is that hypnosis involves a 
failure of metacognition. In Hilgard’s (1977) dissociation theory and also in Spanos’ (1986) 
socio-cognitive theories, subjects intend to perform various actions without being aware of 
the intention. That is, hypnosis is essentially a form of self-deception. This idea was taken 
up by Dienes and Perner (2007) as a suggestion for the simplest theory that might explain 
hypnosis – hypnotic response consists of nothing more nor less than intending to perform 
some motor or cognitive act while thinking one is not intending the action
2
 (see Box 4). 
                                                          
2
 It is not merely the absence of accurate HOTs that make an intentional action hypnotic, but the presence of 
the inaccurate HOT that one is not intending the action (Dienes, 2012). If it were just the absence of HOTs of 
intending, then every absent minded performance of an intentional action would count as hypnotic, and a 
creature, perhaps a dog, not capable of HOTs of intention would be permanently responding hypnotically!  If 
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The Dienes and Perner account draws on Rosenthal’s (2004) higher order thought (HOT) 
theory of conscious awareness (see Box 3). HOT theory claims that a mental state is a 
conscious mental state when we are conscious of being in that mental state, i.e. when we 
have a higher order thought about being in the state. Thus, hypnosis involves having 
unconscious intentions. The subject exerts intentional control without having accurate 
HOTs about those intentions; thus hypnosis is constituted by “cold control”. Hypnosis is a 
purely meta-cognitive phenomenon in which inaccurate higher order thought is produced 
(Dienes, 2012) – a strategic failure of metacognition.  In sum, in terms of metacognition, 
theories have either postulated hypnosis involves an impairment of metacognition (e.g. 
Dienes and Perner, 2007; Hilagrd, 1977; Spanos, 1986), or postulate no special relation of 
hypnotic responding to metacognition (e.g. Baars, 1988). We now consider the actual 
evidence for the relation between each of meditation and hypnosis and attention and 
metacognition. 
 
Attention in hypnosis and meditation 
Both meditation and hypnosis have been claimed to involve enhanced attentional 
skill, particularly in sustained attention (e.g. Ås, 1963; Buttle, 2011; Davidson and 
Goleman, 1977; Gruzelier, 1998; Karlin, 1979; Lutz, Slagter and Dunne, 2008; Raz, 2005; 
Slagter et al, 2007, 2009; Tang, Ma, Wang, Fan, Feng, Yu, et al, 2007; Valentine and 
Sweet, 1999).  Recent research has shown that attentional skills can be trained by 
meditation practice (see Lutz et al, 2008 and Austin, 2006, for reviews.) The relation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
inaccurate HOTs are required, it is only an animal which possesses mental state concepts of intention that 
could in principle respond hypnotically (by believing they did not intend the action). 
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attentional skill to hypnosis is more controversial (e.g. Dienes et al 2009; Jamieson and 
Sheehan, 2002). We consider meditation and hypnosis in turn.  
Meditation can be narrowly viewed as a form of attention training (Bishop et al, 
2006). Lutz et al (2009) found that intensive meditation enhanced attentional stability. 
Meditators were compared before and after a three month intensive meditation retreat, 
during which they practiced open monitoring, focused attention and loving kindness 
meditation for 10-12 hours per day. Subjects in the control condition received a one hour 
meditation training session before each experimental session and meditated for 20 minutes 
per day for one week before each testing session. Both groups were asked to perform two 
versions of a dichotic listening task: the open monitoring version, in which they were asked 
to identify deviant tones in both ears, and the focused attention version, in which they were 
asked to identify a deviant tone in the one attended ear, whilst ignoring tones in the other 
ear. Using EEG, they found that meditators showed increased theta-band phase consistency 
compared to pre-training and to controls, consistent with sustained attention and on-line 
cognitive control. Meditators also showed reduced variability in neuronal processing 
regardless of whether or not the tone was deviant, in line with claims that focused attention 
meditation develops the monitoring faculty, and so one remains vigilant to distractions 
while retaining a stable focus, as well as enhanced ability to disengage from distraction. 
Slagter et al (2007) found that subjects in one study using an attentional blink paradigm 
demonstrated similar detection of T1 (the first target) and increased detection of T2 (the 
second target), compared to baseline and controls, following three months of intensive 
meditation training, indicating meditation practice produced a more optimal distribution of 
attention.  On the Stroop task, expert meditators versus controls showed decreased Stroop 
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interference (Moore and Malinowski, 2009; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). Further, meditators 
reported higher level of mindfulness (on the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Scale) and 
mindfulness was linked to fewer errors on the Stroop task (Moore and Malinowski, 2009) 
 The studies to date consistently point in the direction of good attentional skills in 
expert rather than novice meditators, though a general problem in the field is accounting for 
motivational differences between experts and controls. When experts know they are 
selected for the study based on being experts, they may work harder to meet the demands of 
the situation, or produce expected responses just because they are expected (response 
expectancy; Kirsch, 1985; 1997). A frequent control in the hypnosis field is to select high 
and low hypnotisables for further testing without subjects knowing the basis on which they 
are being selected (Council, Kirsch, and Hafner, 1986) but many studies on the effects of 
meditation or mindfulness training have not taken this into account. A recent study, 
however, tried to disentangle motivational effects by comparing a control group with other 
groups that received a financial incentive, mindfulness based stress reduction training 
(MBSR) and non-mindfulness based stress reduction training (NMSR). They found that 
while some attentional improvements (sustained, visual and temporal attention) can be 
accounted for by an increase in attentional effort, only the group who received MBSR 
training showed improvements on sustained selective attention, suggesting that MBSR 
training had an effect above and beyond motivation and non-specific stress reduction 
(Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer and Hasselbalch, 2012).  
The above studies compared experts and novices in meditation; the comparable 
studies in hypnosis are those comparing high and low hypnotisables. Evidence of superior 
attentional abilities in highs rather than lows is mixed and the issue remains unresolved 
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(contrast e.g. Crawford et al, 1993 with Dienes et al, 2009). Studies using the Stroop test 
have produced conflicting findings, with either no significant difference between highs and 
lows or with differences in either direction. Without hypnotic induction or suggestions 
being used, most studies have found no significant difference between highs and lows on 
Stroop interference (Aikens and Ray 2001; Egner et al 2005; Kaiser et al 1997; Kallio et al 
2001). Dixon, Brunet & Laurence (1990) and Dixon and Laurence (1992) found 
significantly more Stroop interference in highs than lows; however,  Rubichi et al (2005) 
found significantly less Stroop interference in highs rather than lows.  On a related task Iani 
et al (2006) found that highs and lows without an induction were not detectably different in 
terms of the effect of irrelevant flanking items on the classification of a central letter. While 
procedural differences (e.g. responses given as button presses vs. vocalization) may account 
for the different results, the pattern allows only nuanced claims about attention and 
hypnotisability. A component of attention is the ability to inhibit irrelevant information. On 
a negative priming task, in which subjects are instructed to attend to some stimuli and 
ignore others, Dienes et al (2009) found with 180 subjects the correlations between 
hypnotisability and negative priming or between hypnotisability and latent inhibition were 
close to zero, with upper limits of about 0.20. Similarly, Varga et al (2011) with 116 
subjects found no significant correlations between hypnotisability and reaction time 
measures of sustained, selective, divided or executive attention. In sum, the consistent 
findings that expert meditators are superior to novices in attention are not in general 
matched by evidence for highly hypnotisables being better at attention tasks than lows. 
While highs do not seem especially good at attentional tasks when asked to simply 
perform them, when they are given a relevant strategy, they can outperform lows whether 
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or not they had been given a hypnotic induction (Raz et al, 2006). Specifically, when highs 
are given the suggestion that words will appear to them as meaningless, the Stroop effect 
can be substantially reduced (e.g. Parris, Dienes, and Hodgson, in press; Raz et al 2002; 
Raz et al 2003; see also Iani et al 2006). Similarly, Iani, Ricci Baroni and Rubichi (2009) 
found that hypnotic suggestion reduced interference from irrelevant spatial stimuli in highs, 
but not lows in a Simon-like (spatial interference) task. The suggestion that reduces the 
Stroop effect has been shown to be just as effective whether or not a hypnotic induction is 
given (Raz et al 2006; contrast Iani et al 2006), so appears not to depend on being in a 
special state, but on having a certain ability. The effect appears non-existent to weak in 
lows (Parris and Dienes, submitted; Raz and Campbell 2011). Thus, paradoxically, asking 
highs to be less mindful (i.e. to act hypnotically) enables them to perform better on the 
same attention tasks (Stroop) that meditators appear to improve upon by meditation 
training. We do not have a resolution to the paradox that both being more mindful 
(meditation) and less mindful (hypnosis) improves Stroop, but it is a problem on which we 
are currently working. 
In terms of what happens to attentional ability after a hypnotic induction, Gruzelier 
and Warren (1993) found that highs performed worse on letter fluency (particularly 
associated with activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; DLPFC) and finger tapping 
dexterity but improved on design fluency (a measure of planning and cognitive flexibility) 
following a hypnotic induction. The reduction in performance on the letter fluency task was 
replicated by Kallio et al (2001) and Wagstaff, Cole and Brunas-Wagstaff (2007). 
However, Wagstaff et al also found that subjects who reported greater hypnotic depth 
(strongly correlated with hypnotic suggestibility) demonstrated better performance on a 
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phonemic fluency test during hypnosis than during the non-hypnotic condition.  Egner et al 
(2005) found evidence using neuroimaging techniques that there is a dissociation of frontal 
executive and conflict monitoring systems. They used EEG to examine functional 
connectivity and event-related fMRI to image highs and lows while they performed on a 
task measuring attentional conflict resolution (the Stroop task) following a hypnotic 
induction.  There was an increase in gamma band coherence (associated with concerted 
attentional focus) in lows and a decrease in highs, along with an increase in ACC 
activation, consistent with poorer efficiency of conflict monitoring in highs (although no 
difference in Stroop performance was observed).  The (albeit checkered) evidence for a 
general reduction in attentional functioning after hypnotic induction contrasts to claims 
about meditation (though little research has tested people in versus out of a “meditative 
state”). It may be that the act of producing feelings of an altered state takes up capacity, and 
thus leaves less capacity for other tasks. 
One interesting marker of attention to task is activity in the default mode network 
(DMN). The DMN is associated with mind-wandering and self-referential thought and 
reduced activation is usually seen when focusing or paying attention during goal-directed 
and externally oriented tasks (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith and Schooler 2009; 
Uddin, Kelly, Biswal, Xavier Castellanos, and Milham, 2009). Further, activity tends to be 
lower during high rather than low cognitive load (Uddin et al, 2009).  Consistent with the 
claim that an induction encourages highs to pay attention to the hypnotist and/or specific 
strategies, McGeown et al (2009) found activity in the anterior DMN (ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex and DLPFC) was reduced following hypnotic induction during rest 
periods between suggestions in highs. Lows, on the other hand, showed reduced activity in 
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areas related to alertness, probably in response to the relaxation induction used.  Deeley et 
al (2012) conducted a similar study, scanning subjects during passive viewing condition, 
however no suggestions were provided. Reduced activity was seen in the DMN and anterior 
cingulate cortex and increased activity in prefrontal attentional systems after hypnotic 
induction, compared to pre-induction. Furthermore, subjects reported greater levels of self-
reported attentional absorption, which was inversely related to activity in the DMN. The 
results of McGeown et al and Deeley et al support the notion that an induction informs 
subjects to pay attention to whatever strategies are needed to maintain a feeling of being 
hypnotised.    
A number of studies have also shown decreased activation in the DMN in 
meditators during concentration (FA), mettā bhavana (loving kindness) and choiceless 
awareness (OM) meditation, compared to non-meditators (Brewer et al, 2011). This may 
reflect high cognitive load in these styles of meditation. In support of this conjecture, 
another study that investigated activity in the DMN in meditators doing a different type of 
meditation gained the opposite results: greater activation in mid frontal brain regions 
overlapping the DMN during meditation practice (Travis et al, 2009).  Subjects were 
performing transcendental meditation (TM), which is reported to be a simple, easy and non-
demanding task. Thus, work on DMN activity has shown that hypnosis and meditation 
generally involve acts of paying attention, but this is consistent with meditation, which is 
explicitly associated with mental training, involving especially good attentional abilities 
and hypnotic responsiveness requiring only average attentional abilities.  
In sum, both hypnosis and meditation involve paying attention, but whereas 
experienced meditators have better attentional skills than novices, hypnotisability appears 
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unrelated to attentional skill, and the induction of a hypnotic state may even be associated 
with impoverished attentional skills (though contrast Iani et al, 2006).  
Meta-awareness and the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex  
A fundamental difference between hypnotic suggestion and meditation is that 
hypnosis often involves an altered or distorted experience of reality. The purpose of 
meditation for long-term practitioners, on the other hand, is to stimulate change and 
development towards seeing reality more clearly (Kamalashila, 1992), partly by developing 
meta-awareness, or accurate higher order thoughts (HOTs).  
Accurate HOTs, i.e. awareness of mental states, has been linked to the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Lau and Passingham, 2006).  Lau and Passingham found two 
masking conditions in which people could discriminate one of two shapes to an equal 
degree but differed in the extent to which they were aware of seeing the shapes rather than 
just guessing about them. That is, the DLPFC was not linked to the first order mental state 
of seeing, but to awareness of seeing.  Further, when Rounis et al (2010) disrupted the area 
with theta burst TMS, subjects’ self-reported awareness of seeing was disrupted even when 
first order perception was titrated to be the same with and without TMS. That is, the 
disruption Rounis et al found was purely related to HOTs.  We might expect to see 
differences between highly hypnotisables and meditators in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC). Specifically, we might expect less activation in highs and greater 
activation in meditators. 
If the DLPFC is responsible for accurate higher order thoughts in general, 
disrupting the region with rTMS or alcohol should make it harder to be aware of intending 
to perform an action. Given that people who are highly hypnotisable seem to have less 
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accurate HOTs, disrupting the function of the DLPFC should make it easier to subjectively 
respond to a hypnotic suggestion (according to cold control theory)
3
.  
Dienes and Hutton (submitted) tested this with TMS. Subjects gave ratings on a 0-5 
scale of the extent to which they experienced the response, for four suggestions (magnetic 
hands, arm levitation, rigid arm and taste hallucination). Overall, rTMS to the DLPFC 
rather than vertex increased the degree of hypnotic response by about a third of a rating 
point on average. Further, subjects did not differ in their expectancy that they would 
respond in the two conditions, so the rTMS had an effect on hypnotic experience above and 
beyond expectancies. A further study conceptually replicated the effect, but this time using 
alcohol, which has been shown to particularly affect the DLPFC (Wendt and Risberg, 
2001). We recently explored the effect of alcohol on hypnotic response with Theodora 
Duka at Sussex University. Medium hypnotisables were assigned to either an alcohol or 
placebo alcohol condition and were then tested on nine suggestions and various frontal 
tasks. Alcohol indeed disrupted frontal function and crucially, alcohol increased hypnotic 
response by one scale unit compared to placebo, on the same scale as used in the TMS 
study. Although both the TMS and alcohol would have affected regions of the brain outside 
the DLPFC, the evidence is consistent with cold control, hypnosis as self-deception. The 
evidence is also consistent with other theories that postulate hypnosis involves diminished 
executive control (Woody and Bowers, 1994) or metacognitive control (Jamieson and 
Woody, 2007). Either way, the increase of hypnotisability following disruption of the 
                                                          
3
  Cold control theory makes a more precise set of predictions. Namely, if the frontal lobes are impaired 
sufficiently that the relevant cognitive or motor action cannot be performed with conscious intentions then the 
same action cannot be performed as a hypnotic suggestion (Dienes and Perner, 2007). However, if the 
impairment allows the relevant actions to be performed, but is targeted to impair HOT accuracy, then 
hypnotic performance will be facilitated. Thus far at least, in making these predictions, cold control theory has 
remained one step ahead of the data. 
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dlPFC supports the distinction between hypnosis and meditation, during which increased 
activation is seen in the DLPFC. 
In contrast to findings in the hypnosis literature, several studies have shown 
increased activation in the DLPFC, among other areas, in meditation practitioners during 
and after meditation practice (Brewer et al, 2011; Farb et al, 2007; Kosaza et al, 2008; 
Lazar, 2009). For example, Brefczynski-Lewis et al (2007) used fMRI to compare 
experienced and novice meditators and found greater activation in the DLPFC. 
Concordantly, it has been claimed that meditators are better at giving self-reports than non-
meditators (Kabat-Zinn, 2011). In sum, the differential activation seen in the DLPFC 
during meditation and hypnosis seems to support the suggestion that hypnosis and 
meditation differ in metacognitive capabilities subserved by the DLPFC (Dienes, 2012; 
Woody and Sadler, 2008).  
 
Meditation is Hotter than Hypnosis 
One apparent similarity between hypnosis and meditation is that both seem to 
involve absorption. Like high versus low hypnotisables, expert versus novice meditators 
score more highly on absorption as measured by the Tellegen absorption scale (TAS) 
(Davidson, 1976). We have since replicated this finding in our lab at Sussex University (in 
an as yet unpublished study), and found that absorption also correlated positively with self-
reported mindfulness as measured by the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills 
(KIMS; Baer, Smith and Allen, 2004). Although the phenomenological states of hypnosis 
and meditative absorptions (dhyanas in Sanskrit) appear to be similar in some respects 
(Holroyd, 2003), the feeling of absorption involved in both hypnotic and meditative states 
may reflect different processes, as we now discuss.  
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Although absorption and hypnosis appear to be related, we need to take care in our 
understanding of what precisely absorption is (particularly as some of the items in the 
Tellegen Absorption Scale appear to lack face validity; see Council, Kirsch & Hafner, 
1986). The subjective sense of being absorbed could represent four distinct modes of 
mental processing. Firstly, one could be mind- wandering without being aware that one was 
doing so, thus one could believe one was or had been absorbed in the main task (cf 
Schooler, 2006). Particularly when engaging in open-ended imaginative activity, such mind 
wandering may not show in any obvious way, and indeed may blend with the imaginative 
activity itself. Secondly, there could be thoughts distracting the mind, but there is meta-
awareness of this distraction, allowing disengagement from the distraction to take place.  
Thirdly, irrelevant thoughts may be present, but attention is neither attached to nor averted 
from them; the mind is not distracted. Finally, one could actually be single-mindedly or 
one-pointedly thinking about the object of thought (see Taylor, 2002). The first state of 
absorption is only apparent absorption; it appears to be absorption because of a lack of 
accurate HOTs (call it cold absorption)   In meditation, one aims to progress through these 
states, becoming aware of the mental chatter that usually pervades our minds, letting go of 
thoughts and entering the dhyanas (absorptions, in which one becomes aware of more 
subtle thoughts and sensations; see Austin, 2006 and Holroyd, 2003 for more in-depth 
description). Meditation and mindfulness practice involve training in the development of 
second-order awareness (Teasdale, 1999; Wallace 1999). This could be described as a state 
of absorption that involves meta-awareness (Lutz, Dunne and Davidson, 2007) and is a goal 
state of meditation. We could call meditative absorption ‘HOT’ absorption (absorption with 
HOTs), reflecting a state of absorbed attention in which one remains meta-aware of the 
contents of one’s consciousness as opposed, possibly, to hypnotic absorption: ‘cold’ 
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absorption (absorption without HOTs), in which one has less meta-awareness of the 
contents of one’s consciousness and thus may more easily create inaccurate HOTs about 
their experience. 
We have tested the hypothesis that highs have fewer accurate HOTs than meditators 
and controls at Sussex by asking subjects to keep looking at images while trying to either a) 
remain at all times aware of seeing the image (meditation task; cf. Van Nuys, 1973) or b) 
not consciously see the image for 15 minutes (ignore task; compare Wegner’s, 1994, ‘white 
bear’ ironic control task, where people are asked to not think of a white bear). Subjects 
were asked at random intervals (roughly once a minute) whether they were just that instant 
before aware of seeing the image. Because people remained physically looking at the 
images there was a persistent first order visual representation of each image; but to what 
extent did people have accurate higher order thoughts about seeing it? The difference 
between a) and b) in reports of seeing the image was taken as measuring control in having 
accurate HOTs, and the total number of reports of seeing the image in both a) and b) as 
measuring coupling of HOTs to first order states, i.e. the tendency to have an appropriate 
HOT given that a first order state exists. We found that highs had poorer HOT coupling 
than lows, i.e. less accurate higher order thoughts across both tasks (Dienes, 2012, and 
Semmens-Wheeler and Dienes, 2011). This greater propensity to mind-wander meant highs 
were marginally better at ironic control than lows (and non-significantly worse at 
meditation). This apparent weak coupling may allow highs to decide in appropriate 
contexts to forgo higher order thoughts of intending in order to respond hypnotically to 
suggestions. In contrast, we found that meditators were poor at ironic control compared to 
highs, a finding which could be explained by the fact that they had significantly more 
HOTs than both lows and highs. (It is intriguing to find meditators bad at a mental control 
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task!)  Thus it seems unlikely that meditators would experience hypnotic suggestion 
through a lack of HOT coupling and we might even expect that they would not be very 
hypnotisable.  
Consistent with the evidence that highs are not absorbed in an undistracted way, 
hypnotic responding itself does not require attending “one-pointedly” to one idea. 
Zamansky and Clark (1986) asked subjects to engage in imagery inconsistent with the 
hypnotic suggestions given (e.g. for a rigid arm suggestion, to imagine a different world in 
which their arm is bending). Highs were just as responsive to suggestions (e.g. that the arm 
is unbendable) when engaged in imagery inconsistent with the suggestion as when having 
consistent imagery, even as they concurrently reported the imagery. That is, their arm 
remains unbent, even as the subjects described an image of the arm bending. Thus, the 
theory that highs attend to one idea in order to achieve hypnotic response is false. Hypnotic 
response will tolerate not only mind wandering but also contradictory ideas. By contrast, 
the absorption in meditation can be specifically directed at making the mind hold to one 
idea without distraction. 
Shaw (2006 p 98), based on the descriptions of meditation in the Pali cannon, 
describes how the meditator gradually acquires the feeling of control of entering, sustaining 
and leaving absorbed states -  in contrast to the lack  of control a hypnotised subject may 
feel (indeed, needs to feel in some way for a response to be hypnotic). In a related way, 
Gombrich (1996 p 163) emphasizes the self-control and self-awareness cultivated in 
Buddhism as an antithesis to spirit possession. Dienes and Perner (2007) identified spirit 
possession as the same natural kind as hypnosis (i.e. as a case of cold control).  
Mindfulness versus self-deception are general principles defining the nature of 
meditation and hypnosis in broad brush stroke; of course specific hypnotic and meditative 
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experiences may draw on the other in detail. For example, vajrayana meditation (Gyatso, 
2005) involves coming to see imagination as reality, but this does not take away from the 
fact that meditation must involve cultivation of mindfulness generally to be Buddhist 
meditation at all (even such cultivation will always leave scope for inaccurate higher order 
thoughts; cf Shaw, 2006, p 66, points 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 for mistaken beliefs the Buddha 
apparently had about his mental states, e.g. recalling past lives.
4
). Just as an episode in a 
hypnotic context may involve some cognitive activities being consciously controlled in a 
mindful way (Dienes, 2012; Yapko, 2011) so meditation may involve inaccurate higher 
order thoughts. Nonetheless, if a person were aware and mindful of all intentions they 
would have failed to respond hypnotically; and a meditator misrepresenting a mental state 
would have failed to be mindful. Where each succeeds in its goals, meditation is hotter than 
hypnosis. 
 
Directly comparing meditation and hypnosis? 
 So far we have compared meditation and hypnosis indirectly. We will now consider 
directly the relationship between meditation and hypnosis. First we consider the correlation 
between success at meditating and responding to hypnosis, then whether training can 
improve meditation and hypnosis, and finally the hypnotisability of people who meditate 
extensively.  
                                                          
4
 Accurate higher order thoughts depend as much on having a good theory of mental states as on cultivating 
the process of noticing mental states -  just as accurate observation of the world depends crucially on good 
theory (consider telescopes) (cf Hurlburt and Schitzgebel, 2007, and Petitmengin, 2009, for a discussion of 
the capabilities and limits of introspection). In Bayesian terms, accurate beliefs about one’s mental states 
are improved by having good priors. Because of this, empirical results from experimental psychology may 
inform good meditation practice (and vice versa). 
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Van Nuys (1974; also Spanos, Rivers, and Gottlieb, 1978) found that performance 
on a meditation task significantly predicted hypnotisability. Subjects carried out a 
meditation task, which involved subjects pressing a button whenever they experienced an 
intruding thought. (Note that subjects were not probed, but were asked to report whenever 
they noticed thoughts, i.e. when they had a HOT.)  Based on our discussion with hot and 
cold absorption (i.e. absorbed attention with and without meta-awareness, respectively), 
there is an obvious methodological problem with the Van Nuys task. The task may not have 
really been measuring the number of intrusive thoughts, but the awareness of such thoughts 
arising.  Thus, another way of interpreting the results could be to say that it was the lack of 
awareness of intrusive thoughts i.e. a lack of meta-awareness that predicted hypnotisability 
(see Smallwood and Schooler, 2006 for description of meta-awareness and mind 
wandering). On this account highs may even have more intrusive thoughts than lows (as 
found by Bryant and Idey, 2001, on a self-report questionnaire).  When we determined on-
line number of intrusive thoughts by probes, as described above (Dienes, 2012, and 
Semmens-Wheeler and Dienes, 2011), allowing the measure of intrusive thoughts to be 
separated from meta-awareness (as per the methodology of Smallwood and Schooler, 
2006), hypnotisability was not associated with concentration on the task in our data 
(hypnotisability was non-significantly associated with more intrusions, r = .21, 95% CI [-
.09, .51], the confidence interval ruling out the size of effect Van Nuys obtained, i.e.  r 
about -.3)  
 Without training, hypnotic suggestibility is relatively stable, with test-retest 
correlations ranging from 0.64 to 0.82 (Barnier and McConkey, 2004). So far a number of 
attempts have been made to enhance subjects’ hypnotic suggestibility, with some success 
(e.g. Cooper, Banford, Schubot, and Tart, 1967; Diamond, 1972; Engstrom, Perry and Hart, 
39 
 
1970). Apparently successful attempts have involved changing subjects’ beliefs, 
expectations and attitudes to hypnosis in a single session (e.g. the Carleton Skills Training 
Package, see Gorassini, 2004; see also Wickless and Kirsch, 1989, and contrast Benham, 
Bowers, Nash, and Muenchen, 1998). These training schemes contrast dramatically with 
the extensive attentional training required to make progress in meditation. Brief meditation 
training has not yet been found to increase hypnotic ability (e.g. Heide, Wadlington and 
Lundy, 1980).   
What is the effect of extensive meditation training on hypnotic response? We 
compared scores of twelve expert meditators on the Waterloo Stanford Group Scale of 
Hypnotic Susceptibility (WGSC; Bowers, 1998) with scores of over 500 screened subjects 
in the University of Sussex database; our preliminary findings show that meditators, 
passing on average 3/12 suggestions, were less susceptible than the average of  all subjects 
in the database combined (average 5.5 suggestions). Furthermore, in an as yet unpublished 
study at Sussex we found that highly hypnotically suggestible individuals (‘highs’) scored 
significantly lower on measures of mindfulness, which is associated with meditation 
experience (Semmens-Wheeler and Erskine, 2009). The correlation between hypnotisability 
and mindfulness was -.38.  The tendency for meditators for be less hypnotisable than non-
meditators may reflect poor attitudes and low expectations on the part of meditators about 
hypnosis; we are directly testing this possibility now. We predict that meditators will score 
low on hypnotisability even after controlling for beliefs and expectations, precisely because 
they have cultivated having accurate higher order thoughts. 
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Conclusion 
There are certainly some areas of overlap between meditation and hypnosis, yet this 
relationship may turn out to be orthogonal or opposed, particularly with regard to meta-
awareness. We have argued that the essential nature of hypnotic response, that which 
makes it hypnotic at all, is a strategic self-deception with respect to ones intentions (Dienes, 
2012; Hilgard, 1977; Spanos, 1986; Spanos and Gorassini, 1999); by contrast, an essential 
component of meditative practice is mindfulness, seeing plainly what is there. However, it 
is important to take into account response expectancy both theoretically and 
methodologically, as it can explain some effects in both meditation and hypnosis. For 
example, if one expects that either meditation or hypnosis will impair or enhance 
performance on a particular task, then one is likely to conform to to this belief (Kirsch, 
1997). In clinical practice, techniques called hypnotic or mindful may overlap (Lynn, Das, 
Hallquist, and Williams, 2006), but we need to be careful which specific activities we call 
hypnotic. Just calling relaxation or the use of imagination or a suggestion for improvement 
‘hypnotic’ does not make it so. As we said in the introduction, to turn cognitive activities 
into hypnotic responses, those activities must involve distortion in the sense of 
voluntariness or reality. Further, similar clinical outcomes may be produced by opposite 
strategies, for example, analgesia may be produced by seeing pain for exactly what the 
experience is (Salomons and Kucyi, 2011), or by using cognitive strategies of distraction 
and reinterpretation (strategies one intended without knowing, Dienes, 2012). As urged by 
Lynn et al and Yapko (2011), research exploring whether hypnosis and mindfulness are 
useful as complimentary integrated clinical strategies is important. Future studies could 
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explore metacognition and cognitive flexibility (e.g. cognitive set-shifting ability) in 
meditators and high hypnotisables and also provide more in-depth analysis of 
phenomenological experience (Pekala, 1982, 1991).  
 
Box 1. Meditation Styles 
The different meditation styles can be categorized as: ‘focused attention’ (FA); ‘open 
monitoring’ (OM) and non-referential compassion meditation.  These different meditation 
styles have overlapping effects, but do recruit different regions of the brain (Lutz et al, 
2007). FA meditation tends to be practised in stages beginning with breath counting and 
progressing to focus on the point of entry of the breath into the body, for example. OM 
meditation, also known as ‘open presence’ or ‘just sitting’ emphasizes the development of 
meta-awareness, where there is no such thing as distraction but all experience is part of the 
meditation and the goal is to neither avert nor attach one’s mind to any experience in 
particular but to become more familiar with one’s mental tendencies and habits. The third 
style is referred to by Lutz et al as ‘non referential compassion’. However, this is a narrow 
term for what is a set of meditations called the ‘Brahma viharas’ (Sanskrit for ‘divine 
abodes’), which essentially aim to develop greater awareness of emotions and to cultivate 
an attitude of mettā (loving-kindness); karuna (compassion); mudita (sympathetic joy) and 
upekha (equanimity).  
Visualization practices are also used to cultivate desired qualities and fall partially 
into the category of FA meditation, yet they go beyond concentration on a simple object. 
This is commonly done through use of sādhana, which is meditation on a text describing 
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various features (shape, insignia, colour and other attributes) of a Buddha (enlightened 
being) or Bodhisattva (a person who is on the brink of enlightenment but who holds back 
out of compassion for all beings). The aim of sādhana practice is to create single-pointed, 
undistracted focus of the mind on the qualities of this being in order to cultivate them in 
oneself (Sangharakshita, 2001).  
 Other practices involve using what are known as supports to concentration 
(kammathanas), which include the four brahma-viharas, meditation on the decomposition 
of a corpse and the Ten Impurities (various disgusting aspects of bodily experience). These 
practices are designed not only to develop one-pointed concentration, but also to relinquish 
attachment to the body by realizing its transitory, impermanent nature (Sangharakshita, 
2001) and by breaking down the illusion of separate selfhood, with the aim of promoting 
greater compassion and non-attachment. 
 
Box 2. Metacognition 
Metacognition is most broadly construed as cognition about cognition and 
encompasses monitoring and control processes (see Beran et al, 2012, for an overview of 
current debates). Nelson and Narens (1990) described a conceptual framework that has 
been influential for thinking about metacognition. Cognitive processes can be divided into 
object-level and meta-level. Object-level processes are basic cognitive processes such as 
perception, encoding or retrieval. Meta-processes monitor object-level processes and 
control them. For example, when given a memory task, a “feeling of knowing” is a type of 
metacognitive monitoring that may lead to initiating search processes (metacognitive 
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control). Metacognitive monitoring is constituted both by non-conceptual affective signals, 
such as feelings of knowing (consider ‘tip of the tongue’ states), as well as by conceptual 
theories concerning how one’s mind works (cf Koriat, 2007).    
Meditation can be seen as a process of cultivating both metacognitive monitoring 
and control (e.g. sustaining attention, eliminating certain sorts of thoughts). Teasdale 
(1999) distinguished between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive insight. For 
example, we may “know” that we are one day going to die and we will cease to have a 
point of view (metacognitive knowledge) yet we probably do not have a felt sense of this 
fact (metacognitive insight). One of the aims of meditation is to increase metacognitive 
insight so that one begins more and more to experience thoughts as just thoughts rather than 
thinking about them as facts that accurately reflect reality.  This should, in theory, allow 
one to have a more veridical experience of the world through overcoming the delusion of 
thoughts as facts. For example, a thought that one is a failure and worthless could have an 
associated metacognitive insight that this belief is not factual. This is precisely how 
mindfulness meditation is used to help individuals overcome depression.  
In the context of hypnosis, many theories of hypnosis can be construed as 
metacognitive, that is, theories about the way object-level processes can be monitored and 
controlled by meta-level processes. For example in Hilgard’s (1977) neo-dissociation 
theory, both control and monitoring processes were important in a uniquely hypnotic way, 
with either control or monitoring fractionated (see also Woody and Sadler, 2008). 
Similarly, Spanos’ (1986) sociocognitive theory construed hypnosis as an error in 
monitoring (attributing the causes of our actions to hypnosis rather than our intentions) (cf 
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Lynn et al 2008). Similarly, cold control theory pinpoints hypnotic response as caused by a 
specific metacognitive process: Thinking one does not have an intention when one does. 
Box 3. Higher order thoughts  
According to HOT theory, a mental state is a conscious mental state when we are 
conscious of being in that mental state (Rosenthal, 1986, 2002).  To be conscious of 
anything being present, for example, a ball in front of you, you need to be in a mental state 
representing that “there is a ball in front of me”. To be conscious of seeing a ball in front of 
you, therefore you need to be in a mental state representing “I see a ball in front of me”. 
That is, you need to be in a mental state about a mental state: A higher order state. The 
thought asserting that “I am seeing a ball in front of me” is a higher order thought. Seeing 
“there is a ball in front of me” is a first order state: Its content is just about the world. It is 
only by virtue of a second order thought such as thinking “I see that there is a ball in front 
of me” that we are conscious of the first order mental state of seeing and seeing then 
becomes a conscious mental state.  
 A second order thought becomes conscious by virtue of a third order thought; for 
example, it is by thinking “I am aware that I am seeing that there is a ball in front of me” 
that one becomes consciously aware of seeing the ball. With second order thoughts we 
become conscious of mental states; with third order thoughts we become consciously 
aware, i.e. we introspect (Rosenthal, 2002).  
Higher order thoughts are metacognitive in that they monitor other mental states. In 
fact higher order thought theory provides one way of defining what “meta” and “object” 
level mean. Object-level processes are cognitive processes whose content is just about the 
world. Meta-level processes must have content which is at least partly about mental states. 
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Higher order thoughts are particular metacognitions, namely, thoughts asserting that one is 
in a contemporaneous mental state. 
Box 4. Cold control theory 
 Cold control theory (Dienes and Perner, 2007) explains hypnotic responding as 
executive control (e.g. intending to perform a motor or cognitive action, e.g. lifting an arm, 
imagining something present) while having inaccurate higher order thoughts of intending 
(“I am not intending to lift my arm/imagine a pink elephant”). On this account, a person has 
no first order abilities in responding to a hypnotic suggestion that they did not have already. 
The difference between a hypnotic and non-hypnotic action is that performing the action 
hypnotically makes it feel like it is happening by itself. For example, an intention to lift 
one’s arm is usually accompanied by a higher order thought, e.g. “I am intending to lift my 
arm,” but this is not the case in hypnosis, according to cold control theory. (It is cold 
control because there is no accurate HOT.) 
 While cold control theory sees hypnosis as intrinsically involving self-deception, 
such self-deception can be benign or even useful. Hypnosis involves creating illusions of 
reality or automaticity according to situational requirements; that is, hypnotic responding is 
“goal directed striving” (White, 1941), where the hypnotic response is consistent with the 
overall goals and intentions of the subject. Thus, hypnosis is like a metacognitive game: A 
meta-cognitive strategy of relinquishing metacognition (specifically accurate metacognition 
concerning a specific intention) in order to have the experiences a situation calls for (e.g. 
pain going away by itself as one imagines a dial being turned; being possessed by a great 
spirit) (Dienes, 2012). Our contrast of hypnosis with meditation is not to deny the potential 
usefulness of hypnosis. 
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Abstract 
One approach to hypnosis suggests that for hypnotic experience to occur frontal lobe 
activity must be attenuated. For example, cold control theory posits that a lack of awareness 
of intentions is responsible for the experience of involuntariness and/or the subjective 
reality of hypnotic suggestions. The mid-dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex and the ACC are 
candidate regions for such awareness. Alcohol impairs frontal lobe executive function. This 
study examined whether alcohol affects hypnotisability. 
We administered 0.8mg/kg of alcohol or a placebo to thirty-two medium susceptible 
participants. They were subsequently hypnotised and given hypnotic suggestions.  
All participants believed they had received some alcohol. Participants in the alcohol 
condition were more susceptible to hypnotic suggestions than participants in the placebo 
condition.  
Impaired frontal lobe activity facilitates hypnotic responding, which supports theories 
postulating that attenuation of executive function facilitates hypnotic response, and 
contradicts theories postulating that hypnotic response involves enhanced inhibitory, 
attentional or other executive function.  
Key words: Cold control theory, Hypnosis, Higher order thought theory, Dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, Alcohol 
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1. Introduction 
Hypnotic suggestions give rise to a wide range of interesting experiences and 
behaviours.    Typically these involve a sense of involuntariness, such as in the case of 
one’s arm apparently rising by itself. Alternatively they may comprise the experience of an 
entirely convincing yet fabricated subjective reality, such as the experience of a mosquito 
on one’s hand (e.g. McConkey, 2008). There may be different underlying mechanisms and 
thus contributing factors involved in different types of hypnotic suggestions, and 
individuals may create the experience in different ways (e.g. see Barnier & Woody, 2008; 
Terhune, Cardeña and Lindgren, 2011). As such, a number of theories have been developed 
in an attempt to explain hypnotic phenomena.  Hypnosis can be construed either as a 
special state or as a way of responding to suggestions (Kirsch et al, 2011).  In terms of the 
latter, hypnotic responding is a way of responding in which the sense of volition or reality 
has been deliberately distorted (whether or not one is in a special state). In terms of the 
former, it is a state that may facilitate such responding. 
Although several studies have examined the effects of drugs, including cannabis, 
psilocybin, diazepam and nitrous oxide on hypnotisability (Kelly, Fisher and Kelly, 1978; 
Sjoberg and Hollister, 1965; Whalley and Brooks, 2009), surprisingly none has yet 
investigated the relationship of alcohol to hypnotic suggestibility. Yet, as we now describe, 
theories of hypnosis often postulate a role of the frontal lobes in hypnotic responding, and 
alcohol primarily disrupts frontal lobe functioning. 
A number of theories have emphasised the role of the frontal cortex and associated 
executive functions, such as attention. One broad approach posits that hypnotic phenomena 
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arise from a state of hypofrontality (see Dietrich, 2003) and diminished executive functions 
such as attention.  For example, Woody and Bowers (1994) postulate that hypnotic 
induction leads to impairment of executive functions, causing actions to be controlled by 
contention scheduling (i.e. habit). Woody and Sadler (2008) review a number of ways in 
which executive control mechanisms may be disrupted in order to produce hypnotic 
response. Similarly, Gruzelier (1998, 2006) has proposed that hypnosis results from a state 
of frontal lobe exhaustion and diminished attentional abilities resulting from extreme 
concentration during hypnotic induction. Gruzelier and Warren (1993), Kallio, Revonsuo, 
Hamalainen, and Markela (2001), and Farvolden and Woody (2004), found that hypnotic 
induction reduced letter fluency in high rather than low hypnotisables, although similar 
effects were not detected on other frontal tasks. Thus, responding hypnotically may involve 
a specific form of hypofrontality.   If these theories are true then alcohol should increase 
hypnotic responding.  
Other theories would predict that the alcohol-induced frontal lobe impairment 
would reduce hypnotic responsiveness. The theories of both Spanos (e.g. 1986) and Hilgard 
(e.g. 1986) rely on the functioning of the frontal lobes for hypnotic response to be achieved. 
Spanos (e.g. Bertrand and Spanos, 1985; Spanos et al, 1982) has demonstrated that 
hypnotic behaviour can involve overcoming pre-potent responses, which necessarily 
involves executive functioning. Hilgard’s theory relies upon two intact but dissociated 
executive functions. In fact, Hilgard (1986) argued that maintaining the two dissociated 
streams itself took executive capacity, because the hypnotic rather than non-hypnotic 
performance of one of two simultaneous tasks involved more dual task interference (see 
also Wyzenbeek and Bryant, 2011; Tobis and Kihlstrom, 2010).  Similarly Crawford, 
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Knebel, and Vendemia (1998) argue that frontal lobe executive functions are required for 
hypnotic analgesia. Therefore, since alcohol impairs executive function, alcohol should 
decrease hypnotic susceptibility by these approaches.  
 A more recent theory has highlighted the role of metacognition in hypnosis. The 
cold control theory of hypnosis (Dienes, 2012; Dienes and Perner, 2007; also see Barnier et 
al, 2008) explains hypnotic phenomena as the result of a strategic lack of awareness of the 
intention to perform a particular action. In other words, to respond hypnotically, the subject 
performs an action while thinking that they were not intending to perform that action: 
hypnosis essentially involves the lack of accurate higher order thoughts (HOTs) of 
intending. (Hence ‘cold control’: intentional control without HOTs.) Take, for example, the 
hypnotic suggestion that one’s arm is stiff and rigid as if splinted, so that it cannot bend. In 
order to perform the suggestion successfully, the subject might intend to contract the 
antagonistic muscles of the arm simultaneously to prevent it from bending. The hypnotic 
aspect is the experience of involuntariness, and cold control posits that this occurs by way 
of avoiding HOTs of intending, which thus lead to the inaccurate HOT, “my arm has 
become stiff and rigid by itself and I cannot bend it.” Similarly, suggestions for analgesia or 
amnesia may involve distraction away from pain or the to-be-forgotten material. However, 
the hypnotic component is the ability to deceive oneself about having intended to do so; 
that is, by cold control theory this is done by avoiding accurate HOTs of intending. Note 
that on this theory hypnotic experience does not involve any alteration in first-order 
abilities (i.e. abilities with the function of dealing only with the world), but is achieved 
purely metacognitively. Thus, according to cold control, impairment of frontal function 
would enhance hypnotic response in virtue of the role of the frontal lobes in metacognition.  
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Higher order thoughts of seeing have been linked to the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC). Lau and Passingham (2006) using fMRI found that the brain region that 
distinguished reports of “seeing” rather than of “guessing” for equivalent perceptual 
discrimination was the DLPFC; thus, the DLPFC was not linked to the first order mental 
state of seeing, but to awareness of seeing.   In another study, subjects’ self-reported 
awareness of seeing was disrupted when theta burst TMS was applied to the area, even 
when first order perception was held constant with and without TMS (Rounis et al, 2010). 
That is, the disruption found was purely related to HOTs, and not first order perception.  
Fleming, Weil, Nagy et al (2010) also found the individual differences in the accuracy of 
higher order thoughts about perceiving correlated with grey and white matter volume in the 
same region.  
The neural substrate of accurate higher order thoughts may well extend beyond the 
DLPFC. The monitoring and cognitive control functions of the anterior cingulate cortex 
(the ACC) make it a likely co-candidate region for the production of HOTs. Indeed, Woody 
and Szechtman (2011) found that in highly hypnotisable participants there were greater 
levels of activation in the ACC during auditory hallucination compared to imagination of 
the same sounds. That is, the ACC may be involved in determining whether internally 
generated sensory representations are just that – imagination – or else misrepresented as 
perceptions.   
Alcohol impairs both the DLPFC (Wendt and Risberg, 2001) and the ACC 
(Ridderinkhof et al, 2002). Consistent with the claim these areas are involved in accurate 
metacognitive awareness, Sayette, Reichle, and Schooler (2009) found that alcohol 
compared to placebo decreased people’s awareness that they were mind wandering. The 
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DLPFC and ACC not only have executive monitoring functions but also control functions. 
Thus, the effect of alcohol on these areas can also be shown by the effect of alcohol on 
tasks that test inhibition of pre-potent response (like the Stop Signal Task, SST; Fillimore 
and Weafer, 2004), or the ability to resist perseveration (like the letter fluency task; 
Peterson, Rothfleisch, Zelazo and Pihl, 1990). For example, Marinkovic et al (2012) 
reported reduced activation in ACC bilaterally during the incongruent condition on the 
colour Stroop task. Similarly, Gundersen et al (2008) observed decreased activation in ACC 
and cerebellum during a working memory task following alcohol consumption. With a 
different variant of a working memory task, Paulus et al (2006) found less activation in the 
DLPFC in participants who consumed alcohol rather than placebo.  
In sum, alcohol impairs control and monitoring functions subserved by the DLPFC 
and ACC. According to theories postulating that hypnosis involves disruptions in executive 
control mechanisms (e.g. Woody and Sadler, 2008), alcohol should increase hypnotic 
responsiveness. According to cold control theory, as alcohol impairs the areas responsible 
for metacognitive monitoring, alcohol should make it harder to have accurate higher order 
thoughts of intending, and thereby facilitate hypnotic response. On the other hand, theories 
that emphasize that hypnotic response involves extra executive capacity (e.g. Hilgard, 
1986) predict that alcohol should impair hypnotic responding. 
 It is well known that alcohol produces effects of an altered state of consciousness, 
i.e. drunkenness, and this may lead to increased expectations of hypnotic responding. 
Expectancy is a strong predictor of hypnotic response (Braffman and Kirsch, 1999), and 
indeed, according to response expectancy theory, is the final psychological mechanism by 
which hypnotic response is achieved (Kirsch, 1985). Theories that postulate some form of 
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diminished frontal lobe functioning, such as cold control theory, predict that the effect of 
alcohol on hypnotic susceptibility will be observed above and beyond any effects of 
response expectancy. 
The main aim of the study was to determine the effect of alcohol on hypnotic 
suggestibility, specifically measuring the central element to successful responding: the 
sensation that actions and experiences "happen by themselves". We administered real or 
placebo alcohol to medium susceptible participants before they received a series of 
hypnotic suggestions. (Note: although suggestions typical of susceptibility scales were 
used, no attempt was made to assess an individual's objective responsiveness, only the 
feeling of automaticity).  Participants rated how strongly they experienced each suggestion. 
As a manipulation check, the effect of the alcohol on frontal function was determined by 
the letter fluency task and stop signal task. Before responding to hypnotic suggestions, 
participants also rated how strongly they expected to respond in order to control expectancy 
effects. 
2. Methods 
2.1Participants 
Participants in this study were thirty-two undergraduate and postgraduate students aged 
between 18 and 39 years (M =22, SD = 5.62) recruited from the University of Sussex 
hypnosis screening database. Participants scored in the medium range (4-8 suggestions 
passed out of 12) on the Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form 
C (WSGC; Bowers, 1998).  Medium-susceptible participants were selected in order to 
allow for either an increase or a decrease in hypnotic suggestibility. If alcohol were to 
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decrease hypnotic suggestibility then we might see a floor effect in lows, and if it were to 
increase it, then we might see a ceiling effect in highs. For study inclusion, minimum 
alcohol consumption as assessed with the Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ; Mehrabian 
and Russell, 1978) of 10 units per week and maximum alcohol consumption of 40 units per 
week was defined. (One unit equals 8 g ethanol.) All participants were in good health, had a 
body mass index of between 18 and 28, and were not pregnant or breastfeeding. 
Participants included were not heavy smokers (>20 cigarettes per day) and were able to 
abstain from smoking for the duration of the test session. Volunteers with current 
symptoms of mental illness or neurological disease, a history of severe mental illness, drug 
or alcohol abuse or altered metabolism of alcohol (e.g. impaired liver function or 
gastroenteritis) were excluded from the study. Ethical approval was received from the 
University of Sussex ethical committee. Informed consent was obtained from each 
participant before commencing with the study. All thirty-two participants completed the 
study (12 males). Participants were remunerated with course credits or £5 per hour for their 
participation in the study.  
 
2.2 Design 
Participants were randomly allocated to an alcohol or placebo condition according to a 
double blind between-subjects design and administered either an alcohol or placebo 
beverage. Participants were told that they were to receive a high or low dose of alcohol. 
The drinks were prepared by a laboratory assistant and administered to the participants by 
the researcher, who was blind to whether or not alcohol or placebo was being administered.  
 
 
55 
 
2.3 Materials 
 
REY auditory verbal learning test (RAVLT)  
To assess whether the two groups differed in verbal learning and memory abilities, each 
participant completed the REY auditory verbal learning test (RAVLT; Rey, 1964), in which 
the experimenter read aloud 15 words at a rate of one per second.  Participants were 
required to wait two minutes and then recall as many words from the list as possible. 
 
Letter Fluency Task 
Participants were asked to produce as many words as possible starting with the letters F and 
S (in a counterbalanced order across conditions) within one minute. Proper nouns and 
variants of words already given counted as errors. This task was administered to assess the 
effects of alcohol on participants’ monitoring function, which is required in this task to 
avoid perseverations. It was scored by subtracting the score of the post-drink test from the 
score of the pre-drink test to establish that alcohol had impaired the frontal lobe functioning 
of participants in the alcohol compared to placebo condition. 
 
Drunkenness Scale and VASs for alcohol effects 
These scales were used to measure the participants’ subjective ratings on general feelings 
of drunkenness and more specific experiences. The drunkenness scale requires participants 
to indicate how drunk they feel on a scale from 1 (I feel no effect of alcohol) to 9 (So drunk 
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the room is spinning)
5
. The subjective effects visual analogue scales (VASs; Loeber and 
Duka, 2009) required participants to indicate the degree to which they experienced each of 
light-headedness, contentment, stimulation, pleasant glow, irritability, alertness and 
relaxation, by marking a corresponding line labeled from 1 (I feel no effect of alcohol) to 
10 (I feel a strong alcohol effect). 
 
Hypnotic suggestions 
A total of nine hypnotic suggestions were made to participants following the second word 
fluency task, approximately forty-five minutes after alcohol administration was finished
6
. 
The suggestions covered both motor and cognitive types, as well as direct and challenge 
types (Barnier & Woody, 2008). The suggestions were (in order delivered): that they had a 
sour taste in their mouth; that their outstretched hands were attracted to each other, making 
them move together (magnetic hands); to feel that their outstretched right arm was weighed 
down by holding an imaginary heavy object that they could not keep it up (heavy arm); that 
a mosquito had landed on their hand and was tickling it;  that their arm was so stiff and 
rigid that they could not bend it (rigid arm); to see two balls out of three placed in front of 
them (negative hallucination);  that their arm was so heavy they could not lift it (arm 
immobilisation); to forget everything that had happened since they were hypnotised until 
told that they could remember (post-hypnotic amnesia) and to feel a strong urge to move 
seats when a clipboard was handed to them.  
                                                          
5
 1,  Feel no effect of alcohol; 2, Feel the first effects of alcohol; 3, Slightly tipsy; 4, Feeling warm; 5,  a bit 
disinhibited; 6, Very merry; 7, Beginning to feel uncoordinated; 8, Very drunk; hard to focus properly; 9, So 
drunk the room is spinning and I feel sick.  
6
 Nine suggestions were used, rather than twelve, as in the WGSC (Bowers & Woody, 1993), in order that all 
suggestions were completed before the alcohol was metabolised and the blood alcohol level dropped. 
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Expectancy Ratings 
Explicit expectancy ratings were recorded using E-Prime 2.0. Before each hypnotic 
suggestion was made, participants were asked to report whether or not they expected to 
experience the suggestion. For example, “If you were given a hypnotic suggestion that your 
arm would feel so heavy that you would not be able to hold it up, do you expect that your 
arm would feel heavier than normal.” They responded by pressing ‘Y’ for yes and ‘N’ for 
no on a computer keyboard. They were then asked how confident they were about this 
expectancy (on a scale of 1 to 4
7
).Yes/no responses were combined with confidence ratings 
to give a directional “explicit expectancy” scale, ranging from -4 (indicating a strong 
expectancy not to respond to a suggestion) to +4 (indicating a strong expectancy that one 
would respond to the suggestion). Additionally, reaction times for yes/no responses were 
recorded and used as a measure of unconscious expectancy (when explicit ratings are 
partialled out). 
 
Subjective Hypnotic Response Ratings 
Following each suggestion, participants were asked to rate how strongly they experienced 
the suggestion (on a scale of 0 to 5). For example “On a scale from 0 to 5, how strongly did 
you feel your hand becoming heavy (where 0 means you felt your arm was no more heavy 
than normal and 5 means you felt your arm becoming heavy as though you had a heavy 
object in your hand, pulling it down.).  
                                                          
7  1. I am completely guessing, I have no idea whether I would or wouldn't 
2. I am more or less guessing, but I have some feeling I was right 
3. I am pretty sure I am right 
4. I am completely certain 
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Stop Signal Task (SST) 
The SST was administered at the end of the session to check that participants were still 
generally influenced by alcohol, as response inhibition tends to be impaired under alcohol’s 
influence (Loeber and Duka, 2009; Fillmore & Weafer, 2004). The SST, from the 
CANTAB (Cambridge Cognition, Cambridge, UK; http://www.camcog.com), assesses 
response inhibition performance. In each trial, an arrow (go-stimulus) was presented on the 
screen and the participant was required to press the left or the right button of a two-choice 
response box as quickly as possible to indicate if the arrow was either right-facing or left-
facing. In 25% of the trials, an auditory stop signal (a beep sound) was presented at a 
variable delay after the go-stimulus. The subject was instructed to withhold their motor 
response on presentation of the stop signal. Five blocks of 64 trials were presented.  The 
main variable was Stop Signal reaction time (SSRT) a measure of response inhibition 
(Robbins, 2007), which takes into account reaction time on go trials and is calculated from 
the length of time between the go stimulus and the stop stimulus when the participant is 
able to successfully inhibit his or her response in the latter 50% of trials. High SSRT 
indicates impaired inhibitory motor control. 
 
 
2.4 Procedure 
Participants were instructed not to drink alcohol for at least 12 hours before the start of the 
test session. On the day of testing zero blood alcohol concentration was ensured before the 
start of testing. Baseline breath alcohol concentration was measured using a breathalyser 
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(Lion Alcolmeter SD-400, Lion Laboratories LTD., UK) and participants completed the 
Subjective Effects visual analogue scale (VAS) and the drunkenness scale. The Rey 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT; Rey, 1964) and letter fluency task were 
administered to control for any pre-manipulation differences between the two groups.  
 Participants in the alcohol group were given an alcohol dose of 0.8g/kg. For a 70kg 
person this is equal to about 56g of pure alcohol. This is equivalent to approximately 2.5 
pints of lager or 5 glasses of wine (Weissenborn and Duka 2003). The alcohol beverage 
consisted of 90% v/v alcohol diluted with tonic water (Schweppes® Indian Tonic Water) to 
make up a drink of 500 ml which was mixed with Angostura Bitter® to mask the taste of 
the alcohol. The placebo beverage consisted of 500 ml tonic water and Angostura Bitter® 
only. Drinks were divided into 10 portions, and participants consumed the ten portions at 3 
min intervals in the presence of the experimenter. Participants were breathalysed fifteen 
minutes after alcohol consumption and then completed another set of the Subjective Effects 
Visual Analogue Scales (VAS; Loeber and Duka, (2009) and a 9 point drunkenness scale in 
order to obtain a subjective rating of how ‘drunk’ they felt. Participants were next given a 
brief hypnotic induction and nine suggestions. They were asked about their expectancy 
before each suggestion and subjective response after each suggestion. Following this they 
were breathalysed before completing the letter fluency task and finally the stop signal task. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 How blind were subjects to condition? 
Subjects were told at the end of the experiment that there had been two conditions: alcohol 
and placebo. Subjects were then asked if they thought they had received alcohol; 86% 
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thought they had. 73% of those in the placebo condition and 100% of those in the alcohol 
condition, χ²(1) = 5.8, p=.08). A t-test indicated that those who believed they had received 
alcohol rated their drunkenness higher (M=3.4, SD=2.1) than those who did not (M=0.25, 
SD=0.5), t(30)=2.98, p=.006. Participants who believed they had received alcohol also 
rated their experience of “pleasant glow” higher than those who believe they had not 
(M=5.7, SD=1.4 and M=3.9, SD=2.8, respectively), t(30)=2.14, p=.002.  Further, when 
scores on the scales were averaged both before and after administration of alcohol or 
placebo, not only did alcohol change subjective feelings, from 2.82 (SD = 0.49) pre-
administration to 5.04 (0.79), post administration, t(13) = 7.17, p <.001, d = 3.37, but so did 
the placebo, from 3.25 (0.75) to 3.81 (0.80), t(13) = 3.25, p = .006, d = 0.72. Nonetheless 
the change produced by alcohol (0.94, SD = 1.04) was detectably different from the change 
produced by placebo (0.29, SD = 0.73), t(26) = 2.94 p = .035 1-tailed, d = 0.45. Participants 
who had alcohol reported feeling significantly more lightheaded, t(30) = 3.21, p=.003, d = 
1.13 (see Table 1), and more intoxicated,  t(30) = 13.23, p<.001, d = 1.84 (see Table 1) 
compared to those who had placebo.  
 
Table 1.  Mean subjective mood ratings (SEM) after administration of alcohol or placebo 
VAS Placebo Alcohol  
Drunkenness 
1.34  (.19) 4.25 (.23)* 
t(30) = 13.23,  p<.001, 
d = 2.59 
Light-headed 
1.93 (.53) 4.5 (.61)* 
t(30) = 3.21,  p=.003, d 
= 1.12 
Pleasant Glow 
4.73 (.34) 6.12 (.49) 
t(30) = 2.51,  p=.018, d 
= 0.89 
Irritable 
0.50 (.21) 1.59 (.44) 
t(30) = 2.14,  p=.040, d 
= 0.78 
Relaxed  
5.73 (.41) 6.15 (.29) 
t(30) = 0.83,  p=.411, d 
= 0.30 
Alert 4.70 (.43) 4.5 (.39) t(30) = 0.35,  p=.733, d 
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= 0.12 
Stimulated 
4.73 (.27) 4.91 (.46) 
t(30) = 0.32,  p=.749, d 
= 0.12 
Contented 
6.17 (.35) 6.12 (.50) 
t(30) = .08,  p=.938, d 
= 0.938 
* Significant after controlling for familywise error at the .05 level (Hochberg’s, 1988 
sequential Bonferroni).  
 
In sum, while there was a placebo effect, subjects also had some knowledge about 
condition, and thus it is important to control expectancies in determining alcohol’s effect on 
hypnotic response. 
 
3.2 Was enough alcohol administered to affect frontal lobe functioning? 
Blood alcohol levels (BAC) at 45 minutes ranged from 0.55 promille w/volume to 0.96 
promille w/volume in the alcohol group. No participant of the placebo group had a 
detectable BAC (derived from the breath alcohol level; BrAC) or BrAC.  
 
As expected, alcohol impaired performance on tests of frontal lobe functioning. The alcohol 
group’s decline in performance on the word fluency task (M = 3.18, SD = 2.58) was greater 
than the placebo group’s (M = 0.33, SD = 1.45) t(30) = 2.69, p = .014, d = 0.87. Kallio et 
al (2004) found a hypnotic induction reduced letter fluency by 30%, similar to the 23% 
reduction alcohol produced in the current study (from 14.24 to 10.91): That is, we have 
administered sufficient alcohol to reduce frontal function by the order of magnitude 
relevant for effects on hypnotic response.  
 
The alcohol group’s reaction times (M = 255.66, SD = 122.96) on the stop signal task were 
also longer than those of participants in the placebo condition (M = 161.09, SD = 61.5, 
t(30) = 2.69, p = .012,  d = .97, further indicating alcohol’s effect on frontal functioning.  
 
Table 2.  Mean scores on tests of frontal lobe function (SEM) 
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 Placebo Alcohol  
Letter fluency pre  15.733 (1.08) 14.24 (1.01) t(30) = 1.01, p = .32 
Letter fluency post  15.53 (0.71) 10.94 (0.65) t(30) = 4.75, p<.001 
SST post  161.09 (15.88) 255.57 (29.82) t(30) = 2.69, p<.012 
 
 
3.3 Did alcohol affect hypnotic response? 
Table 3 shows the mean subjective response for each suggestion separately. When 
responses were averaged over suggestions, the alcohol group (M = 2.81, SD = 0.71) 
responded subjectively more to hypnotic suggestions than the placebo group placebo group 
(M = 1.96, SD = 0.75, t(30) = 3.27, p = .003, d = 1.16) (on a scale that went from 0 to 5). 
This is the key result of the study. 
The effect of alcohol on hypnotic suggestibility was assessed performing an ANCOVA on 
post-drink subjective hypnotic ratings for each group with baseline hypnotic suggestibility, 
as measured by the WGSC, was as a covariate. An ANCOVA was performed between the 
alcohol group (adjusted M = 2.70, SEM  =.19) and the placebo group (adjusted M = 1.96, 
SEM  = 0.19) with subjective hypnotic ratings (WGSC) as a dependent variable and 
baseline as a covariate to check if baseline differences in the group could explain the effect 
of alcohol/placebo condition on hypnotic suggestibility. The difference in hypnotic 
suggestibility was significant, F(1, 27) = 7.81, p=.009, indicating that alcohol had an effect 
on hypnotic responding, over and above any initial group differences.  
A significant positive correlation was found between expectancy and subjective 
response to suggestion overall, Pearson’s r = .55, p <.001. So was the effect of alcohol just 
based on expectancy? The alcohol group (M = 0.56, SD = 0.91) and placebo group did not 
differ significantly in their expectancy ratings (M = 0.11, SD = 1.28), t(30) = 1.16,  p = .26, 
d = 0.40, (on an expectancy scale that went from -4 to +4)
8
. Crucially, when expectancy 
                                                          
8
 In order to determine if this non-significant result was sensitive a Bayes Factor was used to compare the 
alternative hypothesis (that expectancy was higher for the alcohol rather than placebo group) to the null 
hypothesis. A Bayes Factor greater than 3 indicates strong evidence for the alternative over the null; less 
than a 1/3 indicates strong evidence for the null over the alternative; and anything in between indicates the 
data are insensitive (Dienes, 2011). First we need to specify what sizes of effect the alternative hypothesis 
predicts. The raw regression slope of hypnotic response on expectancy was 0.43 (t = 3.58, p =.001). The 
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was put in as a covariate, the difference between the groups in hypnotic suggestibility 
remains (adjusted means: alcohol group M = 2.73, SEM = 1.7; placebo group M = 2.03 SE 
= 1.6), t(29) = 3.57, p =.002). 
 
3.4 Direct and Indirect Measures of Expectation 
Direct and indirect measures of expectancy were taken. Before each hypnotic suggestion 
was made, participants were asked to report whether or not they expected to experience the 
suggestion and how confident they were about this expectancy (on a scale of 1 to 4) as a 
direct measure, and the reaction time for the yes/no response was taken as an indirect 
measure. We would expect that subjects with more confidence in ‘no’ responses would be 
less hypnotically suggestible, and vice versa for ‘yes’ responses. In order to examine the 
effect of these direct and indirect measures of expectancy on subjective  ratings (hypnotic 
response), for each subject a multiple regression was run with expectation RT and 
confidence rating predicting subjective response for yes and no responses separately. 
Regression weights (betas) for yes and no should be in opposite directions, as the more 
confident a subject is in a no response, the less hypnotically responsive they should be, so 
we reversed the sign for ‘no’ expectancy response regression weights and averaged across 
both (for both indirect and direct measures). Separate multiple regression analyses were 
carried out for ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses. Although a combined analysis was possible with 
explicit expectancy ratings, this could not easily be done with RTs (the indirect measure of 
expectancy). The mean standardised regression weight for confidence was 0.11, t(24) = 
1.00, p = .33, d = .51, indicating that conscious expectancy did not significantly predict 
subjective response controlling for RT differences. However, the mean standardised 
regression weight for RT was 0.29, significantly above chance, t(25) = 2.62, p = .015, d = 
                                                                                                                                                                                
difference in hypnotic response between groups was 0.85 units. Thus the change in expectancy needed to 
produce the observed change in hypnotic response  is 0.85/0.43 = 2.0 units. Thus, the predictions of the 
alternative hypothesis were modelled as a half normal with a standard deviation of 2.0 (see Dienes, 2011, 
Appendix, for this recommendation; and website for Dienes, 2008, for free online software for Bayes 
Factors). The Bayes Factor was 0.63; thus the non-significant difference in expectancy between groups 
cannot be used to support the null hypothesis, the data are insensitive. The ANCOVA shows however that 
expectation did not mediate the effect of group. The extent of mediation is discussed further below. 
64 
 
.20, indicating that RT as an indirect measure of expectancy did predict subjective 
response.  
 
Table 3.  Mean subjective responses to individual hypnotic suggestions (SEM)  
Suggestion Placebo (SEM) Alcohol (SEM)  
Rigid arm 2.53 (.41) 3.82 (.31) t(30) = 2.53, p = .017 
Posthypnotic suggestion 0.73 (.25) 2.06 (.47) t(30) = 2.42, p = .022 
Negative hallucination 0.40 (.16) 1.71 (.50) t(30) = 2.36, p = .025 
Heavy arm  3.73 (.37) 4.53 (.15) t(30) = 2.08, p = .047 
Arm immobilisation 2.60 (.34) 3.41 (.24) t(30) = 1.99, p = .056 
Sour taste  1.67 (.35) 2.41 (.31) t(30) = 1.61, p = .119 
Magnetic hands  3.27 (.32) 4.00 (.24) t(30) = 1.87, p = .172 
Posthypnotic amnesia 1.67 (.39) 2.24 (.32) t(30) = 1.15, p = .259 
Mosquito hallucination 1.07 (.36) 1.12 (.27) t(30) = 0.12, p = .91 
 
 
3.5  Mediation analyses 
Measures of explicit and unconscious expectancy were entered into separate mediation 
analyses to investigate the effect they had on the relationship between alcohol/placebo 
condition and subjective hypnotic response. In order to measure unconscious expectancies 
differences between groups, Go trial RTs from the SST were partialled out of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
expectancy RTs as a baseline measure of reaction time so as to account for any between-
groups differences, such as alcohol causing longer latencies. ‘Yes’ and ‘no’ expectancy 
RTs were regressed separately on SST go trial RTs and the residuals were used as the 
measure of unconscious expectancies.  
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Figure 1 displays mediation analysis for alcohol/placebo condition with explicit expectancy 
as a mediator. The standardised regression weight predicting hypnotic response from 
condition partialling out expectancy is “c”; the correlation between condition and 
expectation is “a”; and the standardised regression weight predicting hypnotic response 
from expectancy, controlling condition is “b”. If c>0, then there is not full mediation; if 
ab=0 there is no mediation; and if ab>0, then there is some mediation (Woody, 2011). 
Conventional mediation analysis, being based on significance testing, does not provide a 
systematic method of establishing no meditation, as opposed to partial mediation by 
establishing if ab= 0. The amount of mediation depends on the size of ab. If there is full 
mediation by a variable, then c = 0
9
 and if there is no mediation, then ab = 0 (see Woody, 
2011). As c > 0, the only question is whether there is no mediation or partial mediation, and 
this depends on determining if ab = 0.  Thus, we calculated a Bayes Factor, the only known 
method of providing evidence for a point null hypothesis (Berger & Sellke, 1987).  
 As the partial correlations were close to the original correlations in each case, we 
normalised them with Fisher’s Z, which has a known standard error. We can use the 
following formula for the standard error of ab in order to test if ab=0 or if ab>0: 
SEab = √              
 
To represent the prediction of partial mediation for the purposes of calculating a Bayes 
factor, we used a uniform distribution from zero to an upper limit of the correlation 
between condition and hypnotic response - because the most the mediated effect can be (ab) 
is the full effect. If the Bayes Factor is <1/3, then it is strong evidence for no mediation. If 
it is >3, it is strong evidence for partial mediation, and if it is anywhere in-between, then 
there is insufficient evidence.  
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Therefore, we need to first of all check to see if c is significant. If it is not, (and ab is non-zero) then there 
may be partial or full mediation. A Bayes Factor can be used to test c > 0 by using an estimate of the full 
effect as an upper limit of the uniform, in a similar way as for testing ab.  
66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p<.05. 
Figure 1. Regression coefficients for the relationship of alcohol/placebo condition with 
subjective hypnotic response as mediated by explicit expectancy ratings.  
As can be seen in figure 1, c>0, therefore there is not full mediation. The Bayes Factor for 
the test of ab>0 as opposed to ab=0 is 5.6. Therefore, there was  evidence to suggestion 
partial mediation of condition on  subjective response by explicit expectancy.  
 
 
*p<.05. 
 
Explicit Expectancy 
(M) 
Condition 
(X) 
 
Subjective 
response (Y) 
a = .21 b = .53* 
c =.49* (.51)* 
-.03 .06 
.51* (.52)* 
No Expectancy RTs 
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Figure 2. The effect of condition (alcohol or placebo) on subjective hypnotic response with 
‘no’ expectancy RTs as a single mediator. (Standardised regression coefficient for 
condition and subjective response controlling for ‘no’ expectancy RTs is in parentheses.) 
 
As can be seen in figure 2, c>0, therefore there is not full mediation of ‘no’ expectancy RTs 
on the relationship between alcohol/placebo condition and subjective hypnotic response. 
The Bayes Factor for the test of ab>0 as opposed to ab=0 is 0.05. Therefore, there was  
evidence to suggest no mediation by unconscious expectation not to respond to a 
suggestion. 
 
 
*p<.05. 
Figure 3. Regression coefficients for the relationship of alcohol/placebo condition with 
subjective hypnotic response as mediated by ‘yes’ expectancy RTs.  
As can be seen in figure 3, c>0, therefore there is not full mediation. The Bayes Factor for 
the test of ab>0 as opposed to ab=0 is 2.47, which weakly supports the theory that ‘yes’ 
expectancy RTs (unconscious expectation to respond to a suggestion) partially mediated the 
relationship between condition and  subjective response, yet the data are insensitive. 
 
 
-.25 .09 
Yes Expectancy RTs 
.51* (.52)* 
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*p<.05. 
Figure 4. Regression coefficients for the relationship of alcohol/placebo condition with 
subjective hypnotic response as mediated by SST No-go trial RTs.  
As can be seen in figure 4, c>0, therefore there is not full mediation. The Bayes Factor for 
the test of ab>0 as opposed to ab=0 is 0.18 Therefore, there was  evidence to no mediation 
of condition on  subjective response by SST no-go trial RTs (response inhibition).  
 
4. Discussion 
In this study we examined the effect of alcohol on hypnotic suggestibility. The placebo 
was somewhat effective, although there was a significant difference between the ratings 
of drunkenness reported between the two groups. Alcohol consumption increased 
hypnotic responsiveness, compared to placebo. While explicit expectancy strongly 
predicted performance, the effect of alcohol on hypnotic suggestibility remained after 
controlling for explicit expectancy. We measured unconscious as well as conscious 
expectancies for the first time, and showed that unconscious expectancy could predict 
hypnotic response above and beyond conscious expectancy. Yet the effect of alcohol 
could not be fully accounted for by either type of expectancy. Bayesian analysis also 
indicated that explicit expectancy partially mediated the relationship between alcohol 
SST No-go trial RTs 
Subjective 
response  
Condition 
.51* (.52)* 
.44* 
-.11 
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condition and hypnotic responding, and that unconscious expectancies may also partially 
mediate this relationship. 
The results also confirmed that alcohol impaired frontal lobe functions, as 
demonstrated by the alcohol group’s decline in performance on the stop signal task and 
the letter fluency task. Performance on the stop signal task did not mediate the 
relationship between alcohol condition and subjective hypnotic response, though, which 
is problematic for dissociated control theory (Woody & Bowers, 1994). However, these 
findings support theories postulating that diminished frontal lobe functioning is related to 
hypnotic suggestibility, such as the cold control theory (e.g. Dienes, 2012), some types of 
dissociation theory (e.g. integrated dissociative control theory; Woody & Sadler, 2008) 
and related neurophysiological approaches (Gruzelier, 1998, 2006). The results 
conceptually replicate those of Dienes and Hutton (2013) who showed that applying 
rTMS to the left DLPFC increased subjective ratings of hypnotic experience, compared to 
stimulation of the vertex.  
 These findings do not, however, rule out the arguments suggesting that sufficient 
frontal lobe impairment should reduce hypnotisability. For example, the theories of both 
Spanos (1986) and Hilgard (1977) rely on intact executive functioning. Similarly, cold 
control does not postulate a state of utter hypofrontality; on this theory executive control is 
still implemented in order to carry out the cognitive or motor action performed. Thus, if 
executive function is impaired to the degree that the action could not be performed by 
executive control, then hypnotic suggestibility would be impaired (Dienes and Perner, 
2007; contrast Woody and Bowers, 1994). For moving the hands together, or even 
imagining a mosquito, it is obvious people have sufficient frontal function after the amount 
of alcohol we administered to still intend to voluntarily perform these actions and 
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successfully perform them. What is crucial for hypnotic suggestibility to be facilitated is 
that diminished frontal lobe functioning reduces concomitant higher order thoughts about 
intentions, allowing for HOTs of not intending to arise (Barnier, Dienes, and Mitchell, 
2008). Indeed, it may be that performance on suggestions that heavily involve executive 
functions would be impaired following alcohol consumption (e.g. consider the inhibition of 
pre-potent responses hypnotically suggested in Bertrand and Spanos, 1985). For example, 
forgetting the number 4, which involves overcoming habit, may become more difficult 
according to cold control (Dienes and Perner, 2007) but not dissociated control theories 
(Woody and Bowers, 1994). We found that alcohol increased responsiveness to a negative 
hallucination suggestion. This suggestion involves the hypnotic subject avoiding the 
perception of a clearly visible object, a mental task that one would naturally assume to be 
an inhibitory task. The increase on the alcohol group’s ability on this task despite a 
reduction in executive functioning suggests that responding to this suggestion does not 
involve above average inhibitory abilities (cf. Kirsch et al, 2011). It may be people attended 
away from the third ball without being aware of that intention (cold control) – the special 
ability of highs may not be in their ability to attend away, which may be normal (Dienes, 
Brown, Hutton, Kirsch et al, 2009) but in their ability to not know that is what they were 
doing. We predict that once sufficient alcohol is administered to impair inhibition of 
prepotent responses under standard conditions, the corresponding response performed 
hypnotically will also be impaired. 
Frontal lobe impairment may be just one of a number of ways of creating a 
hypnotic experience. Highly hypnotisable subjects differ in the way they create hypnotic 
experiences. For example, Barber’s three-dimensional theory of hypnosis theory suggests 
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that there are three types of hypnotisable subjects: those who are fantasy prone and spend 
much of their lives having “real-as-real” daydreams; amnesic subjects, who tend to forget 
life events and hypnotic experiences and subjects who are extremely motivated and have 
strong expectations about their ability to respond hypnotically (Barber, 1999).  
McConkey and colleagues (e.g. McConkey et al, 1989) have also identified two types of 
highly hypnotisables: those who actively construct hypnotic experience and those who are 
more passive, listening to the suggestions and waiting for the effects to happen to them. 
Future research could investigate the effect of alcohol on different types of highs. 
 Although alcohol particularly disrupts the DLPFC and ACC, it also affects a large 
area of the prefrontal cortex and beyond (Kähkönen et al, 2003) and so we cannot 
definitively conclude that the increase in hypnotic suggestibility was specifically due to a 
reduction in metacognition, nor even specifically executive function. In future, specific 
disruption of DLPFC function could be coupled with a measure of accuracy of higher 
order thoughts as well as hypnotic responsiveness.   
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Abstract 
Cold control theory identifies metacognition as a common strand across different 
approaches to explaining hypnosis. According to this strand of theorising, hypnotic 
responding is a strategic lack of awareness of intentions. We use mindfulness meditation as 
a contrast case, as the goal of such meditation is to increase accurate awareness of mental 
states. In study 1, we collected data from 136 subjects on self-report measures of 
mindfulness, cognitive failures, thought suppression, absorption and perceptual encoding 
style. A factor analysis performed on these measures indicated two factors: internal 
absorption and external awareness. In study 2, we assessed and compared the hypnotic 
suggestibility of meditators on a large existing database and found that they were less 
hypnotisable than the database average, and that this difference was not meditated by age, 
gender, response expectancies or attitudes towards hypnosis. We tested high and low 
hypnotically suggestible subjects (highs and lows) and meditators on measures of higher 
order awareness, including higher order thought (HOT) coupling, ironic control and meta-
awareness. Meditators scored higher on HOT coupling but were poorer at ironic control 
than both highs and lows. Results also point to a possible contribution of meta-awareness, 
although further research is needed. Subjects were also assessed using the above self-report 
measures. Meditators and highs reported similar levels of absorption, and highs reported 
higher levels of absorption than lows. Highs reported greater levels of internally directed 
absorption than lows. Our findings suggest that variations in higher order awareness and 
perceptual encoding style may at least partially underlie individual differences in hypnotic 
suggestibility. 
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Introduction 
An individual’s responsiveness to hypnotic suggestion is very stable and reliable, with test-
retest reliability over 25 years at about .75 (Piccione, Hilgard and Zimbardo, 1989), yet the 
underlying mechanisms remain elusive. There are two main features that characterise 
hypnotic experience: involuntariness and a sense of subjective reality of the hypnotic 
experience (e.g. Kihlstrom, 2008). For example, a hypnotic subject might believe that they 
really cannot remember the number ‘four’, following a suggestion to forget it. They may 
also believe that their arm is rising by itself following a suggestion that a helium balloon is 
tied to their wrist, in other words they believe that their action was involuntary.  A variety 
of theories of hypnosis have been put forth to explain such phenomena, and they can be 
broadly grouped into two categories: dissociation approaches and socio-cognitive 
approaches. In this paper we will explore how both of these approaches relate to 
metacognitive abilities, and then how the contrasting role of metacognition in meditation 
and hypnosis might help us to further understand their underlying mechanisms. 
Metacognition
 
refers broadly to cognition about cognition and encompasses 
cognitive control and monitoring (see e.g. Beran, Brandl, Perner, & Proust, 2012, for a 
review). Monitoring includes the basic process of being aware of what mental state one is 
in. Of special relevance to different approaches to hypnosis is the extent to which people 
can choose to have intentions but not be aware of having them (Dienes & Perner, 2007). 
The role of specifically this metacognitive strategy in different approaches to hypnosis will 
now be explored.  
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Socio-cognitive accounts of hypnosis explain hypnotic responding as arising from 
everyday social psychological principles such as strategic role enactment (Sarbin and Coe, 
1972), expectations (Kirsch, 1991), demand characteristics (Spanos, 1991), motivation 
(Barber & Calverley, 1962) and imaginative involvement (Lynn & Rhue, 1986; Spanos and 
Barber, 1974). Such explanations can be understood in terms of metacognition. For 
example, demand characteristics could prevent one from attributing oneself as a cause of 
hypnotically suggested motor or cognitive actions, such as a male subject thinking that he is 
a woman; demand characteristics instead may lead to a failure of metacognition by virtue of 
the inaccurate thought “I was not intending to think that I was a woman.” The thought that 
“I am a woman” appears to arise not from an intention to pretend, but of its own accord. 
However, socio-cognitive theories need not necessarily be explained in terms of 
inaccurate metacognition about intentions. For example, Kirsch (1991; 1997) argues that 
situational cues lead to expectancies about hypnosis, such as that one‘s arm will rise with a 
feeling of involuntariness, and that these expectations themselves trigger the hypnotic 
response.  Attitudes toward hypnosis are also thought to play a role in hypnotic responding 
(Hine, 2009; Spanos, 1986) and one’s attitude toward hypnosis is likely to affect motivation 
and expectancies. According to Spanos, Cross, Menary, Brett & de Groh (1987), a positive 
attitude toward being hypnotised is necessary (but not sufficient) to respond to hypnotic 
suggestions and negative attitudes inhibit hypnotic suggestibility (Barber, 1969). These 
accounts do not need to postulate that intentions (to act, think or imagine) are necessary in 
order to perform (behavioural or cognitive) actions  - indeed these accounts do not need to 
postulate that intentions even exist as natural kinds (as things required for acting; cf 
Churchland, 1991). Rather at the psychological level, expectations may directly produce 
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actions and experiences, and thinking that one was not intending to so act involves no 
inaccuracy (so socio-cognitive approaches do require some folk mental states – like 
expectation - be natural kinds, just not intentions). On the other hand, some analyses of 
action require an intention (cf Searle, 1983) so as to distinguish actions from mere 
movement (and hypnotic responses are never movements as they satisfy specified 
requirements, they are produced under a certain description). Further, some psychological 
theories of certain actions (executive function ones) claim such actions require controlling 
executive representations, i.e. intentions (Norman & Shallice, 1986). Thus, by the latter 
theories of executive function, an intention is involved any time a suggestion involves 
something new or non-habitual for the person, especially something going against habit 
(such as acting in strange ways, imagining novel non-existent objects, ignoring cued 
memories or noxious stimuli, i.e. actions typical of hypnotic suggestions). In that case, 
hypnotic responses are associated with intentions, and the socio-cognitive approach 
amounts to the claim that people strategically engage in a lack of metacognition about their 
intentions in order to act hypnotically. 
Dissociation theories explain hypnotic responding in terms of executive 
functioning, describing hypnosis as occurring because of a dissociation between executive 
control and monitoring or awareness. For example, Hilgard’s (1977) neo-dissociation 
theory describes the splitting of the ‘executive’ ego into two conscious streams, one of 
which controls hypnotic responses but which is hidden behind an amnesic barrier, so the 
other stream is unaware of this control, leading to a lack of awareness of the intention and 
thus the experience of involuntariness.  The subject actually believes that they did not 
perform the action, despite intending to do it: a failure of metacognition. However, not all 
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dissociation theories need to be explained metacognitively. According to dissociated 
control theory (Woody and Bowers, 1994), hypnotic responses occur as a result of a 
weakened supervisory attentional (executive) system. Hypnotic responses are thus 
controlled by contention scheduling (automatic processes/habit). In this case, responding to 
the hypnotic suggestion avoids (executive) intention entirely and is just an automatic 
response that follows from an activated schema. For example, following a suggestion for 
the arm to become lighter, as though a helium balloon were attached to the wrist, the 
concomitant monitoring might be something like “I am being told my arm is getting lighter, 
so the arm is lifting”. There is an experience of involuntariness, as the subject did not feel 
as though they initiated the action themselves. As the response is controlled by habit, the 
thought of non-intending can be accurate (in that habit need not be intentional), and a 
strategic failure of metacognition is not involved in the explanation of hypnotic responding. 
The problem for these non-metacognitive accounts of hypnosis to solve is how hypnotic 
responding can involve executive function tasks, such as performance of new actions 
(acting like Elvis) or overcoming salient stimuli (Dienes & Perner, 2007). 
Dienes and Perner (2007) isolated the common metacognitive strand in the socio-
cognitive and dissociative accounts of hypnosis and proposed to treat it as a sufficient 
theory of hypnotic responding. To do this, they drew on the higher order thought (HOT) 
theory of Rosenthal (e.g. 2005). Rosenthal distinguished between first order and higher 
order mental states. A first order mental state has content that is just about the world; for 
example, “There is a cat” for an indicative mental state (e.g. perception), or “Lift the arm!” 
for an imperative one (e.g. an intention). A second order mental state asserts that one is in a 
first order mental state, making one aware of being in the first order state. First order states 
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can exist without higher order ones; one can perceive without being aware of perceiving 
(subliminal perception; first order perception without an accurate second order thought), 
just so one can intend without being aware of intending (intention without an accurate 
second order thought). Intention without an accurate higher order thought (HOT) of 
intending (intentional control without HOTs, hence cold control), means the intentional 
control is unconscious, the person is not aware of controlling. The cold control theory of 
hypnosis (Dienes & Perner, 2007; Dienes, 2012) asserts that hypnotic responding is just the 
process of employing cold control, together with inaccurate higher order thoughts, that is 
thinking that one did not intend the behavioural or cognitive actions in fact employed to 
carry out the response. According to cold control theory, the essence of hypnosis is playing 
a certain metacognitive trick on oneself – strategically, when contextually appropriate – 
having inaccurate HOTs about intending. Such an approach unites major strands within the 
great dissociation and socio-cognitive traditions (while remaining in conflict with other 
theories within those traditions). We will explore the metacognitive approach to hypnosis. 
If special types of metacognitive strategies or tendencies are important for hypnotic 
responding, then individual differences in metacognitive abilities may be related to 
hypnotic suggestibility. The ability to inhibit thoughts or mental images is a difficult task, 
as demonstrated by Wegner, Carter, Schneider and White (1987), and presumably there are 
individual differences in this metacognitive control variable. They found that when 
participants were asked to not think of white bears for two minutes (the ‘ironic control’ 
task), they reported experiencing a subsequent ‘rebound effect’ of intrusive thoughts of 
white bears. One reason for this is that by virtue of creating an intention to not think of 
white bears, one creates a representation of white bears within the intention. Bowers and 
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Woody (1996) tested high and low hypnotisable subjects on a similar task after a hypnotic 
induction, finding that highs were not only able to avoid thinking of their favourite car for 
two minutes, but that they did not experience the thought rebound effect. Bowers and 
Woody took this as evidence that highs’ hypnotic amnesia for their favourite car was 
directly triggered by the hypnotic suggestion, obviating intentions to forget and thus 
avoiding the type of paradoxical thought intrusions seen in Wegner et al’s (1987) white 
bear task. A possible alternative explanation is that highs did have intentions to forget, but 
tended to have fewer accurate HOTs of intending – i.e. they did have intentions, just not 
conscious intentions (Dienes & Perner, 2007). Alternatively, highs may be more prone to 
mind-wandering than lows without explicit awareness of the contents of their mental 
experience, i.e. they may lack meta-awareness (in the sense described by Schooler, 2002 
and Schooler & Smallwood, 2006).  
Van Nuys (1973) and Spanos, Rivers & Gottlieb (1978) asked subjects to perform a 
task converse to the ironic control task, i.e. not to ignore a stimulus but rather to 
concentrate on it (the ‘candle task’). They found that highs experienced fewer intrusive 
thoughts than lows when asked to concentrate on a candle or on the breath.  However, the 
same explanation is possible for this result as for the Woody and Bowers one with ironic 
control: highs may mind wander more than lows, but without realising that they are, i.e. 
they may have low meta-awareness. We test the possibility that highs have fewer HOTs 
and are more prone to mind-wandering without awareness using the ‘HOT task’, which is 
described below, and combines the ironic control and candle tasks. 
Meditation may provide a way to examine the role of metacognition and higher 
order awareness in hypnosis. Meditation has frequently been compared and sometimes 
confounded with hypnosis (see Semmens-Wheeler & Dienes, 2012, for a review). It takes 
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many forms among various traditions (Dumont, Martin & Broer, 2012), but it can be 
broadly described as a complex family of practices that aim to develop skills in attention, 
emotional regulation, and metacognition. Mindfulness meditation, which comprises aspects 
of both focused attention and open monitoring meditation, involves practicing non-
judgmental awareness of mental states. i.e. mindfulness (Teasdale, 1999; Thompson, 2006; 
Wallace, 1999; Zeidan et al, 2010). Meditators reporting greater levels of mindfulness than 
non-meditators and more frequent meditation practice is associated with higher levels of 
self-reported mindfulness (Farb et al, 2007; Moore and Malinowski, 2009; Semmens-
Wheeler and Erskine, 2009), though causal direction in these studies is unclear. The 
claimed role of meditation and mindfulness practice in increasing metacognitive skills 
contrasts starkly with accounts of hypnosis that postulate a lack of higher order awareness.  
Despite the putative metacognitive differences between meditation and hypnosis, 
there are some areas of overlap. For example, both meditation and hypnosis have been 
associated with absorption (e.g. Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974; Laurence and Nadon, 1986; 
Davidson, Goleman and Schwartz, 1976; Holroyd, 2003), which has been defined as “the 
ability to maintain a state of attentional involvement on current experience” (Lau, Bishop, 
Segal, et al, 2006, pp.1448) and is typically measured using the Tellegen Absorption Scale 
(TAS; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974).  
The overlap in absorption between meditation and hypnosis may not be 
straightforward, however. Absorption refers to attentional involvement in one’s current 
experience, yet the current experience itself, i.e. the ‘object’ and nature of absorption could 
be quite different in meditation and hypnosis. We have previously outlined several possible 
distinct modes of mental processing that could be represented by absorption (Semmens-
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Wheeler and Dienes, 2012). One mode is mind-wandering blended with imaginative 
involvement, such  that one is unaware of the mind-wandering (i.e. lacking metacognition; 
c.f. Schooler, 2002; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), which we call ‘cold absorption’ 
(without HOTs). In another mode, an individual experiences one-pointed awareness of a 
thought or object (see Taylor, 2002), which we call ‘HOT’ absorption (absorption with 
accurate HOTs/metacognition.) These different states of absorption could be associated 
differentially with meditation and hypnosis, with meditation being associated with accurate 
higher-order awareness that is related to mindfulness and hypnosis being associated with a 
more internally-directed absorption that might involve fantasy and imagination, as 
suggested by Barber and Wilson (1978; 1982). 
In line with the idea that the experience of absorption reported by meditators might 
reflect a strong tendency to pay attention to one’s surroundings, mindfulness has been 
associated with a lower incidence of everyday cognitive failures, (Herndon, 2008) as 
measured by the cognitive failures questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald and 
Parkes, 1982), such as forgetting people’s names immediately after being told them and 
taking the wrong turn at a junction. Cognitive failures have been associated with lapses in 
attention toward external stimuli, as indexed by a greater number of commission errors on 
the sustained attention to response task (SART), and it is these attentional lapses that are 
thought to be a causal factor of cognitive failures (Cheyne, Carriere and Smilek, 2006). If 
meditators are more mindful, then we would expect them to perform fewer cognitive 
failures than highs. If highs are susceptible to hypnotic suggestion by virtue of a lack of 
accurate HOTs, then we might expect them to be more prone to cognitive failures. 
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A tendency to exhibit cognitive failures, as well as being negatively related to 
mindfulness, has been associated with an internal perceptual encoding style, as measured 
by the Encoding Style Questionnaire (Lewicki, 2005). Mindfulness, on the other hand, is 
associated with a relatively external encoding style (Herndon, 2008). External encoders 
perceive the world by thoroughly relying on external evidence before a schema is activated 
and a perception is reached (Lewicki, 2005).  Conversely, internal encoders rely heavily on 
expectations and are prone to “split-second illusions” such as seeing a black bag out of the 
corner of their eye and mistaking it for a black cat. The reliance of internal encoders on 
schemata, rather than on external sensory information, makes them very susceptible to 
priming effects (Lewicki, 2005). For example, internal encoders are able to recognise 
tachistoscopically presented and borderline subliminal images much more quickly and 
accurately than external encoders, supporting the notion that they rely on schemata in 
interpreting environmental stimuli.  
In a situation that is labelled ‘hypnotic’, internal encoders might be more 
susceptible to the effects of situational priming and thus more likely to act in accordance 
with their schema for hypnosis, such as attributing a sense of agency to the hypnotist or to 
the hypnotic suggestion, as suggested by socio-cognitive theories (e.g. Sarbin and Coe, 
1972; Spanos, 1986) The effects of encoding style could also work on a more specific 
perceptual level. Internal encoders also appear to be able to ignore information that does 
not fit their goals. For example, in impression formation studies, internal encoders simply 
ignored adjectives about people that were inconsistent with their expectations (Gill, 2000). 
This may work similarly in a hypnotic suggestion to see only two of three balls presented in 
plain view (a suggestion on the Waterloo Stanford Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility; 
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Bowers, 1993); the expectation to see only two, rather than three balls, may override the 
external evidence to the contrary. So as well as expecting highly hypnotisable people to 
have fewer accurate HOTs about the world, we might also expect them to have a more 
internal encoding style than lows.  On the contrary, mindfulness (as measured by the 
MAAS, Brown and Ryan, 2003) has been positively related to a more external perceptual 
encoding style (Herndon, 2008).  Internal/external encoding is a type of metacognitive style 
(a persistent decision whether to weight prior beliefs or new perceptual evidence more 
strongly in making perceptual judgments), but whether it is related to a tendency to have 
accurate HOTs about perceptual states is an issue we will explore.  
It is not easy to measure metacognition, that is, to separate first from second order 
thoughts. However, we have devised a task to measure second order thoughts, while 
keeping first order mental states about an externally presented stimulus (a sequence of 
images) as constant as possible. We combined Wegner et al’s (1987) ironic control task, 
with Van Nuy’s (1973) candle task, and Schooler’s (2002) measure of meta-awareness in 
one task (cf pilot results in Dienes, 2012).  We tested highs, lows and meditators on their 
ability to avoid HOTs when requested (ironic control), to maintain HOTs when requested 
(meditation) and their tendency to have HOTs, regardless of the task (HOT coupling).   
Dienes (2012) found reduced HOT coupling in highs rather than lows. The main aim of this 
study was to explore differences in higher order awareness metacognition among highs, 
lows and meditators. Cold control theory motivates the hypothesis that highs have fewer 
accurate higher order thoughts than lows. Similarly meditators should have a greater 
number of accurate higher order thoughts than the other two groups, if meditation enhances 
metacognition. We would also thus predict that, if meditators have greater higher order 
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awareness, that they should not be very hypnotically susceptible. We also aimed to explore 
differences among meditators and high and low hypnotisable individuals on perceptual 
encoding style, mindfulness, absorption and cognitive failures, as well as the relationships 
between these constructs.  
 
2. Study 1 Method 
2.1 Participants  
136 participants (51 male) were recruited from Sussex University and a convenience 
sample obtained via the first author’s Facebook page; snowball sampling was used from 
here, as connected Facebook users were asked to pass along the survey to their friends. The 
mean age of the participants was 31.9 years (range: 18-72).  
 
2.2 Materials 
2.2.2 Mindfulness: Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
Brown and Ryan’s (2003) Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) was used to assess 
mindfulness or attention to current experience of the world. The questionnaire contains 15 
questions that assess awareness of one’s interactions with the outer environment. It contains 
items such as “I find myself doing things without paying attention” and “I snack without 
being aware that I’m eating”. Reponses are made using a 6-point Likert scale (1 = Almost 
Always, 6 = Almost Never). Higher scores mean greater assessed mindfulness. 
2.2.3 Mindfulness: Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills  
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The Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS, Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) is a 
38-item questionnaire that was used to assess observing, describing, acting with awareness 
and accepting without judgment. Participants rated each item on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 (Never or very rarely true) to 5 (Almost always or always true). Some items 
are direct descriptions of the mindfulness component being measured, such as “When I’m 
walking, I deliberately notice the sensations of my body moving”, whereas others described 
the absence of that component and were reverse scored, such as “I drive on automatic pilot” 
without paying attention to what I’m doing.” The scale taps into four subcomponents: 
‘accepting (or allowing) without judgment’; ‘acting with awareness’; ‘observing’ and 
‘describing’. The KIMS contains items that relate to awareness of the outer environment, 
such as “I pay attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars passing.” 
However, it contains more items that are related to internal states than the MAAS, such as 
“I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions” and “When I do things, 
my mind wanders off and I’m easily distracted”. Higher scores indicate higher assessed 
mindfulness. 
 
2.2.4 Thought Suppression (WBSI) 
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) is a 15 item 
questionnaire that was used to measure participants' propensity to use thought suppression 
in everyday life, and contains statements like “I always try to put problems out of mind” 
and “I have thoughts I cannot stop.” Ratings are made on a five-point Likert-type scale 
(ranging from “strongly disagree to “strongly agree”). Higher scores mean greater assessed 
thought suppression tendencies. 
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2.2.5 Cognitive Failures (CFQ) 
The CFQ (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982) has 25 items describing a variety 
of deficits due to less than optimal cognitive functioning. For example, “Do you find you 
forget people’s names?” and “Do you find you forget which way to turn on a road you 
know well but rarely use?” Items were tested on a five-point Likert-scale (ranging from 
“Always” to “Never”). Higher scores mean greater tendency to exhibit cognitive failures. 
 
2.2.6 Absorption 
The Tellegen Absorption Scale (Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974) is a 34 item questionnaire 
used to measure absorption, or openness to absorbing and self-altering experiences with 
items such as “While watching a movie, a TV show, or a play, I may become so involved 
that I may forget about myself and my surroundings and experience the story as if it were 
real and as if I were taking part in it”. Usually the scale requires a dichotomous true/false 
response option, but we adapted it to a five point- Likert-scale (ranging from “Certainly 
always false” to “Certainly always true”). We also modified some answers so that they 
would be reverse scored, such as “The crackle and flames of a wood fire do not stimulate 
my imagination” to control acquiescence bias. Higher scores indicate greater levels of 
assessed absorption. 
 
 
2.2.6 Perceptual Encoding Style 
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The (Internal/External) Encoding Style Questionnaire (ESQ, Lewicki, 2005) was used to 
measure thoroughness of perceptual processing (external encoding). The scale consists of 6 
critical items, such as “When I’m on a walk, I sometimes see a rock or piece of wood and 
for a split second mistake it for something else (or have a similar experience in other 
conditions)” and 21 filler items. Ratings are made on a six-point Likert-type scale (ranging 
from “Strongly disagree to “Strongly agree”), with higher scores indicating a more internal 
encoding style.  
 
2.2.8 Social Desirability 
The Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960) was used to 
control social desirability in correlations among other questionnaire measures and 
performance on the HOT task, which relied on self-reports about mental states. The scale 
consists of 33 questions requiring a yes/no response and contains items such as  
“There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone” (a reverse worded item) or 
“I always try to practice what I preach”. If a person says they have never taken advantage 
of someone or never lied, the presumption is that they are lying in order to preserve a 
desirable social image. Higher scores mean greater assessed desire for social desirability. 
 
2.3. Procedure 
The Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer, Smith & Allen, 2004), 
Tellegen Absorption Scale (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale (MCSD; Crowne and Marlowe, 1960), Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
(CFQ; Broadbent,  Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982), White Bear Suppression Inventory 
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(WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), Mindful Awareness Attention Scale, MAAS (Brown 
and Ryan, 2003), and Internal/External Encoding Style questionnaire (Lewicki, 2005) were 
administered to participants in the listed order via an online survey website 
(www.surveybris.ac.uk).  
 
2.4 Study 1 Results 
2.4.1. Relationships among self-report measures 
In order to examine the relationships between the various self-report measures, bivariate 
correlations were performed among the WBSI, ESQ, TAS, KIMS, MAAS and CFQ (see 
table 1). The same correlations were performed again, this time controlling for social 
desirability, as measured by the MCSD scale (see table 2).  
 
Table1. Correlations among self-report measures  
 KIMS TAS MAAS CFQ WBSI ESQ 
KIMS -      
TAS .35* -     
MAAS .56** .04 -    
CFQ -.56** -.10 -.59** -   
WBSI -.10 .05 -.35** .46** -  
ESQ -.11 .27** -.40** .42** .17** - 
MCSD -.22** -.08* .17* .25** -.08 .02 
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*p<.05; **p<.01 
Note: KIMS = Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills; TAS = Tellegen Absorption 
Scale; MAAS = Mindful Awareness Attention Scale; ESQ = Encoding Style Questionnaire; 
WBSI =White Bear Suppression Inventory; CFQ = Cognitive Failures Questionnaire. 
 
Table 2. Correlations among self-report measure controlling for social desirability (MCSD) 
 KIMS TAS MAAS CFQ WBSI 
KIMS -     
TAS .32** -    
MAAS .34** -.003 -   
CFQ -.52** -.04 -.55** -  
WBSI -.50** .07 -.49** .48** - 
ESQ -.07 .31** -.35** .43** .23** 
*p<.05; **p<.01 
 
2.4.2 Factor Analysis  
A principal components analysis was performed in order to investigate the dimensionality 
of the WBSI, ESQ, TAS, KIMS, MAAS and CFQ. The KMO value was .73, suggesting an 
overall substantial degree of item inter-correlation, and the lowest MSA value was of .36 
for the TAS, with all other values at .65 or above, suggesting that all values showed 
substantial correlations and were thus suitable for factor analysis (Dziuban & Shirkey, 
1974). An orthogonal solution was determined using a varimax rotation. This analysis 
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yielded two factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1.0, which cumulatively accounted for 
70% of the variance. The first factor accounted for 47%. The leading item on this factor 
was MAAS, which measures the extent to which one is mindful of their environment. 
WBSI, measuring thought suppression, ESQ, measuring internal encoding style, and CFQ, 
measuring cognitive failures loaded negatively onto the factor, all with loadings greater 
than .60, except for internal encoding, which had a loading of .46 (see table 2). This factor 
appears to relate to awareness of, or paying attention to, how one is engaging with the 
environment in the present moment. The TAS did not load strongly onto this factor. Thus 
this component appears to relate to the degree to which individuals are paying attention in 
the moment, or are ‘mindful’ and was labelled ‘external awareness’. 
 
Table 3. Component Matrix  
Scale External Awareness Internal Absorption 
ESQ -.46 .69 
CFQ -.83 .13 
KIMS .82 .30 
MAAS .82 -.11 
WBSI -.74 .09 
TAS -.18 .88 
Extraction Method: Principal component analysis with varimax rotation  
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The second factor accounted for 23% of the variance. The leading item on this factor was 
the Tellegen Absorption scale, with a loading of .86 (see table 3). The ESQ, measuring 
internal encoding, also loaded strongly onto this factor and the KIMS, as well as loading 
strongly onto the first factor, showed a small-to-moderate loading onto this factor. This 
may reflect some of the items in the scale that refer to awareness of internal emotional and 
bodily states. The second factor, therefore, appears to relate to internally focused 
absorption. 
In conclusion, there appears to be a bipolar  unimensional factor of ‘external 
awareness’, consisting of the KIMS, MAAS at one end of the dimension, represented by 
higher scores on the factor, and  ESQ and CFQ at the other end, represented by lower 
scores,  and a second unidimensional factor of ‘internal absorption’, consisting of the TAS 
and ESQ. These factors will be used in the next Study to look at individual differences in 
hypnotic suggestibility and meditation experience. 
 
3. Study 2 Method 
3.1 Participants 
Thirteen meditators (mean age = 36.4 years, SD = 12.9; 13 males) were recruited from the 
Brighton Buddhist Centre in Brighton, UK and the Triratna Dharma Training course at 
Madhyamaloka Buddhist Community in Birmingham, UK. Meditators had a mean of 16.9 
years of meditation practice experience (SD = 3.96). They were all practicing Buddhists in 
the Triratna Buddhist Community and their primary meditation practices were mindfulness 
of breathing (focused awareness of sensations of the breath), ‘just sitting’ (open 
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monitoring) and mettā bhavana (loving kindness). Fourteen highly hypnotisable 
participants (6 males and 8 females ;mean age = 22.2 years, SD = 4.8) and fourteen low 
hypnotisable participants (mean age = 22.6 years, SD = 7.7; 6 males and 8 females) were 
selected from the University of Sussex hypnosis screening database. Highly hypnotizable 
participants scored between 9 and 12 (out of 12) and low hypnotisable participants scored 
0-3 (out of 12) on the Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Suscestibility, Form C 
(WSGC; Bowers, 1998).  Ethical approval was received from the University of Sussex 
ethical committee. Informed consent was obtained from each participant before 
commencing with the study. High and low hypnotisable participants were remunerated with 
course credits or £5 per hour for their participation. Meditators were paid £20 for their 
overall participation in the study.  
Following the main experiment, highs, lows and mediums from the Sussex 
University hypnosis screening pool and meditators were contacted and asked to complete 
measures of hypnotic response expectancy and attitudes to hypnosis. Not all participants 
who took part in the other tasks were available to complete these measures. Thirty-five 
participants (16 males, 19 females; mean age 32.57, SD = 12.05) completed the expectancy 
scale, ten of whom had also completed the other tasks. Twenty-five participants (13 males, 
12 females; mean age 32.14, SD = 12.13) completed the expectancy scale, eighteen of 
whom had also completed the other tasks.  
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3.2 Materials 
 
3.2.1 Higher Order Thought (HOT) task 
In order to measure HOTs, subjects were asked to keep looking directly at a sequence of 
images presented using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) 
while trying to either a) remain at all times aware of seeing the image (meditation task; cf. 
candle task of Van Nuys, 1973) or b) not consciously see the image for 15 minutes (ignore 
task; cf. Wegner et al’s, 1987, ‘white bear’ ironic control task, where people are asked to 
not think of a white bear). Participants completed both the ‘ignore’ and ‘meditation’ tasks 
in a randomised counterbalanced order. Subjects were probed by a tone at random intervals 
(roughly once a minute), which prompted them to indicate whether they were, just that 
instant before hearing the tone, aware of seeing the image by pressing a button (cf 
Schooler’s, 2002, meta-awareness procedure). They pressed one of three buttons to indicate 
if they were aware of seeing the image, zoning out (mind wandering) and aware of zoning 
out, or zoning out and unaware that they were doing so.  
 The difference between a) and b) in reports of seeing the image was taken as 
measuring a participant’s control in having accurate HOTs (HOT control), and the total 
number of reports of seeing the image in both a) and b) as measuring coupling of HOTs to 
first order states, i.e. the tendency to have an appropriate HOT given that a first order state 
exists (HOT coupling). Finally, we measured meta-awareness as the proportion of total 
zone-outs for which participants had been aware that they were zoning out (Schooler, 
2002). 
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3.2.2 Questionnaires 
The same questionnaire measures of mindfulness (KIMS and MAAS), cognitive failures 
(CFQ), absorption (TAS), encoding style, social desirability (MCSD) and thought 
suppression (WBSI) were completed as in study 1 via the same website.  
In addition, participants completed the Attitudes Toward Hypnosis scale 
(Spanos,Brett,  Menary,  & Cross,1987) and a response expectancy questionnaire. The 
Attitudes Toward Hypnosis scale consists of fourteen items assessing positive beliefs about 
hypnosis, willingness to be hypnotised, fears about hypnosis and negative beliefs about 
hypnotisable people. Higher scores reflect more positive attitudes toward hypnosis. Items 
are rated on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from ‘Not at all true’ to ‘Entirely true’.  
The response expectancy questionnaire contained twelve questions requiring yes/no 
answers about whether or not participants expected to respond to each item on the 
Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility. For example, “If you were 
given a hypnotic suggestion that your arm will feel stiff and rigid, so stiff that you cannot 
bend it, do you expect to feel your arm becoming more stiff than normal?” Each of these 
items was followed by a confidence rating about their expectancy with response options as 
follows:  
1. I am completely guessing, I have no idea whether I would or wouldn't. 
2. I am more or less guessing, but I have some feeling I was right. 
3. I am pretty sure I am right. 
4. I am completely certain. 
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3.3 Procedure 
Participants completed the questionnaires measuring mindfulness, thought suppression, 
cognitive failures, internal/external encoding style, absorption and social desirability via an 
online survey either before or after completing the HOT task, i.e. the questionnaires and 
HOT task were run in counterbalanced order.  
 
3.4 Study 2 Results 
3.4.1 How hypnotisable are meditators? 
Meditators were screened for hypnotic suggestibility using the same scale as the highs and 
lows selected from the Sussex University hypnotic suggestibility screening database 
(WGSC; Bowers, 1993). Meditators (M = 1.92, SD = 1.98) were significantly less 
hypnotisable than highs M = 9.93, SD = 1.07), t(25) = 13.21  p<.001. There was no 
significant difference in hypnotic suggestibility between meditators and lows (M = 1.23, SD 
= 1.01), t(24) = 1.12  p=2.74. We also compared meditators’ hypnotic suggestibility with 
the Sussex University hypnotic suggestibility screening database (consisting of largely 
University undergraduates who have signed up for credit or payment over several years) 
and found that meditators were significantly less hypnotisable than the database average, 
(M = 4.9, SD= 2.51), t(710) = 3.92, p<.001, r=.15. Our database average is comparable 
with other norms for the scale (e.g. Carvalho, Kirsch, Mazzoni & Leal, 2008). Meditators 
were on average older (M = 36.4 years, SD = 12.9) than subjects in the database (M = 21.6 
years, SD = 5.9), so we compared the hypnotic suggestibility of meditators and subjects 
from the database with age as a covariate. . Age was not significantly correlated with 
hypnotic suggestibility, r=-.13, p=.44. The difference in hypnotic suggestibility remained, 
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with meditators less hypnotisable (adj. M 4.9 =, SEM = .10) than the database average (adj. 
M 2.6 =, SEM = .72), F(2, 699)  = 10.2, p=.001. The sample of meditators consisted 
entirely of males (N=13) and the database consisted of 165 males and 542 females. A t-test 
indicated that males (M = 4.8, SD = 2.9) and females (M = 4.9, SD = 2.4 had similar levels 
of hypnotic suggestibility, t(705) = 0.16, p = .88, CI LL: -.48, LL: .41.  The difference in 
hypnotic suggestibility between meditators and non-meditators remained when gender was 
added as a factor, F(1,704)  = 16.19, p<.001.   
 
3.4.2 Do meditators have negative attitudes or expectancies toward hypnosis? 
In order to ascertain whether attitudes toward hypnosis were responsible for meditators’ 
low hypnotic suggestibility, nine highs, nine lows, nine mediums and eight meditators 
completed the Attitudes Toward Hypnosis scale (ATH; Spanos, Brett, Menary, & Cross, 
1987). There was no significant difference between the hypnotic suggestibility of this group 
of highs, mediums and lows (M = 5.6, SD =3.8) who were selected to complete the 
attitudes toward hypnosis questionnaire and the unselected sample from the hypnotic 
suggestibility database, (M = 4.9, SD= 2.51), t(717)  = 1.34, p = .18, CI LL: -1.72, LL: 
0.33. Thus, the groups were considered to be equivalent in hypnotic suggestibility and the 
selected group was used to represent the population of the subject pool in a comparison of 
attitudes with meditators.  
A significant correlation was found between attitudes toward hypnosis and hypnotic 
suggestibility for meditators, highs, mediums and lows. Pearson’s r = .43, p=.03, 
suggesting that positive attitudes contribute to hypnotic suggestibility.  
Then, we compared meditators with the group of 27 highs, mediums and lows on 
hypnotic suggestibility, with attitudes as a covariate. Meditators (adjusted M = 1.61, SD = 
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3.53) were still significantly less hypnotisable than non-meditators (adjusted M = 5.78, SD 
= 4.19) while controlling for attitudes, F(3, 31) = 4.45, p=.01, indicating that attitudes 
toward hypnosis cannot account for differences in hypnotic suggestibility between 
meditators and non-meditators (assuming the scale sensitively measures attitudes, of 
course).  
In order to find out whether any expectancy differences accounted for the low 
hypnotic suggestibility of meditators, we compared the response expectancies of eight 
meditators with a group of non-meditators, consisting of 10 highs, eight mediums and eight 
lows. A large and significant correlation was found between response expectancy and 
hypnotic suggestibility for meditators, highs, mediums and lows, Pearson’s r = .75, p<.001, 
indicating that response expectancies contribute to hypnotic suggestibility.  
Meditators’ response expectancies (M=.64, SD=2.56) were not significantly 
different from non-meditators’ (M=.56, SD=1.95), t(33) = 1.30, p=.20, CI LL: -2.73, UL: 
.60. Crucially, the difference in hypnotic suggestibility between meditators (adjusted M = 
2.9, SEM =.85) and non-meditators (adjusted M = 5.7, SEM = .45) remained significant 
when controlling for response expectancy, F(1, 33) = 8.45, p=.006.  
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3.4.3 Who is HOT and who is not? 
Table 4. Mean scores on the HOT task (Standard deviation)  
 
Bonferroni adjusted post-hoc tests revealed that meditators reported significantly more 
HOTs during the task overall (as measured by HOT coupling) than highs and lows, p=.006 
and p=.025, respectively. An ANCOVA was performed between meditators (adjusted M = 
2.6, SEM  =.79) and non-meditators (adjusted M = 5.6, SEM  = 1.2) with hypnotic 
suggestibility as a dependent variable and HOT coupling as a covariate to see if the 
differences in HOT coupling could explain the difference in hypnotic suggestibility. 
(Attitudes and expectancies were not included in these analyses, as it was not expected that 
they would influence these measures.) The difference in hypnotic suggestibility was 
 Lows Highs Meditators  
HOT control 4.69 (1.08) 5.14 (0.64) 3.54 (1.38) 
F(2, 37) = .61, p = .55,  
η2=.03 
HOT 
coupling 
10.85 (0.96) 10.14 (1.06) 15.23 (1.26) 
F(2, 37) = 6.29, p = .004, 
η2=.26 
Ironic 
control 
10.92 (0.50) 11.43 (0.56) 8.08 (1.02) 
F(2, 37) = 6.17, p = .005,  
η2=.25 
Meditation 7.71 (0.81) 7.64 (0.73) 9.38 (0.89) 
F(2, 37) = 1.45, p = .25,  
η2=.07 
Meta-
awareness 
0.72 (.20) 0.71 (.26) 0.56 (.23) 
F(2, 37) = 2.14, p = .13,  
η2=.11 
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marginally significant, F(1, 37) = 3.8, p=.059.
10
 When ironic control was added as a 
covariate, the differences between meditators and non-meditators in hypnotic suggestibility 
was marginally significant, F(1, 37) = 1.5, p=.078. When the meditation component was 
added as a covariate, the differences between meditators and non-meditators in hypnotic 
suggestibility remained significant, F(1, 37) = 6.7, p=.014.   
Meditators were, however, poorer at ironic control than highs and lows, p=.007 and 
p=.028, respectively. Highs and lows scored similarly on HOT coupling, p=.63, CI LL: -
2.25, UL: 3.65 (a point we discuss later, given the results of Dienes, 2012), HOT control, 
p=.72, CI LL: -3.01, UL: 2.10, Ironic control, p=.51, CI LL: -2.06, UL: 1.05 and 
meditation p=.91, CI LL: -2.20, UL: 2.46. Highs scored similarly to lows and meditators on 
meta-awareness, (p=.23, CI LL: -0.06, UL: 0.37 and p=.29, CI LL: -0.21, UL: 0.23, 
respectively.)
11
 Lows and mediators also scored similarly, p=1.0, CI LL: -0.23, UL: 0.21. 
The Pearson’s correlation between hypnotic suggestibility and meta-awareness in highs and 
lows (not including meditators) was -.36, p=.06.
12
  
                                                          
1 A Bayes Factor can compare the theory (that HOT coupling mediated the difference in hypnotisability 
between meditators and non-meditators) to the null hypothesis. A Bayes Factor greater than 3 indicates strong 
evidence for the theory over the null; of less than a 1/3, strong evidence for the null over the theory; and 
anything in between  indicates the data are insensitive and do not strongly support either the null or the theory 
over the other.  A Bayes factor requires specification of what effect sizes the theory predicts. If HOT coupling 
mediated the difference in hypnotisability between meditators and non-meditators, the adjusted mean 
difference should be zero (null hypothesis); if the mediation was not complete, the adjusted mean difference 
should be between 0 and the unadjusted mean difference which was 5.78. Thus the alternative theory of 
incomplete mediation can be represented as a uniform between 0 and 5.78. The Bayes Factor was BF = 2.99, 
indicating reasonably strong evidence for the alternative theory over the null, i.e. despite the non-significant 
result difference between groups when HOT coupling is put in a covariate, the evidence more strongly 
indicates that HOT coupling does not completely mediate the difference.  
11
 We calculated the Bayes factor for the non-significant difference in meta-awareness between highs and 
meditators representing the theory that there is a difference using a uniform distribution between 0 and 5, 
based on the difference between highs and meditators in ironic control.  . The Bayes factor was 0.15, 
indicating reasonably strong evidence for the null over the alternative theory. 
12
 A Bayesian analysis was performed on the marginally significant correlation between meta-awareness and 
hypnotic suggestibility. Since the theory predicts a negative correlation between meta-awareness and hypnotic 
suggestibility, we represented it using a half-normal distribution with an SD of 0.3, since correlates of 
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3.4 How did hypnotic suggestibility and personality measures relate to the HOT task? 
Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated for measures of the HOT task and 
personality measures for the combined sample of meditators and non-meditators. Table 5 
shows standardised correlation coefficients (Fisher’s Z) and confidence intervals, calculated 
from Fisher’s Z, which was obtained for each correlation using the following formula: 
0.5*(natural log ((1+r)/(1-r)) and the standard error of Z (1/√(n-3)). The limits are 
converted back from Fisher’s Z to units of correlation. 
Ironic control was positively correlated with hypnotic suggestibility, whereas HOT 
coupling correlated negatively. Ironic control was positively correlated with internal 
encoding r=.34, p=.03, as was HOT control, r=.50, p=.001.Meta-awareness was 
negatively correlated with ironic control, r=.48, p=.002 and positively with HOT coupling, 
r=.37, p=.019. There were no other significant correlations among the personality 
measures and performance on the HOT task. But note the confidence intervals allow 
considerable population correlations as consistent with the data. 
 
 
Table 5. Correlations among HOT task measures and personality variables 
                                                                                                                                                                                
hypnotic suggestibility rarely reach a correlation of greater than 0.3 in repeated replications. The Bayes Factor 
was 3.18, indicating reasonably strong evidence for the alternative theory over the null, i.e. that greater 
hypnotic suggestibility is associated with less meta-awareness. We also performed a  Bayesian analysis on the 
non-significant correlation between hypnotic suggestibility and HOT coupling, again using a half-normal 
distribution and an SD of 0.3. The Bayes factor was 0.99, indicating that the data were insensitive. 
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 Meditation Ironic Control HOT Coupling HOT Control 
WGSC .14 [.07, .32] .36* [.06, .7] 
.01- [.03, .33] 
-.02 [-.34, .03] 
-.10, [-.42, .22] 
-.11, [-.21, .43] 
-.01, [-.33 ,.03] 
.34* [.02 ,.66] 
-.32* [.01., 65]  
.16 [-.16,.48] 
.10 [-.22, .42] 
-.06 [-.38, .26] 
.03 [-.29, .35] 
.03 [-.29, .35] 
  .03 [-.29, .35] 
.18 [-.14.50] 
.20 [-.12, .52] 
.06 [-.26, .38] 
-.21 [-.53, .11] 
-.10 [-.22, .42] 
.04 [-.28,.36] 
.50* [.23,.87] 
KIMS .24 [-.08, .56] 
.11 [-.21, .43] 
.18 [-.14, .50] 
.04, -.28, .36] 
.05 [-.27, .37] 
.29 [-.03, .61] 
MAAS 
WBSI 
CFQ 
TAS 
ESQ 
Values in parentheses = confidence intervals; *p<.05 
 
3.5 How did highs, lows and meditators differ on personality measures? 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine differences between highs, lows and 
meditators on the ‘external awareness’ and ‘internal absorption’ factors identified in study 
1. Highs scored significantly higher on internal absorption than lows, p=.04 but were 
similar to meditators, p = .19. Meditators scored higher on the external awareness factor, 
but this difference was only marginally significant, p=.07
13
. 
Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated for hypnotic suggestibility, internal 
absorption and external awareness. Hypnotic suggestibility positively correlated with 
‘internal absorption’, r = .45, p = .02 
                                                          
13
 A Bayes factor was calculated for the non-significant difference in external awareness between highs and 
meditators.  The theory that, there is a difference was represented using a uniform distribution between 0 and 
3, which seems reasonable based on the difference between highs and lows on internal absorption. The Bayes 
factor was 1.18, indicating that the data were insensitive. 
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Table 6.  Mean scores on internal absorption and external awareness (Standard deviation) 
 Lows Highs Meditators  
External Awareness -.12 (2.78) -1.43 (1.45) 1.78 (4.19) 
F(2,36) =2.81, p=.07, 
η2 =.16 
Internal Absorption -.64 (1.53) .82 (1.38) -.24 (1.42) 
F(2,37 )=2.81, p=.04, 
η2 =.13 
 
A one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences between highs, lows and meditators in 
the individual measures that comprised the internal absorption and external awareness 
factors: internal encoding, absorption, cognitive failures, thought suppression and both 
measures of mindfulness (see table 7). Meditators scored significantly lower than highs on 
the ESQ, p=.029 and higher on both measures of mindfulness: MAAS p=.04; KIMS p=.04. 
Meditators also scored significantly higher on the TAS than lows, p=.01, as did highs, 
p=.002. Interestingly, highs and meditators were similar in their levels of absorption. Lows 
scored lowest on thought suppression and highs scored highest, however this difference 
was non-significant. Meditators scored lowest on the cognitive failures questionnaire, 
followed by lows and then highs, but this difference was not significant. 
 
Table 7.  Mean scores on components of external awareness factor (standard deviation) 
 Lows Highs Meditators  
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MAAS 3.55 (.38) 3.13 (.15) 3.43 (.43) F(2,37) = 4.80, p=.014, η2 =.22 
CFQ 2.01 (.49) 2.17 (.31) 1.88 (.32) F(2,37) = 1.77, p=.19, η2 =.09 
WBSI 2.20 (.56) 2.63 (.20) 2.39 (.15) F(2,37) = 2.05, p=.137, η2 =.08 
ESQ 2.60 (.85) 3.45 (.65) 2.83 (.78) F(2,37) = 5.08, p=.011, η2 =.22 
KIMS 3.17 (.27) 3.10 (38) 3.40 (.38) F(2,37) = 2.48, p=.097, η2 =.12 
TAS 3.11 (.49) 3.58 (.39) 3.48 (.38) F(2,37) = 4.34, p=.02, η2 =.19 
Note: MAAS = Mindful Awareness Attention Scale; ESQ = Encoding Style Questionnaire; 
WBSI =White Bear Suppression Inventory; CFQ = Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, 
KIMS = Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills 
 
4. Discussion 
The aims of this study were to explore the role of higher order awareness and individual 
personality differences in hypnosis and meditation. As predicted, meditators were relatively 
low in hypnotic suggestibility, scoring lower than the average of our database and placing 
them, on average, in the ‘low hypnotisable’ category.  This finding provides support for the 
notion that meditation is different from hypnosis and establishes meditators as a suitable 
candidate population with which to explore differences in higher order awareness and 
personality traits in order to elucidate the mechanisms involved in hypnotic responding. 
 Before considering differences in higher order awareness, we need to take into account 
the possibility that the low hypnotic suggestibility of meditators could be explained by 
negative attitudes toward hypnosis, which might have inhibited their hypnotic 
104 
 
suggestibility. In line with previous research (Benham et al, 2006; Spanos et al, 1987; 
Spanos & McPeake, 1975), positive attitudes toward hypnosis were associated with greater 
hypnotic suggestibility. However, meditators’ attitudes were similar to those of non-
meditators, and differences between meditators and non-meditators in hypnotic 
suggestibility remained after controlling for attitudes.  
Since attitudes could not explain the differences in hypnotic suggestibility, we are left 
with several other possibilities. One alternative is that the differences could be accounted 
for by response expectancy, which has been consistently associated with hypnotic 
suggestibility (Braffman and Kirsch, 1999; Council, Kirsch and Grant, 1996; Gearan and 
Kirsch, 1993). Response expectancy was strongly correlated with hypnotic suggestibility (r 
= .75). This was a large effect, compared to that found by e.g. Benham et al (2006), who 
found coefficients of hypnotic suggestibility and response expectancy of around .12. 
Benham et al argue that response expectancy is predicted by response to previous 
suggestions, with successful hypnotic responses increasing expectations for future success. 
Participants in our study had previously experienced the suggestions when giving 
expectancy ratings. We asked participants very specific questions about how much they 
expected to respond to each suggestion and how confident they felt about this, making this 
a sensitive measure of response expectancy. By contrast, the measure of response 
expectancy used by Benham et al was very general, referring to a range of suggestions 
overall: “If at some future time we were to give you 20 suggestions, at that time (knowing 
what you know now) how many of those 20 suggestions do you think you would respond 
to?” (p. 345) Therefore, their measure of expectancy is likely to have been much less 
sensitive. Due to their correlational nature, these results cannot establish a causal direction 
of the relationship between expectation and hypnotic suggestibility. Nonetheless, 
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meditators still had similar hypnotic response expectancies to non-meditators and when 
controlling for response expectancy the difference in hypnotic suggestibility remained 
between meditators and non-meditators. 
Having ruled out expectancy and attitudes toward hypnosis as explanatory factors of the 
differences found between highs and meditators in hypnotic suggestibility, at least for now, 
differences in higher-order awareness remains a possible cause. In support of this 
possibility, meditators showed greater HOT coupling than lows and mediums in the higher 
order thoughts (HOT) task. HOT coupling was a measure of the number of HOTs across 
both the ‘attend’ condition, in which the objective was to have HOTs about the presented 
images, and the ‘ignore’ condition, in which the objective was to avoid HOTs about them. 
Meditators were also poorer than lows and highs at ironic control task; they were unable to 
avoid HOTs of the images presented in front of them, suggesting that the prevalence of 
HOTs was greater than their ability to control when they have HOTs. When ironic control 
and meditation were added as covariates (separately from attitudes), the difference in 
hypnotic suggestibility between meditators and non-meditators remained. Together these 
findings suggest that meditators’ lower hypnotic suggestibility may be associated with 
greater higher order awareness overall, but either that is not the whole explanation for their 
lower hypnotic suggestibility, or else we need more sensitive measures of HOT control and 
coupling. Future studies could simply use a longer duration for the meditation and ignore 
tasks, ideally e.g. 45 minutes instead of 15 minutes each. While Van Nuys (1973) obtained 
significant correlations of the meditation task with hypnotic suggestibility with 15 minutes, 
Spanos et al (1978) did not and used two blocks of 15 minutes. To measure meta-
awareness, Schooler (2002) also typically uses 45 minutes. We adopted a smaller length to 
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make the whole set of tasks manageable for subjects, but more sessions with subjects may 
be needed.  
It was surprising to find that lows and highs performed similarly on the HOT tasks, as 
we might expect that a lack of hypnotic suggestibility in lows would also be due to lower 
HOT coupling. However, Bayesian analyses indicated that the data were not sensitive 
enough to support the null hypothesis that there was no difference between highs and lows 
on HOT coupling, and indicated strong evidence that there is a difference between highs 
and lows in meta-awareness, and so we are planning to recruit more highs and lows from 
Sussex University and the local community and more meditators from retreat centres in 
Australia and New Zealand. 
The “HOT coupling” measure assumes that first order states are equivalent in different 
groups of subjects attending to the images; that is, that when subjects continue to look at 
the screen, first order representations are created to an equivalent degree in different groups 
and the remaining difference is in awareness of those states (Dienes, 2012). The motivation 
for this assumption for highs versus lows is the persistent failure to find attentional 
differences that replicate between highs and lows (e.g. Dienes et al 2009; Jamieson and 
Sheehan, 2002). The case for meditators versus non-meditators is less clear though, as 
attentional differences are often found (e.g. Moore and Malinowski, 2009; Slagter et al, 
2007; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). Thus, the difference in “HOT coupling” may partially reflect 
difference in ability to attend or disattend to the presented images, leading to differences in 
first order strength of representations between meditators and non-meditators. This issue 
remains problematic but one piece of evidence favouring a higher order explanation of 
individual differences on this task is the fact that meditators were worse at ironic control 
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than other groups – this is the opposite to what would be expected if they good at 
attentional regulation in controlling the strength of first order representations, but exactly 
what would be expected if they had particularly accurate higher order thoughts. First 
research could scan the different groups of subjects while performing the HOT task to 
determine if there is equivalent activation in visual perceptual areas but different levels of 
activation in metacognitive areas (i.e. prefrontal cortex). Nonetheless, the Schooler meta-
awareness measure may be less problematic in that the question is about awareness of what 
is explicitly a mental state (that of mind wandering) not of what is on the screen (the 
world). Thus, the fact that there appears to be a difference between highs and lows in meta-
awareness is encouraging for cold control theory. 
The finding that highs were better than meditators at ironic control is consistent with 
previous findings (Bowers and Woody, 1996; and Spanos et al, 1978; Van Nuys 1973), that 
highs were good at avoiding intrusive thoughts compared to lows. It was inferred from this 
that highs had good attentional abilities. An alternative explanation is that the apparent 
avoidance of intrusive thoughts is due to mind wandering and a lack of meta-awareness, 
which would fit with the prediction of cold control theory that highs will tend not to have 
accurate HOTs about the world. However, our results concerning differences in meta-
awareness in the Schooler sense and also in the sense of HOT coupling are inconclusive. 
The matter currently remains open. 
Despite the lack of strong evidence relating to differences in meta-awareness from the 
HOT task, findings from the questionnaires supported the idea that higher hypnotic 
suggestibility is associated with a lack of accurate HOTs about the world. Highs scored 
lower than meditators on external awareness. External awareness is the underlying factor 
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that emerged from the two mindfulness scales, the cognitive failures questionnaire and 
thought suppression. Higher scoring on this factor appears to indicate a greater tendency to 
pay attention to the external world and a lesser tendency to suppress thoughts and perform 
everyday cognitive errors. Hypnotic suggestibility was also associated with ‘internal 
absorption’ (the factor underlying absorption and internal encoding), with highs scoring 
higher than lows and meditators. This is in line with previous findings that hypnotic 
suggestibility is associated with absorption (Spanos and Barber, 1974; Tellegen and 
Atkinson, 1974). Interestingly, highs and meditators reported similar levels of absorption 
and both reported significantly more absorption than lows. They did differ on encoding 
style, however; highs had a significantly more internal encoding style than lows and 
meditators.  
These findings, combined with meditators’ tendency to have greater higher order 
awareness, could indicate that meditators are able to focus their attention externally on the 
environment. Therefore, the type of absorption meditators experience may, thus, be 
externally directed and involve ‘HOT’ absorption, in contrast to highs’ internally directed 
and ‘cold’ absorption. Alternatively as Roche and McConkey (1990) point out, social and 
cultural experiences can confound self-reported absorption. For example, self-reported 
absorption was greater when subjects were asked to include marijuana-induced experiences 
than when they were asked to exclude them. Similarly, meditators could have been taking 
into account meditative states of absorption (dhyanas; Sangharakshita, 2001) that do not 
reflect their everyday experience. In future, this could be explored by asking meditators to 
report on absorption experiences that either include or exclude meditative states, or by 
testing absorption directly, using an experimental task.  
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A more internal focus of attention as indicated by the scores on external awareness and 
internal absorption, relative to meditators and lows, could explain the mechanisms by 
which some highs experience hypnotic suggestions. However, this explanation might not be 
true for all highs. Some studies have shown that hypnotic responding can be achieved in 
different ways, and that these can be more or less effective for different suggestions. For 
example, Bryant and McConkey (1990) found that highs instructed to employ an active and 
constructive cognitive style to achieve a hypnotic suggestion for blindness were more 
successful than those who used a concentrative style. More recently, Terhune, Cardeña & 
Lindgren, 2011) identified two distinct subtypes of highs: high dissociating (HD) and low 
dissociating (LD) highs. HD highs exhibited poorer cognitive control in an attentional 
(Stroop) task than LD highs and lows.  Another recent study on HD and LD highs showed 
that HD highs were poorer at a sustained attention task (SART; Marcusson-Clavertz, 
Terhune & Cardeña, 2012) and LD highs were slightly better. The poor attentional 
performance of HD highs was explained by a greater tendency toward mind-wandering, as 
seen during a ganzfeld task than lows and LD highs. A greater propensity for HD highs to 
mind-wander goes with the lack of mindfulness and HOT coupling that we found among 
highs in our study, but this might only apply to HD highs. Thus low HOT coupling might 
account for hypnotic responding in HD but not LD highs. (Maybe LD highs will prove 
especially good at HOT control?) In future, HOT coupling, HOT control, cognitive failures, 
mindfulness and encoding style could be measured in highs identified as HD or LD to 
establish whether or not this is the case.  
Cold control theory postulates that executive control remains intact and that it is simply 
the awareness of executive control, in particular intentions that contribute to successful 
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hypnotic responding. In this case, HD highs are not necessarily inherently bad at attentional 
tasks (in fact, highs have been shown in some tasks to be superior when given suggestions 
to override the Stroop effect, e.g. see Raz et al, 2002). This could be tested using a similar 
procedure to that which Wyzenbeek & Bryant (2012) employed, to measure low 
dissociating and high dissociating highs’ performance on a secondary auditory decision       
task during a hypnotic suggestion. If HD highs are poorer at a secondary task due to poorer 
executive control, then they should perform worse than LD highs and lows.  
The lower levels of HOT coupling seen in highs, relative to meditators, provides 
support for cold control theory. However, this may only account for certain types of 
suggestion and certain subtypes of highs. Internal encoding and external awareness may 
represent separate components of hypnotic suggestibility, or different cognitive styles. For 
example, the differences in internal absorption could be driven by differences in HD/LD 
subtypes. In the study by Marcusson-Clavertz et al (2012), HD highs reported greater 
alterations in consciousness during ganzfeld (a mild sensory isolation that can trigger 
hallucinations), which could be associated with an internal encoding style where a greater 
bias in perception  is experienced due to a lower threshold of schema activation (see Naish, 
1986, for a discussion on how perceptual distortion in hypnosis may be engendered by a 
criterion shift). If this is the case, then hypnotic responding in some highs might be 
achieved by a change in perception, i.e. in first order mental states, in which case no 
consideration of higher-order awareness is required. Conversely, it may be the case that HD 
highs, who show greater cognitive flexibility and executive functioning, achieve hypnotic 
responding by strategically avoiding HOTs of intention  
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Our study is one of the first to explicitly investigate meta-cognition in the form of 
meta-awareness in meditators, despite the aim of the practice being to increase meta-
cognitive skills. However, it should not be taken for granted that meditation invariably 
leads to good meta-awareness and accurate higher order thoughts. It appears people with 
extensive experience of mindfulness meditation can misconstrue their mental states, 
believing for example they can mentally scan their bones for cracks or see atoms (Snyder & 
Rasmussen, 2009). Some of the various strands of Mahayana Buddhism seem to have 
arisen from meditators believing that appearances in their imagination were true visions of 
the Buddha who recounted new scriptures (Williams, 2008). Such phenomena appear not 
only to involve failures to have accurate higher order thoughts but also to be essentially 
hypnotic in nature. So our claim is not that meditation and hypnosis are mutually exclusive 
in practice, but that their aims, as far as regards mindfulness and metacognition, are 
opposite. This creates a tension, since mediators are less hypnotisable but still respond to 
some suggestions (yet to be shown in a longitudinal study).If we are wrong it should be 
possible to create strong hypnotic response in experienced meditators. For example, it may 
be that the attitudes questionnaire we used was just an insensitive instrument and by 
recasting a hypnotic suggestibility scale in a Buddhist language, meditators become at least 
as hypnotically suggestible as non-meditators. 
In summary, our findings indicate that high hypnotic suggestibility, relative to 
meditators, could be accounted for by a lack of accurate higher order awareness of the 
world or by first order perceptual alterations. Individual differences in dissociative 
tendencies among highs might have also confounded results on the HOT task. Furthermore, 
meditators, highs and lows form only a minority of the population, and there remain the 
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possibility that highs are a special group that is distinct from the rest of the population 
(Kirsch, 2011), as opposed to there being a linear relationship between higher order 
awareness and hypnotic suggestibility.  
 Future research could test the application of cold control theory by comparing HD 
and LD highs’ with lows’ and mediums’ performance on the HOT task, as well as their 
responses to different types of hypnotic suggestion (e.g. cognitive vs. motor; challenge vs. 
direct), as there may be an interaction between subtypes of highs and suggestion type, 
which could be explained differentially by theories that explain hypnosis as a) a change in 
first order mental states together with only accurate higher order states or b) as a strategic 
alteration in higher order awareness, allowing changes in first order states via unconscious 
intentions. 
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Abstract 
Hypnosis is purported to affect one’s sense of self-agency, which has previously been 
shown to affect judgment errors about when movements occurred. We investigated the 
perceived time of finger movements in voluntary, passive and hypnotically suggested 
ideomotor movements among high suggestible and low suggestible simulating subjects and 
meditators in a Libet style task. We also measured response expectancy and 
involuntariness. Highs judged ideomotor movements as feeling more involuntary than 
meditators and lows did. They also had stronger expectations to respond to the suggestion 
than simulators, although this could not account for differences in judgment error. Highs’ 
perceptions of ideomotor movements were significantly delayed, compared to lows’ There 
were no significant differences in judgment errors for the passive and for the voluntary 
conditions between groups. Meditators’ judgment errors were not significantly different 
from highs’ or simulators’ in any of the conditions. Importantly, our findings suggest that 
highs’ responses were genuine, as simulating lows were unable to simulate the delayed 
judgment error observed in highs. 
 
1. Introduction 
We tend to take the fact that we have ‘free will’ for granted. For example, when I 
raise my arm I almost invariably have the sense that I freely willed myself to do so. A stark 
counter-example is when a highly hypnotically suggestible person is given a suggestion 
that their arm will rise by itself because there is a helium balloon attached to it, which is 
lifting it up. This sense of involuntariness is one of the key features of hypnotic experience; 
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if the subject experiences their hand lifting as if by itself, despite having moved it 
themselves, then they have successfully responded to the suggestion. In this paper we will 
explore various explanations of this phenomenon and discuss how these can be understood 
in terms of metacognition. We will then compare the contrasting role of metacognition in 
hypnosis and meditation and discuss how this might contribute to differing responses to 
hypnotic suggestions.  
A number of cognitive theories have been put forward to explain the phenomenon 
of experiencing voluntary actions as involuntary in hypnosis. Cold control theory (Dienes, 
2012; Dienes and Perner, 2007) emphasises the role of metacognition, specifically a lack of 
awareness of the intention to perform the action, i.e. a lack of higher order thoughts – 
‘HOTs’ (in the sense discussed by Rosenthal, 2005). In the example given above, the 
intention at the first-order level would be “lift the arm”. Under normal, non-hypnotic 
conditions, a second-order thought (a HOT) would be something like “I am intending to lift 
my arm”, making one conscious of the intention to lift the arm. However, according to cold 
control theory, in hypnosis, HOTs are strategically avoided, so that one does not become 
conscious of the intention. In fact, the subjects responding hypnotically have the inaccurate 
HOT “I am not intending to lift my arm”, thus creating the experience of involuntariness. 
This way of describing hypnotic responding fits both the dissociation approach of Hilgard 
(1986) and the socio-cognitive approach of Spanos (1986). Hilgard postulated that the 
executive control system is split into two streams, a process which uses up attentional 
capacity. One stream controls movements but is hidden behind an amnesic barrier, so that 
the other part is unaware of this control, leading to a misattribution of the action to an 
external source, hence the feeling of involuntariness. In this way, hypnotic responding can 
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be seen as a failure of metacognition. Socio-cognitive theories emphasise the strategic 
nature of hypnotic responding, viewing hypnosis as a mundane form of behaviour that is 
possible without any attentional deficiency or enhancement but with the right expectations, 
motivations and attitudes (Kirsch, 1991; Spanos, 1991; Sarbin and Coe, 1972). Once again, 
hypnotic responding involves a metacognitive error in attributing one’s actions not to 
oneself but to the hypnotist or a special hypnotic state.  
Other approaches are less obviously metacognitive. For example, dissociated 
control theory (Woody & Bowers, 1994) postulates that the executive control system is 
weakened and dissociated form the monitoring/awareness system, so that hypnotically 
suggested actions are effected by contention scheduling (habit), avoiding intention entirely. 
So no metacognitive error is made when a subject declares they did not intend a hypnotic 
action. But all theories of hypnosis must explain why the hypnotic subject lacks the 
experience of self-agency and does not feel as though they made the movement themselves 
- and this is intrinsically a metacognitive phenomenon. As such, we might expect 
metacognitive consequences. 
The experience of self-agency affects judgments of when actions occur. Haggard & 
Tsakiris (2003) showed that passive finger movements triggered by transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) were judged as occurring later than voluntarily willed movements. 
Haggard, Carteledge, Daffyd & Oakley (2004) have also demonstrated that as well as 
feeling more involuntary, subjects judged hypnotically suggested ‘ideomotor’ movements 
as occurring later, compared to non-hypnotic actions.  They used hypnotically suggested 
‘ideomotor’ movements to investigate the estimation of the actual time the movement was 
made. Subjects’ estimations of the time the ideomotor movement was made were 
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significantly later than for active movements but similar to passive movements, suggesting 
that the feeling of agency was removed by the suggestion despite the hypnotically 
suggested movements actually being voluntarily initiated (possibly due to a lack of 
metacognition about the movement’s initiation). Neuroimaging research has demonstrated 
that ideomotor movements are produced by the same motor-production regions in the brain 
as active movements, yet they were attributed to an external source (Blakemore, Oakley 
and Frith, 2003). One problem with Haggard et al’s study (2004) is that they did not use a 
simulating control group, making it difficult to discern whether the effects seen were the 
result of genuine responses to the hypnotic suggestions or demand characteristics. 
The main aim of the current study was to establish the reality of the tendency of the 
timing of ideomotor actions to be judged as closer to passive than voluntary movements, 
taking into account expectations and demand characteristics. The size of the effect – about 
50ms – is perhaps one unlikely to be faked. Thus, the effect may at once be indicating 
something about how awareness of agency operates, and also indicating the subjective 
reality of hypnotic response. 
Hypnosis is sometimes said to be similar to meditation (e.g. Holroyd, 2003; Yapko, 
2011), although we have argued it is fundamentally different at a metacognitive level 
(Semmens-Wheeler & Dienes, 2012). Mediation is a broad term used to refer to a range of 
what can be described as mental training practices (aside from their more transcendental 
role). Meditation and hypnosis are frequently compared (e.g. Davidson & Goleman, 1977; 
Delmonte, 1981; Holroyd, 2008; Lifshitz, Campbell & Raz, 2012; and see Semmens-
Wheeler & Dienes, 2012 for a review). They have a number of characteristics in common. 
For example, both meditation and hypnosis are associated with a relatively high level of 
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absorption (Davidson & Goleman, 1977; Semmens-Wheeler & Dienes, in preparation) and 
they have both been purported to involve altered states of consciousness (but see Raz, 2011 
for discussion of how hypnosis can be distinguished from an altered state). Where they 
fundamentally differ, however, is that while hypnosis involves alterations or distortions of 
reality, meditation aims to cultivate a clearer, more veracious experience of the world 
(Kamalshila 1992), in which they are able to make more intentional and considered 
responses (Teasdale, Segal & Williams, 2003) at least partly by cultivating more accurate 
metacognition/HOTs. At least, that is the purpose of the practice. Mindfulness meditation is 
a practice in which one focuses attention on an object such as the breath as well as 
cultivating an open, non-judgemental awareness. Its effects in practitioners include 
apparent increased metacognitive awareness and mindfulness as assessed by self-report 
measures. (Teasdale, 1999; Thompson, 2006; Wallace, 1999). Findings from a recent study 
also suggest a possible increase in metacognition in subjects following brief training in 
mindfulness meditation; subjects were better able to sustain attention and track their 
movements during a computerised n-back task (Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David, 
& Goolkasian, 2010). Sustained attention does not necessarily involve metacognition, but 
enhanced metacogntiive skills may help with sustained attention (Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 
2002). 
Another point of comparison between meditation and hypnosis has been the role of 
attention (see Lifshitz, Campbell & Raz for a recent review). Slagter et al (2007) found that 
participants who had received three months of intensive meditation training were able to 
allocate their attentional resources more efficiently than controls in an attentional blink 
task.  On the Stroop task, expert meditators versus controls showed decreased Stroop 
interference (Moore and Malinowski, 2009), which was linked to greater levels of 
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awareness, as indexed by self-reported mindfulness. Similarly, highly hypnotisable people 
can reduce the Stroop effect, given a suitable suggestion (Raz, 2002). However, there is 
little evidence that highs are in general better at attention tasks than lows (Dienes et al 
2009, Kallio et al, 2001), and so it is not yet clear that attention serves as a point of 
similarity or difference between meditation and hypnosis. 
Based on the above findings, one might expect that meditators are better at mental 
control, such as deciding when to inhibit or attend to particular mental states, than non-
meditators. We tested this at Sussex University by asking highs, meditators and controls 
(lows) to either attend to (cultivate HOTs) or ignore (avoid HOTs) a sequence of images 
presented on a screen immediately in front of them, which provided a persistent first order 
visual representation of each image (Semmens-Wheeler & Dienes, in preparation). Subjects 
were asked at random intervals (roughly once a minute) whether they were just that instant 
before aware of seeing the image. Meditators had more HOTs overall and were less able to 
avoid HOTs of the images than highs and lows, when asked to ignore the images. 
Conversely, highs were better able to avoid HOTs of the images (ironic control) and had 
fewer accurate HOTs (HOT coupling). This ironic control appears due to a lack of HOT 
coupling to first order mental states, rather than a special ability in controlling HOTs 
(Dienes, 2012), and so we would expect highs to have fewer HOTs coupled to first order 
mental representations of action or intention and thus less awareness of their own actions 
than meditators. Meditators might thus be aware of their actions earlier, by virtue of being 
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more mindful; or they may become aware later by virtue of responding to more bottom up 
than top down information.
14
 Thus, no precise predictions are made about meditators. 
The primary aim of the present study was to compare judgment errors made by 
highs and low susceptible subjects (simulators) when estimating the time at which they 
made a finger movement passively, voluntarily or following a hypnotic suggestion. Using a 
group of simulators as a control group allowed us to evaluate whether or not we were 
seeing a genuine effect (although we did not employ a full real-simulator design as the 
study was not blind - see Orne, 1971). Following Haggard et al (2004), we predicted that 
highs would judge hypnotically suggested movements as occurring later than ordinary 
voluntarily initiated movements. Crucially we predicted that simulators would not show 
this effect. A secondary aim was to see if meditators showed any differences in timing 
judgments compared to the other groups.  
 
2. Method 
2.1 Subjects 
Eleven meditators (mean age = 36.7 years, SD = 10.6; 11 males) were recruited from the 
Brighton Buddhist Centre in Brighton, UK and the Triratna Dharma Training course at 
Madhyamaloka Buddhist Community in Birmingham, UK. Meditators had a mean of 21.9 
years of meditation practice experience (SD = 4.8). They were all practicing Buddhists in 
the Triratna Buddhist Community and their primary meditation practices were mindfulness 
                                                          
14
 A study recently conducted in our lab at Sussex suggests that meditators tend to have a 
more internal perceptual encoding style than highs, as measured by Lewicki’s (2005) 
Encoding Style Questionnaire (see paper 3). 
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of breathing (focused awareness of sensations of the breath), ‘just sitting’ (open 
monitoring) and mettā bhavana (loving kindness). Twelve highly hypnotisable (4 males and 
8 females, mean age = 25.8 years, SD = 6.7) and twelve low hypnotisable subjects (mean 
age = 22.6 years, SD = 7.7; 4 males and 8 females) were selected from the University of 
Sussex hypnosis screening database. Highly hypnotisable subjects scored between 9 and 12 
(out of 12) and low hypnotisable subjects scored 0-3 (out of 12) on the Waterloo-Stanford 
Group Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility, Form C (WSGC; Bowers, 1993).  Ethical approval 
was received from the University of Sussex ethical committee. Informed consent was 
obtained from each participant before commencing with the study. High and low 
hypnotisable subjects were remunerated with course credits or £5 per hour for their 
participation in the study. Meditators were paid £20 for their overall participation in the 
study.  
 
2.2 Materials 
A device for lifting subjects’ fingers and measuring the precise time at which the finger 
lifted was custom-made for this experiment by Peter Naish. The apparatus consisted of a 
box with a ‘finger rest’ made from half a plastic pipe, where subjects placed their right 
index finger for the duration of the experiment. Inside the box was a lever connected to a 
lifting rod, which could push up the finger rest from underneath and was activated by 
squeezing a motorcycle brake attached by its cable to the box. Subjects’ fingers were 
secured to the finger rest using micro-pore tape and the finger rest was covered with 
insulating foam to minimise any sensation of the lever pushing the finger rest up during 
passive conditions. 
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The box had a micro switch one inch in front of the lifting rod. The underside of the 
finger rest was covered in self-adhesive copper tape to create a circuit when the finger rest 
was connected with the microswitch. The microswitch recorded the timings of the 
movement, i.e. when the circuit was broken by the finger lifting.  Movement timings were 
displayed to the experimenter on an LED display, which fixed on the back of an un-
numbered clock face. The clock hand was calibrated to revolve at a speed of 2.56s per 
cycle. 
 
2.3 Experimental Procedure 
The design of the experiment was adapted from that used by Libet, Gleason, Pearl & 
Wright (1983) and Haggard et al (2004). There were three main task conditions: voluntary, 
passive, and ideomotor. The voluntary and passive conditions were carried out with and 
without hypnosis. Hypnosis and non-hypnosis conditions were counterbalanced so that half 
of each group carried out non-hypnosis first and then hypnosis conditions, and vice-versa. 
Within hypnosis conditions, passive, ideomotor and voluntary conditions were 
counterbalanced, and non-hypnosis passive and voluntary conditions were also 
counterbalanced. Subjects carried out 3 practice trials and 30 tests trials in each condition. 
  Throughout all conditions the participant’s right index finger was placed on a finger 
lifting device. The finger lifting device was hidden from the participant’s view by a screen. 
In each trial, subjects watched the clock hand revolving and were asked to report the time at 
which they felt their finger actually begin to lift. In the voluntary condition, subjects were 
required to wait for the clock hand to make at least one full revolution and then voluntarily 
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lift their right index finger, at any time they choose. Subjects were asked to avoid making 
finger movements in a non-random way, such as always moving in synchrony with some 
particular position of the clock hand.  In the passive condition, the participant’s fingers 
were lifted by the mechanism, at similar time intervals to those made during the voluntary 
condition. In the ideomotor condition the subjects lifted their finger in response to a 
hypnotic suggestion (see below), whether it was a genuine or a simulated response. After a 
brief random interval the clock hand stopped revolving and subjects were required to report 
when the movement occurred. The timings of these movements were recorded by a micro 
switch, which is part of the finger lifting device.   
 
2.4 Hypnosis Procedure 
A brief hypnotic eyes-closed relaxation induction was given to subjects. They were 
given the suggestion that they would remain hypnotised once they had opened their eyes. 
This was then followed by either the voluntary, passive or ideomotor condition.  In the 
ideomotor condition, subjects were given the following hypnotic suggestion: “Now I want 
you to imagine a helium filled balloon that is attached to your right forefinger. In a few 
moments your finger will start to feel light. It is getting lighter and lighter... lighter and 
lighter...... rising up, slowly but surely, rising up. .....That’s right. ......Now let it gradually 
go back to normal and sink down again........Now you can feel what it’s like for your finger 
to become light and lift it will do so within a few moments of me telling you that it’s 
getting light again. ......In a few moments your finger will become light…... Now you can 
let your finger go back to normal and sink down again.” After the ideomotor trials were 
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completed the suggestion was removed, but subjects were reminded that they were still 
hypnotised, if they were still to complete trials in the hypnosis condition. Lows and 
meditators were asked to simulate the hypnotic movement as if they were really 
experiencing the suggestion, and this was checked in the practice trials to ensure that 
comparable movements were made by subjects in all groups. Subjects were also asked to 
rate the degree to which they expected to respond to the suggestion, and were then asked 
how involuntary the ideomotor movements had felt. Lows and meditators, who were asked 
to simulate the ideomotor response, were asked to answer these questions honestly and not 
to simulate. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Did a hypnotic induction affect judgment errors? 
Mean judgement errors were compared across groups and conditions. Paired-sample t-tests 
showed that voluntary trials with hypnosis (M = 22.88, SD = 188.93) and without hypnosis 
(M = 13.34, SD = 124.53) were not significantly different, t(34)  = 0.34, p=.74, CI LL: -
47.43; UL: 66.50.  Passive trials with hypnosis (M = 85.97, SD = 106.99) and without 
hypnosis (M = 91.10, SD = 90.33) were not significantly different either, t(34) = 0.61, 
p=.54,  CI LL: -38.71; UL: 20.78, so mean judgement errors for active and passive trials 
were collapsed across hypnosis and non-hypnosis conditions
15
. 
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 In order to determine whether these non-significant differences could be interpreted as evidence that a 
hypnotic induction made no difference to judgement errors overall, we performed a Bayesian analysis. We 
used a uniform distribution with an upper limit based on  the largest differences in judgement error 
conditions in Haggard et al’s (2004) study, which were between the passive and voluntary conditions  after a 
hypnotic induction: 38ms. The Bayes Factor for the comparison of voluntary movements with no hypnotic 
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3.2 Did highs and simulators differ in judgment errors and involuntariness ratings? 
The mean judgement errors for all groups are shown in table 1. First we will consider the 
differences between highs and lows (excluding meditators), as that was the main aim of the 
study. A 2x3 (highs vs. simulators x passive, voluntary, ideomotor) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with judgment error as a dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of 
condition, F(2, 21) = 4.41, p=.018. The passive condition elicited the largest judgment 
errors overall (M = 105.13, SEM = 19.20), followed by the ideomotor condition (M = 
82.51, SEM =31.05) and the (M = 13.63, SEM = 25.34). There was a main effect of group, 
F(2, 21) = 8.05, p=.010. Highs’ judgments errors the (M = 26.72, SEM = 61.98) were more 
delayed than simulators’ the (M = 16.70, SEM = 23.44). Although the interaction was not 
significant, a series of comparisons were conducted using a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level 
of .017 that means family wise error rate was controlled despite the lack of interaction.  
Highs’ judgment error was significantly greater in the ideomotor condition, compared to 
simulators, t(21) = 2.86, p=.014. This comparison was the main point of the experiment 
(and so strictly does not require correction, but survives correction anyway.)  Highs’ and 
that simulators’ judgment errors were not significantly different in the voluntary and 
passive conditions, t(21) = 1.69, p=.11, CI LL: -191.12, UL: 19.71and t(21) = 1.31, p=.21, -
CI LL: -130.02, UL: 29.70. Highs also rated their ideomotor finger movements as being 
significantly more involuntary than simulators did, t(22) = 5.35, p<.001. (Simulators were 
instructed to give real responses for their ratings, they just simulated movements.) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
induction condition with voluntary movements without hypnotic induction was 0.92 and for the passive with 
hypnotic induction and passive without hypnotic induction was 0.69. The evidence supports the null since it 
is less than 1, and thus the results indicate that hypnotic induction made no difference to judgement errors.  
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Table 1. Mean judgement errors relative to actual time of finger movement (ms) 
 Simulators Meditators Highs  
Ideomotor -0.73 (179.56) 88.09 (165.28) 165.94 (88.75) 
F(2, 31) = 3.87, 
p=.04, η2=.19 
Passive 80.05 (71.44) 52.33 (56.32) 130.21 (112.44) 
F(2,31) = 2.31,        
p= .12, η2=.08 
Voluntary -29.22 (85.49) 5.13 (120.76) 56.48 (15.37) 
F(2,31) = 1.43,        
p= .26,  η2=.13 
 
Highs’ response expectancy ratings were significantly greater than simulators’ (see table 2), 
t(18) = 5.37, p<.001, so we compared highs’ and simulators’ judgment errors in the 
ideomotor condition with response expectancy as a covariate. The effect remained 
significant, with highs’ judgment errors (adj. M = 172.53, SD =178.95) being greater than 
simulators’ (adj. M = -5.79, SD =172.92). 
 
Table 2. Mean response expectancy and involuntariness ratings for hypnotic suggestion 
 Simulators Meditators Highs  
Expectancy -0.25 (2.53) 1.25 (3.00) 2.56 (1.74) 
F(2, 24) = 3.07, 
p=.04, η2=.33 
Involuntariness 1.75 (1.14) 1.5 (1.0) 3.33 (1.0) 
F(2,24) = 6.88,        
p= .005,  η2=.50 
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3.3 Did meditators differ from highs and lows in their judgment errors, involuntariness 
ratings and response expectancies? 
A 3x3 ANOVA was conducted (highs vs. simulators vs. meditators x passive vs. voluntary 
vs. ideomotor) with judgment error as a dependent variable. There was a main effect of 
group, F(1, 30) = 4.22, p=.024 and of condition, F(1, 30) = 6.42, p=.017, but there was no 
significant interaction, F(2, 30) = 1.10, p=.49. Although the interaction was again non-
significant, a series of independent t-tests with Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .017 
were conducted.  Meditators’ judgment errors were similar to highs in the voluntary, t(22) 
= 0.85, p = .41, CI LL: -177.78, UL: 75.07, passive, t(22) = 1.96 p = .07, CI LL: -161.42, 
UL: 5.67, and ideomotor conditions, t(22) = 1.32 p = .20, CI LL: -200.92, UL: 45.21
16
. 
Meditators’ judgment errors were also similar to simulating lows’ in the voluntary, t(22) = 
0.81 p = .42, CI LL: -53.18, UL: 121.89, passive, t(22) = 1.23 p = .22, CI LL: -84.91, UL: 
29.49, and ideomotor conditions, t(21) = 1.10 p = .60, CI LL: -58.35, UL: 235.98. 
Paired-sample t-tests indicated that meditators’ judgment errors were also similar 
across all conditions. (Voluntary and passive conditions: p = .62, CI LL: -151.24, UL: 
95.25; voluntary and ideomotor conditions: p = .62, -CI LL: -151.24, UL: 95.25; ideomotor 
and passive conditions: p = .76, CI LL: -135.43, UL:  63.96). 
                                                          
16
  In order to determine whether or not these non-significant results could be interpreted as evidence that 
meditators do not differ from highs and simulators in their ideomotor judgements errors we used a Bayes 
factor analysis (Dienes, 2008, 2011). A Bayes Factor can compare the theory (that meditators’ judgement 
errors in the ideomotor condition would differ from highs’ and from simulators’) to the null hypothesis. A 
Bayes Factor greater than 3 indicates strong evidence for the theory over the null; of less than a 1/3, strong 
evidence for the null over the theory; and anything in between  indicates the data are insensitive and do not 
strongly support either the null or the theory over the other.  A Bayes factor requires specification of what 
effect sizes the theory predicts. We based our predictions on the difference in judgement error seen 
between highs and simulators in the ideomotor condition, which was 167ms. Predictions of the theory were 
represented as a half-normal. The Bayes Factor for the comparison of meditators with highs was 1.78 and 
for meditators with simulators was 1.42 – the evidence actually supports the theory weakly more than the 
null since it is greater than 1, indicated that the data were insensitive. 
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Independent t-tests were performed using a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of .025 
to see if meditators’ response expectancies (see table 2) differed from those of simulators 
and highs. Meditators were similar in their response expectancies to both simulators 
t(19)=1.27, p=.22 but had lower expectancies than highs, t(17) = 2.39, p=.03. Meditators’ 
involuntariness ratings (see table 2) were significantly lower than highs’, t(17) = 4.82, 
p<.001 but were not significantly different from simulators’,  t(19) = .11, p=.91, CI LL: -
1.12, UL: 1.01. 
 
4. Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to investigate the effects of hypnotic suggestion on 
awareness of movement in highly hypnotisables, compared with controls (simulators). In 
line with previous findings (Haggard et al, 2004), a hypnotic induction made no difference 
to judgement errors overall. We replicated Haggard et al’s (2004) findings that highs, 
unlike meditators and controls, judged true voluntary finger movements as occurring sooner 
than hypnotically suggested ideomotor finger movements, despite movements in both 
conditions being voluntarily initiated, rather than being passively moved.
17
 Highs’ 
judgement errors for ideomotor movements were similar to those of passive movements, 
suggesting that the hypnotic suggestion altered highs’ sense of self-agency so that they felt 
that they did not have full voluntary control over the ideomotor finger movements. 
Involuntariness ratings corroborated the judgement error data, with highs reporting 
                                                          
17
 The judgement error in Haggard et al’s (2004) study was around 50ms, whereas in this study it was around 
100ms. This might be due to the fact that subjects used different types of finger movement. In Haggard et 
al’s study subjects pressed down on a button, a movement that is extremely common and familiar to most 
people, whereas in this study subject’s fingers were lifted, a movement that is more seldom made than 
pressing down, which could account for the longer delays seen. 
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ideomotor movements as feeling significantly more involuntary than meditators and 
controls did.  
Our study appears to demonstrate a real effect of ideomotor hypnotic suggestion, as 
simulators, who were asked to simulate the hypnotic experience that was suggested to 
them, did not display the delayed judgement errors or reports of involuntariness that 
genuine highs did. This suggests that highs’ performance in response to hypnotic 
suggestions for their fingers to lift was not just the result of demand characteristics, as if 
this were the case, then subjects who were simulating the response would have made 
similar judgement errors. It may be argued that the simulators were not simulating very 
hard, as they did not rate the movements as involuntary as highs, whereas in true (blind) 
real-simulating designs, simulators tend to over-act compared to the behaviour of highs 
(Spanos, 1986).  Nonetheless, when differences in expectations were statistically 
controlled, highs and simulators still differed in their judgment errors for ideomotor 
actions. These findings provide an important addition to the existing body of literature 
suggesting that hypnosis is a genuine phenomenon. For example, Kirsch, Silva, Carone, 
Johnston, Dennis & Barry (1989) used a ‘surreptitious observation’ paradigm to show the 
subjective reality of hypnotic response.  Highs and simulating lows were given a hypnotic 
induction and several suggestions. The experimenter was present in one condition, and they 
were secretly observed in the other. Simulators responded significantly less when the 
experimenter was not present, whereas highs continued to respond as normal, indicating 
that highs’ responses are not simply the result of compliance or demand characteristics, 
which influenced the simulators. 
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Expectations about responding are important determinants of response (see Kirsch, 
1991). Highs’ ratings of response expectancy were higher than simulators’, yet, as 
mentioned, when we added expectancy as a covariate the difference was slightly reduced 
but still remained, suggesting that expectancy did not account for the differences in 
judgments of hypnotically suggested ideomotor movements between highs and simulators. 
Expectancy has been shown to affect other types of suggestion, however (e.g. see 
Semmens-Wheeler, Dienes and Duka, under review).  
The findings do not provide support for the theory that highs have superior 
attentional abilities as one would expect that if this were the case, then highs would be 
better at attending to their movements. However, the results did not provide support for the 
previously observed superior attentional abilities of meditators, either. Meditators 
performed similarly to the other groups, however Bayesian analyses indicated that the data 
were insensitive and so we cannot draw any firm conclusions. We are planning to collect 
more data as we only tested a small sample. The means indicated that meditators’ judgment 
errors lay somewhere in-between highs’ and simulators, and more data might reveal 
whether or not there are any real differences.  
In sum, we replicated the finding that highs experienced a reduced sense of agency 
compared to lows and meditators when given a hypnotic suggestion to move their finger. 
Our findings also suggest that this effect is genuine and not a result of demand 
characteristics, because simulators were unable to produce the same effect, as reflected in 
their judgment errors. We cannot yet draw any conclusions regarding meditators. In 
addition to collecting more data from highs, lows and meditators, who represent a small 
proportion of the population we are also planning to test mediums, as hypnotic 
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susceptibility may not be a dimensional trait and that the differences we have observed 
between highs and lows may be driven by special differences between the groups (Kirsch, 
2011). We are also in the process of collecting data on awareness of intentions, as this 
might more specifically reflect metacognitive differences in individuals with differing 
levels of hypnotic susceptibility. 
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Summary of Findings, Theoretical Implications and Suggested Further Research 
 
The primary contribution of this research has been to further our understanding of the role 
of metacognition and higher order awareness in hypnosis. The evidence from the research 
findings points to a reduction in metacognition being involved. However, there are 
alternative explanations that need to be further explored in order to draw firm conclusions.  
Firstly, we showed that alcohol increased mediums’ subjective hypnotic responding, 
compared to a placebo (paper 2). This finding is concordant with previous research by 
Sayette et al (2006), which showed that alcohol increased subjects’ mind-wandering 
tendencies and reduced their higher order awareness of such episodes, and with cold control 
theory (Dienes & Perner, 2007; Dienes, 2012), which posits that hypnotic responding is a 
results of avoidance of accurate HOTs. A logical inference is that alcohol impaired the 
DLPFC, which is involved in the production of accurate HOTs, and that a reduction in 
HOTs was thus responsible for the increase in hypnotic susceptibility in subjects who 
received alcohol. However, alcohol affects a large region of the pre-frontal cortex, beyond 
the DLPFC, and while the findings provide support cold control theory, they also provide 
support for other theories that postulate a reduction in frontal lobe executive functioning 
(e.g. Woody & Bowers, 1994; Gruzelier, 1998). 
It was interesting to see, however, that despite alcohol’s effects on frontal lobe 
functioning, subjects’ responses to a negative hallucination, which one would intuitively 
suppose involved inhibitory control, were increased. This suggests that either the task does 
not involve inhibition of a first order mental state of perception or that highs are no better 
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than lows at inhibitory control, as suggested by the findings of a recent study by Dienes et 
al (2009). The finding could alternatively be explained metacognitively; it is possible that 
highs are better at attending away from the unperceived object without being aware of the 
associated intention to do so. This latter possibility is reflected in highs’ better performance 
on ironic control and fewer HOTs, compared to meditators. However, while this possibility 
might explain differences in hypnotic suggestibility between meditators and highs, it cannot 
currently explain differences between highs and lows. In future, in order to more directly 
investigate the role of metacognition we would need to take a more direct measure of 
higher order awareness while testing the effects of alcohol on hypnotic responding. 
Since a reduction in higher order-awareness may contribute to hypnotic 
susceptibility, it follows that an increase in high-order awareness would be associated with 
relatively low hypnotic susceptibility. In fact, it is the difference in metacognition and 
higher order awareness that appears to fundamentally distinguish hypnosis from meditation 
(paper 1 and paper 3). Meditation has been theoretically linked to increased metacognition 
(e.g. Teasdale, 2006), yet to my knowledge there has been no evidence to date that 
empirically supports this link. The findings in this research presented here the findings here 
provide the first empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that meditation is linked to 
increased metacognition. These findings indicate that HOT coupling, ironic control and 
meta-awareness may contribute to differences in hypnotic suggestibility between highs and 
meditators, although Bayesian analyses indicated that our data are not sensitive enough to 
draw firm conclusions and further data needs to be collected (paper 3).  It is not easy to 
distinguish first order mental states from higher order thoughts, and The HOT task has been 
only recently developed. Future research could seek to validate its measures of HOTs. One 
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way of doing this might be to compare subjects on a Schooler-type meta-awareness task 
(Schooler, 2002; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006).  Functional neuroimaging to also be used 
to investigate actual neural correlates associated with different HOT task responses, and 
could also shed light on the role of the DLPFC in metacognition in hypnosis and 
meditation. 
Longitudinal designs might also help to address some of the questions elicited by 
our studies. We used  cross-sectional designs (in Papers 3 & 4) and we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the meditators we recruited, who have persisted with meditation practice for 
a long period of time, did not already possess the particular traits or characteristics 
observed, such as higher levels of mindfulness and an external encoding style. If someone 
is good at meditation already because they are calmer and more mindful, they may be more 
motivated to continue practising. These traits could potentially also be associated with low 
hypnotic suggestibility, but not be caused by meditation practice, so in future longitudinal 
studies should be carried out to assess the effects of mindfulness meditation training on 
metacognition and perceptual encoding style. For the logic of examining cold control 
theory of hypnosis it does not strictly matter why meditators have high mindfulness, only 
that they do. 
 In light of the differences between highs and meditators, the latter of whom have 
relatively low hypnotic suggestibility (paper 3) it is intriguing that there was no difference 
between highs and lows in any of the HOT task measures. However, recent studies have 
highlighted differences in subtypes of highs, which might confound the data. For example, 
recent research by Marcusson-Clavertz, Terhune & Cardeña (2012) indicated that highs 
with a greater tendency to dissociate (HD highs) had a greater propensity to mind-
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wandering than ‘low dissociating’ (LD) highs. Dissociation tendencies in highs might have 
diluted any differences between highs and lows in higher-order awareness. They may have 
been more distinct in meditators due to them being a more specific and homogeneous 
sample in terms of the performance on the higher-order awareness tasks we measured. 
Gorassini & Spanos (1986) reported that they were able to increase the hypnotic 
suggestibility of at least 50% of lows, at least temporarily, using the Carleton Skills 
Training Program. What factors led some people’s hypnotic suggestibility to increase, 
while others remained the same? Perhaps it was due to differences in metacognitive 
abilities, or it could have been merely due to compliance. In future, baseline measures of 
personality and higher order awareness could be taken in order to assess this.  
Dissociative tendencies might also play a role in how individual highs achieve 
hypnotic experiences to suggestions. HD highs showed reduced performance on a cognitive 
control task (Terhune et al, 2011) following a hypnotic induction, whereas lows and LD 
highs showed increased performance. It might be that LD highs are actually better than HD 
highs at, for example, HOT control tasks, and these might be the type of highs in whom 
greater cognitive flexibility is seen (e.g. Gruzelier & Warren, 1993). Further illumination of 
the issue could come from testing the neglected but majority population of medium 
hypnotically suggestible subjects (Kirsch, 2011). If hypnotic suggestibility is not a 
dimensional trait and then differences may be driven by special differences in highs or lows 
that we are unable to see as we are only examining the extreme ends of the ‘spectrum’.  
It might also be useful to collect self-report data on personality correlates from 
mediums. The results here replicate the findings of many previous studies (e.g. Tellegen & 
Atkinson, 1974) that absorption and hypnotic suggestibility are correlated. What is perhaps 
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surprising, though, is that meditators and highs reported similar levels of absorption. Data 
from mediums might add a piece of the puzzle that is currently missing, which could show 
that absorption co-varies with hypnotic suggestibility or is only a relevant factor when 
comparing highs and lows. Additionally, as Roche & McConkey (1990) point out, subjects’ 
self-reports of absorption can be confounded by social and cultural experiences such as 
drug-taking or even periods of social isolation, and so, given that meditation can lead to 
states of absorption (dhyana; see Paper 1), these may influence meditators’ reports. It might 
also be that the focus of absorption is different, perhaps internal for highs and external for 
meditators, as reflected in their perceptual encoding styles.  Phenomenological reports (e.g. 
see Pekala, 1991) could help to further clarify whether or not this is the case. Meditators 
could also be asked to complete self-reports of absorption with and without reference to 
meditation experience, for comparison.  
Finally, the findings here provide support for the existing body of literature that 
indicates that a) expectancies and attitudes are important factors in hypnotic responding 
(papers 2, 3 and 4), that b) they cannot completely explain hypnotic responding (papers 2, 3 
and 4), and that c) hypnosis is a real phenomenon, as demonstrated in paper 4. The findings 
here also demonstrated, in line with previous studies (Blakemore et al, 2003; Haggard et al, 
2004), that hypnosis reduces one’s sense of self-agency, an intrinsically metacognitive 
experience, which has an impact on the judgment of when one makes a movement. We are 
currently planning to collect data on awareness of intentions in highs, lows, mediums and 
meditators for passive, voluntary and suggested ideomotor movements. 
In sum, the findings here have demonstrated hypnosis as a real phenomenon, 
providing preliminary evidence in support of theories that postulate differences in 
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metacognition (e.g. cold control theory, Dienes & Perner, 2007; Dienes, 2012) and 
illustrating how meditation and hypnosis research programmes may be combined so as to 
bring out not just similarities but especially differences. 
 
  
138 
 
References 
 
Aikens, D., & Ray, W. J. (2001). Frontal lobe contributions to hypnotic susceptibility: A 
neuropsychological screening of executive function. International Journal of 
Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 49, 320–329. 
Anālayo (2010). Satipatthana: The Direct Path to Realization. Cambridge, England: 
Windhorse Publications. 
Ås, A. (1963). Hypnotisability as a function of nonhypnotic experiences. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66, 142–150. 
Austin, J. (2006). Zen-Brain Reflections Reviewing Recent Development in Meditation and 
States of Consciousness. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Baars, B. J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Baer, R. A., Smith, G.T. & Allen, K. B. (2004). Assessment of mindfulness by self-report: 
The Kentucky inventory of mindfulness skills. Assessment, 11(3), 191–206. 
Banyai, E. I., Hilgard, E. R. (1976). A comparison of active-alert hypnotic induction with 
traditional relaxation induction. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 85(2), 218–224. 
Barber, T. X. (1969). Hypnosis: A scientific approach. New York: Van Nostrand.  
Barber T.X. (1999). Hypnosis: A mature view. Contemporary Hypnosis, 16(3), 123-127. 
Barber, T.X. & Calverley, D.S. (1963) Toward a theory of hypnotic behavior: Effects on 
suggestibility of task motivating instructions and attitudes toward hypnosis. The 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67(6), 557-565. 
139 
 
Barber T.X. & Wilson, S.C. (1978). The Barber Suggestibility Scale and the Creative 
Imagination Scale: Experimental and clinical applications. American Journal of 
Clinical Hypnosis, 21: 84-108. 
Barnier, A. J. Dienes, Z. & Mitchell, C. J. (2008). How hypnosis happens: New cognitive 
theories of hypnotic responding. In M. Nash & A. Barnier (Eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Hypnosis: Theory, Research, and Practice (pp 141-178). Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press. 
Barnier, A., & McConkey, K. (2004). Defining and identifying the highly hypnotisable 
person. In M. Heap, R. J. Brown & D. A. Oakley (Eds.). The Highly Hypnotisable 
Person. London, England: Routledge. 
Barnier, A., & Nash, M. R. (2008) Introduction: A roadmap for explanation, a working 
definition. . In M. R. Nash & A. Barnier (Eds.). The Oxford handbook of hypnosis: 
Theory, research and practice (pp. 1–18). Oxford, England: Oxford University 
Press. 
Barnier, A. & Woody, E.Z. (2008). Hypnosis scales for the twenty-first century: what do 
we need and how should we use them? In Nash, M., and Barnier, A. (Eds.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis:  Theory, Research, and Practice. Oxford University 
Press, pp 255-282. 
Benham, G., Bowers, S., Nash, M., & Muenchen, R. (1998). Self-fulfilling prophecy and 
hypnotic response are not the same thing. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 75, 1604–1613. 
Benham, G., Woody, E., Wilson, S. K. & Nash, M. R. (2006). Expect the unexpected: 
Ability, attitude, and responsiveness to hypnosis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 91 (2), 342-350. 
140 
 
Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J., & Proust, J. (Eds.) (2012) The Foundations of 
Metacognition. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Bertrand. L.D. & Spanos, N.P. (1985). The organization of recall during hypnotic 
suggestions for complete and selective amnesia. Imagination, Cognition, and 
Personality, 4, 249–61. 
Bishop. S., Lau, M., Shapiro, S.,  Carlson, L., Bishop, S. Anderson, N. D., … Devins, G. 
(2006). Mindfulness: A proposed operation definition. Clinical 
Psychology: Science and Practice, 11, 230–241. 
Blakemore, S.J., Oakley, D.A., Frith, C.D. (2003). Delusions of alien control in the normal 
brain. Neuropsychologia, 41(8), 1058 - 1067. 
Bowen, S., Witkiewitz, K., and Dillworth, T., Chawla, N., Simpson, T., Ostafin, B., … 
Marlatt, G. (2006). Mindfulness meditation and substance use in an incarcerated 
population. Psychology of Addictive Behaviours, 20(3), 343–347. 
Bowers, K. S. (1993). The Waterloo-Stanford Group C (WSGC) scale of hypnotic 
suggestibility: Normative and comparative data. International Journal of Clinical 
and Experimental Hypnosis, 41, 35–46. 
Bowers, K. S. & Woody, E. Z. (1996). Hypnotic amnesia and the paradox of intentional 
forgetting. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 105, 381–389. 
Braffman, W., & Kirsch, I. (1999). Imaginative suggestibility and hypnotisability: An 
empirical analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(3), 578-587. 
Braffman, W., & Kirsch, I. (2001). Reaction time as a predictor of imaginative 
suggestibility and hypnotisability. Contemporary Hypnosis, 18(3), 107–119. 
Brefczynski-Lewis, J. A., Lutz, A., Schaefer, H. S., Levinson, D. B., & Davidson, R. J. 
(2007). Neural correlates of attentional expertise in long-term meditation 
141 
 
practitioners. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(27) 11483–
11488. 
Broadbent, D.E., Cooper, P.F., Fitzgerald, P and Parkes, K.R. (1982). The Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) and its correlates. British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 21(1), 1-16. 
Brown, K. W. & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its 
role in psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
84(4), 822–848. 
Bryant, R. A., & Idey, A. (2001). Intrusive thoughts and hypnotisability. Contemporary 
Hypnosis, 18, 14–20. 
Buttle, H. (2011). Attention and Working Memory in Mindfulness-Meditation Practices.  
Journal of Mind and Behaviour, (32)2, 123–134. 
Carvalho, C., Kirsch, I., Mazzoni, G. &, Leal. I. (2008). Portuguese Norms for the 
Waterloo-Stanford Group C (WSGC) Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, 
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 56(3), 295-305. 
Chan, D., & Woolacott, M. (2007). Effects of Level of Meditation Experience on 
Attentional Focus: Is the Efficiency of Executive or Orientation Networks 
Improved? The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine. 13(6), 651–
658.  
Cheyne, J., Carriere, S. A. & Smilek, D. (2006) Absent-mindedness: Lapses of conscious 
awareness and everyday cognitive failures. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 578–
592. 
Christoff, K., Gordon, A. M., Smallwood, J., Smith, R., & Schooler, J. W. (2009). 
Experience sampling during fMRI reveals default network and executive system 
142 
 
contributions to mind wandering. Proceedings of the National Academy if Science. 
U. S. A., 106, 8719–8724. 
Churchland, P. M. (1991).Elimintaive materialism and the propositional attitudes. In D. 
Rosenthal (Ed.), The nature of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 601-612. 
Clayton, P. (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion. Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press. 
Council, J. R., Kirsch, I., & Grant, D. L. (1996). Imagination, expectancy, and hypnotic 
responding. In: R. G. Kunzendorf, N. P. Spanos and B. Wallace (Eds.), Hypnosis 
and Imagination, pp. 41-65, New York: Baywood. 
Council, J. R., Kirsch, I., & Hafner, L. P. (1986). Expectancy versus absorption in the 
prediction of hypnotic responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
50, 182–189. 
Cooper, L., Banford, S., Schubot, E., & Tart, C. (1967). International Journal of Clinical 
and Experimental Hypnosis, 15(3), 118–124. 
Crawford, H. (1994). Brain dynamics and hypnosis: Attentional and disattentional 
processes. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 42(3), 204–232. 
Crawford, H., Brown, A., & Moon, C. (1993). Sustained attentional and disattentional 
abilities: Differences between low and highly hypnotisable persons. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 102(4), 534–543. 
Crawford, H.J., Knebel, T., & Vendemia, J.M.C. (1998). The nature of hypnotic analgesia: 
Neurophysiological foundation and evidence. Contemporary Hypnosis, 15: 24-35. 
Critchley, H. D., Wiens, S., Rotshtein, P., Öhman, A., & Dolan, R. J. (2004). Neural 
systems supporting interoceptive awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 189–195. 
143 
 
Crowne, D. & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of 
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24(4), 349-354. 
Damasio, A.R., (1996). The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the 
prefrontal cortex. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 351, 1413–1420. 
Davidson, R. J., & Goleman, D. J. (1977). The role of attention in meditation and hypnosis: 
A psychobiological perspective on transformations of consciousness. International 
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 25, 291-308.  
 Davidson, RJ, Goleman, D., & Schwartz, GE (1976). Attentional and affective 
concomitants of meditation: A cross-sectional study. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 85¸235-238. 
Deeley, Q., Oakley, D. A., Toone, B., Giampietro, V., Brammer, M. J., Williams, S. C., & 
Halligan, P. (2012). Modulating the default mode network using hypnosis. The 
International journal of clinical and experimental hypnosis, 60, 206–228. 
Delmonte, M. M. (1984). Meditation: Similarities with hypnoidal states and hypnosis. 
International Journal of Psychosomatics, 31, 24–34. 
Derbyshire, S. W., Whalley, M. G., & Oakley, D. A. (2009). Fibromyalgia pain and its 
modulation by hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion: An fMRI analysis. European 
Journal of Pain, 13, 542–550. 
Diamond, M. J. (1972). The use of observationally presented information to modify 
hypnotic susceptibility. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 79(2), 174–180. 
Dienes, Z. (2008).Understanding Psychology as a Science: An Introduction to Scientific 
and Statistical Inference. Palgrave Macmillan 
144 
 
Dienes, Z. (2011). Bayesian versus Orthodox statistics: Which side are you 
on? Perspectives on Psychological Sciences, 6(3), 274-290. 
Dienes, Z. (2012). Is hypnotic responding the strategic relinquishment of metacognition? In 
M. Beran, J. Brandl, J. Perner & J. Proust (Eds.) The Foundations of Metacognition. 
Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Dienes, Z., & Hutton, S. (submitted). Understanding hypnosis metacognitively: rTMS 
applied to DLPFC increases hypnotic suggestibility. 
Dienes, Z., & Perner, J. (2007). The cold control theory of hypnosis. In G. Jamieson (Ed.). 
Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective (pp 293–
314). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.  
Dienes, Z., Brown, E., Hutton, S., Kirsch, I., Mazzoni, G. & Wright, D.B. (2009). Hypnotic 
suggestibility, cognitive inhibition, and dissociation. Consciousness and Cognition, 
18, 837-847. 
Dietrich, A. (2003). Introduction to Consciousness. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dixon, M., Brunet, A., & Laurence, J.-R. (1990). Hypnotizability and automaticity: Toward 
a parallel distributed processing model of hypnotic responding. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 99, 336–343. 
Dixon, M., & Laurence, J.R. (1992). Hypnotic susceptibility and verbal automaticity: 
Automatic and strategic processing differences in the Stroop color-naming task. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 101, 344–347. 
Dumont, L., Martin, C., & Broer, I. Functional Neuroimaging Studies of Hypnosis and 
Meditation: A Comparative Perspective. Journal of Mind-Body Regulation 2: 58–
70. 
145 
 
Dziuban, C.D. & Shirkey, E.C. (1974). When is a correlation matrix appropriate for factor 
analysis? Some decision rules. Psychological Bulletin, 81(6), 358-361. 
Eckert, M. A., Menon, V., Walczak, A., Ahlstrom, J., Denslow, S., Horwitz. A., & Dubno, 
J. (2009). At the heart of the ventral attention system: The right anterior insula. 
Human Brain Mapping, 30(8), 2530–2541. 
Egner, T., Jamieson, G. & Gruzelier, .J (2005). Hypnosis decouples cognitive control from 
conflict monitoring processes of the frontal lobe. Neuroimage 27(4), 969-78. 
Engstrom, D., Perry, P., & Hart, J. (1970). Hypnotic Susceptibility increased by EEG 
Alpha Training. Nature, 227, 1261–1262. 
Farb, N., Segal, Z., Mayberg, H., Bean, J., McKeon, D, Fatima, Z. & Anderson, A. (2007). 
Attending to the present: Mindfulness meditation reveal distinct neural modes of 
self-reference. Social and Affective Neuroscience, 2(4), 313-322. 
Farvolden P and Woody EZ. Hypnosis, memory, and frontal executive functioning. 
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 52(1):3-26. 
Fernandez-Duque, D., Baird, J. A., & Posner, M. I. (2000). Executive attention and 
metacognitive regulation. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 288–307. 
Fillimore, M. & Weafer, J. (2004) Alcohol impairment of behaviour in men and women. 
Addiction 99(10), 1237-4 
Finnigan F Shulze D and Smallwood J (2011). Alcohol and the wandering mind: A new 
direction in the study of alcohol on attentional lapses. International Journal on 
Disability and Human Development. 6(2), 189-199. 
Fleming, S.M., Weil, R.S., Nagy, Z., Dolan, R.J., and Rees, G. Relating Introspective 
Accuracy to Individual Differences in Brain Structure. Science, 329, 1541-1543, 
2010. 
146 
 
Gearan, P. & Kirsch, I. (1993). Response expectancy as a mediator of hypnotisability 
modification. A brief communication. International Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Hypnosis, 41(2), 84-91. 
Gill, T (2000). Individual differences in schema activation, as measured by the Revised 
Nisroe (The Encoding Style Questionnaire). Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
University of Tulsa, Tulsa.  
Goleman, D. J. & Schwartz, G.E. (1976). Meditation as an intervention in stress reactivity. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 44(3), 456-466. 
Gombrich, R. F. (1996). How Buddhism began: The conditioned genesis of the early 
teachings. Muchiram Manoharlal Publishers. 
Gorassini, D. (2004), Enhancing Hypnotzability. In M. Heap, R. J. Brown & D. A. Oakley 
(Eds.). The Highly Hypnotisable Person. New York: Brunner-Routledge. 
 Green, J.P. and Lynn, S.J. (2011) Hypnotic responsiveness: expectancy, attitudes, fantasy 
proneness, absorption, and gender. International Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Hypnosis, 59(1),103-21. 
Gruzelier, J. (1998). A working model of the neurophysiology of hypnosis: a review of 
evidence. Contemporary Hypnosis, 15, 3–21. 
Gruzelier, J. (2006) Frontal functions, connectivity and neural efficiency underpinning 
hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility. Contemporary. Hypnosis 23: 15–32. 
Gruzelier, J. & Warren, K. (1993). Neuropsychological evidence of reductions on left 
frontal tests with hypnosis. Psychological Medicine, 23, 93–101. 
Gundersen, H., Specht, K., Grüner, R., Ersland, L. & Hugdah, K. (2008). Separating the 
effects of alcohol and expectancy on brain activation: An fMRI working memory 
study. Neuroimage 42(4), 1587-1596. 
147 
 
Gyatso, G. K. (2005). Mahamudra Tantra: The supreme heart jewel nectar, a reduction to 
meditation on tantra. Cumbria, UK: Tharpa Publications. 
Haggard, P., Cartledge, P., Dafydd, M. & Oakley, D.A. (2004). Anomalous control: When 
free-will is not conscious. Consciousness and Cognition 13, 646–654. 
Hanh, T. N., & Nquyen, A. (2006). Walking meditation. Louisville, CO: Sounds True Inc. 
Heap, M., Brown, R. J., & Oakley, D. A. (Eds.) (2004) The Highly Hypnotisable Person. 
London, England: Routledge. 
Heide, F. J., Wadlington, W. L., & Lundy, R. M. (1980). Hypnotic responsivity as a 
predictor of outcome in meditation. International Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Hypnosis, 28, 358–385. 
Herndon, F. (2008). Testing mindfulness with perceptual and cognitive factors: External vs. 
internal encoding, and the cognitive failures questionnaire. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 44(1), 32-41. 
Hilgard, E. R. (1977). Divided consciousness: Multiple controls in human thought and 
action. New York, NY: Wiley-Interscience. 
Hilgard E.R. (1965). Hypnotic suggestibility. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World. 
Hilgard, E.R. (1977). Divided consciousness: multiple controls in human thought and 
action. New York: Wiley-Interscience. 
Hilgard, E.R. & Tart, C.T. (1966) Responsiveness to suggestions following waking and 
imagination intstuctions and following induction of hypnosis. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 71(3), 196-208. 
Hine, K.M. (2009) Gender Roles and Desire for Control as Predictors of Hypnotic 
Responsiveness. Unpublished undergraduate dissertation, Wilfrid Laurier 
University, Waterloo, Ontario. 
148 
 
Holroyd, J. C. (2003). The science of meditation and the state of hypnosis. American 
Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 46(2), 109–128. 
Hölzel, B. K., Ott, U., Hempel, H., Hackl, A., Wolf, K., Stark, R., & Vaitl, D. (2007). 
Differential engagement of anterior cingulate and adjacent medial frontal cortex in 
adept meditators and non-meditators. Neuroscience Letters, 421, 16–21. 
Hurlburt, R. T., & Schwitzgebel, E. (2007). Describing inner experience: Proponent meets 
skeptic. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Iani, C., Ricci, F., Baroni, G. & Rubichi, S. (2009). Attention control and susceptibility to 
hypnosis, Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 856–863. 
Iani, C., Ricci, F., Gherri, E. & Rubichi, S. (2006). Hypnotic suggestion modulates 
cognitive conflict. Psychological Science, 17, 721–727. 
Jamieson, G. (Ed.), (2007). Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience 
perspective. Oxford University Press, pp 293-314. 
Jamieson, G. A. & Woody, E. Z. (2007). Dissociated control as a paradigm for cognitive 
neuroscience research and theorizing in hypnosis. In G. Jamieson (Ed.). Hypnosis 
and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective (pp 111–129). Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press. 
Jamieson. G. A., & Sheehan, P. W. (2002). A critical evaluation of the relationship between 
sustained attentional abilities and hypnotic susceptibility. Contemporary Hypnosis, 
119, 62–74. 
Jensen, C. G., Vangkilde, S., Frokjaer, V., & Hasselbalch, S. G. (2012). Mindfulness 
training affects attention—or is it attentional effort? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 141(1), 106–123. 
149 
 
Jha, A., Krompinger, J., & Baime, M. J. (2007) Mindfulness training modifies subsystems 
of attention. Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioural Neuroscience, 7(2), 109–119. 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1990). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind to 
face stress, pain, and illness. New York: Dell Publishing. 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (2011). Some clinical applications of mindfulness meditation in medicine 
and psychiatry: The case for mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR). In J. 
Kabat-Zinn, R. Davidson & Z. Houshmand (Eds.) The mind’s own physician: A 
scientific dialogue with the Dalai Lama on the healing power of meditation. 
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications.  
Kabat-Zinn, J., Davidson, R. & Houshmand, Z. (Eds.) (1985). The mind’s own physician: A 
scientific dialogue with the Dalai Lama on the healing power of meditation. 
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications. 
Kabat-Zinn, J., Massion, A. O., Kristeller, J., Peterson, L. G., Fletcher, K. E., Pbert, L., 
Santorelli, S. F. (1992). Effectiveness of a meditation-based stress reduction 
program in the treatment of anxiety disorders, American Journal of Psychiatry, 
149(7), 936–943. 
Kabat-Zinn, J., Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. W. G., & Teasdale, J. D. (2002). Mindfulness-
based cognitive therapy for depression. New York, NY: The Guildford Press. 
Kähkönen, S., Wilenius, J., Nikulin, V., Ollinkainen, M & Ilmoniemi, R. (2003). 
Alcohol reduces prefrontal cortical excitability in humans: a combined TMS and 
EEG study. Neuropsychopharmacology, 28: 747–754. 
Kaiser, J., Barker, R., Haenschel, C., Baldeweg, T., & Gruzelier, J. H. (1997). Hypnosis 
and event-related potential correlates of error-processing in a Stroop type paradigm: 
150 
 
A test of the frontal hypothesis. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 27, 
215–222. 
Kallio, S., Revonsuo, A., Hämäläinen, H., Markela, J., & Gruzelier, J. (2001). Anterior 
brain functions and hypnosis: A test of the frontal hypothesis. International Journal 
of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 49, 95–108. 
Kamalashila. (1992). Meditation: The Buddhist way of tranquility and insight. Cambridge, 
England: Windhorse Publications. 
Kamalashila, (2012). Buddhist Meditation -Tranquility, Imagination and Insight, 
Cambridge: Windhorse Publications. 
Karlin, R. J. (1979). Hypnotisability and attention. Journal of Abnonnal Psychology, 88(1), 
92–95. 
Kelly, S.F., Fisher, S., Kelly, R.J. (1978). Effects of cannabis intoxication on primary 
suggestibility. Psychopharmacology, 56(2):217-9.  
Kihlstrom, J. (2008). The domain of hypnosis, revisited. In Nash, M. & Barnier, A. (Eds.) 
The Oxford handbook of hypnosis: Theory, research and practice, (pp. 21-52), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kirsch I. (1985). Response expectancy as a determinant of experience and behaviour. 
American Psychologist, 40, 1189-1202. 
Kirsch, I. (1991). The social learning theory of hypnosis. In S. J. Lynn & J. W, Rhue (Eds.), 
Theories of hypnosis: Current models and perspectives (pp. 439-465). 
Kirsch, I. (1997). Suggestibility or hypnosis: What do you scales really measure? 
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 45, 212–225. 
Kirsch, I. (2011). Suggestibility and suggestive modulation of the Stroop effect. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 335-336. 
151 
 
Kirsch, I., & Braffman, W. (1999).  Correlates of hypnotisability:  The first empirical 
study.  Contemporary Hypnosis, 16: 224-230 
Kirsch I, Cardeña E, Derbyshire, S, Dienes Z, Heap M, Kallio S, Mazzoni G, Naish P, 
Oakley D, Potter C, Walters V, Whalley M. (2011). Definitions of Hypnosis and 
Hypnotisability and their Relation to Suggestion and Suggesitibility: A Consensus 
Statement. Contemporary Hypnosis and Integrative Therapy, 28(2), 107-11. 
Kirsch, I., & Lynn, S. J. (1995). The Altered State of Hypnosis - Changes in the Theoretical 
Landscape. American Psychologist, 50(10), 846-858. 
Kirsch, I., Silva, C.E.. Carone, J.E., Johnston, J. D.; Barry, S. (1989) Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 98(2), May 1989, 132-136. 
Koriat, A. (2007) Metacognition and consciousness. In P. D. Zelazo, M. Moscovitch, & E. 
Thompson (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of consciousness (pp. 289–325). 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Kubose, S. (1976). An experimental investigation into the psychological aspects of 
meditation. Cited in D. Shapiro, & R. Walsh (Eds.). The science of meditation: 
Research, theory and practice. New York, NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 
Lau, H. C., & Passingham, R. E. (2006). Relative blindsight in normal observers and the 
neural correlate of visual consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Science, 103, 18763–18768. 
Lau, M. A., Bishop, S. R., Segal, Z. V.,  Buis, T., Anderson, N.D., Carlson, L., Shapiro, 
S., Carmody, J., Abbey, S. & Devins, G. (2006). The Toronto mindfulness scale: 
Development and validation. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62(12), 1445-67. 
152 
 
Lazar, S. W., Kerr, C., Wasserman, R. H., Gray, J. R., Greve, D., Treadway, M. T., … 
Fischl, B. (2005). Meditation experience is associated with increased cortical 
thickness. NeuroReport, 16, 1893–1897. 
Lewicki, P. (2005). Internal and external encoding style and social motivation. In J. P. 
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W. & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention 
to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious 
initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain, 106, 623-642. 
Lichtenberg, P., Bachner-Melman, R., Gritsenko, I., & Ebstein, R. P. (2000). Exploratory 
association study between catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) high/low enzyme 
activity polymorphism and hypnotisability. American Journal of Medical Genetics 
96, 771–774. 
Liftshitz, M., Campbell, N. and Raz, A. (2012). Varieties of attention in hypnosis and 
meditation. Consciousness and Cognition, 21: 1582-1585. 
Loeber, S. & Duka, T. (2009). Acute alcohol impairs conditioning of a behavioural reward-
seeking response and inhibitory control processes--implications for addictive 
disorders. Addiction 104(12): 2013-22. 
Lutz, A., Brefczynski-Lewis, J., Johnstone, T., Davidson, R. J. (2008) Regulation of the 
Neural Circuitry of Emotion by Compassion Meditation: Effects of Meditative 
Expertise. PLoS ONE, 3(3), e1897. 
Lutz, A., Slagter, H. A., Dunne, J., & Davidson, R. J. (2008). Attention regulation and 
monitoring in meditation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(4), 163–169. 
Lutz, A., Slagter, H., Rawlings, N. B., Francis, A. D., Greischar, L. L., & Davidson, R. J. 
(2009). Mental training enhances attentional stability: Neural and behavioural 
evidence. Journal of  Neuroscience, 29, 13418–13427.  
153 
 
Lutz, A., Dunne, J., & Davidson, R. (2007). The Neuroscience of Meditation. In P. Zelazo, 
M. Moscovitch, E. Thompson (Eds.) Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness.  
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Lynn, S. J., Das, L. S., Hallquist, M. N., & Williams, J. C. (2006). Mindfulness, 
acceptance, and hypnosis: Cognitive and clinical perspectives. International Journal 
of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 54(2), 143–166. 
Lynn, S. J., Kirsch, I., & Hallquist, M. (2008). Social cognitive theories of hypnosis. In M. 
R. Nash, & A. Barnier (Eds.). The Oxford handbook of hypnosis: Theory, research 
and practice (pp. 111-140). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press 
Lynn, S. J., & Rhue, J. W. (1986).  The fantasy-prone person: hypnosis, imagination, and 
creativity. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 5(2), 404-408. 
Lynn, S. J., & Rhue, J. W. (1988).  Fantasy proneness:  Hypnosis, developmental 
antecedents, and psychopathology. American Psychologist, 43: 35-44. 
Lynn, S.J. & Rhue, J.W. (Eds.) (1991), Theories of hypnosis: Current models and 
perspectives. New York, Guilford Press. 
Lyons, L. & Crawford, H. (1997). Sustained attentional and disattentional abilities and 
arousability: Factor analysis and relationships to hypnotic susceptibility. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 23(6), 1071–1084 
Marcusson-Clavertz, D., Terhune, D. & Cardeña, E. ( 2012). Individual differences and 
state effects on mind-wandering: Hypnotisability, dissociation and sensory 
homogenization. 21, 1097-1108. 
Marinkovic, K., Rickenbacher, E., Azma, S. and Artsy, E. (2012). 
Acute alcohol intoxication impairs top–down regulation of Stroop incongruity as 
154 
 
revealed by bloody oxygen level-dependent functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
Human Brain mapping, 33, 319-333.  
McGeown, W. Mazzoni, G., Venneri, A. & Kirsch, I. (2009). Hypnotic induction decreases 
anterior default mode activity. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 848–855. 
McConkey. K.M., Glisky, M.L., & Kihlstrom, .J.F. (1998). Individual differences among 
hypnotic virtuosos: A case comparison. Australian Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Hypnosis, 17, 131-140. 
Mehrabian, A. & Russell, J.A. (1978). A questionnaire measure of habitual alcohol use. 
Psychological Report 43, 803–806. 
Mura, G. (Ed.) (2010). Metaplasticity in Virtual Worlds: Aesthetics and Semantics 
Concepts, Hershey, Pennsylvania: IGI Publishing. 
Nadon, R., Hoyt, I., Register, P., & Kihlstrom, J. (1991). Absorption and hypnotisability: 
Context effects re-examined. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(1), 
144–153. 
Naish, P. (1986). What is Hypnosis? Current Theories and Research. Philadephia: Open 
University Press. 
Nash, M. & Barnier, A. (Eds.), (2008). The Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis: Theory, 
Research, and Practice. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press 
Nelson, T. O., & Narens, I. (1990). Metamemory: A theoretical framework and new 
findings. In G. Bower, (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation: Advances 
in research and theory (pp. 12 5-17 3). New York, NY: Academic Press. 
Norman, D., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of 
behaviour. In R. Davidson, G. Schwartz, & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and 
155 
 
self-regulation: Advances in research and theory, Vol.4. pp. 1–18. New York: 
Plenum. 
Oakley, D. A. (2008). Hypnosis, trance and suggestion: Evidence from neuroimaging. In 
M. R. Nash & A. Barnier (Eds.). The Oxford handbook of hypnosis: Theory, 
research and practice (pp. XXXX). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Orne, M.T. (1971). The simulation of hypnosis: Why, how, and what it means. 
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 19, 183-210. 
Parris, B.A., Dienes, Z. and Hodgson, T. L., (2012). Temporal constraints of the post 
hypnotic word blindness suggestion on Stroop task performance. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 38(4), 833-837. 
Paulus M, Tapert S, Pulido C and Schuckit M. (2006). Alcohol attenuates load-related 
activation during a working memory task: Relation to level of response to alcohol. 
Alcoholism 30(8), 1363–1371.  
Pekala, R. J. (1982). Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI). (Unpublished 
psychological test). 
Pekala, R. J. (1991). Quantifying consciousness: An empirical approach. Emotions, 
personality, and psychotherapy. New York, NY: Plenum Press.  
Pekala, R. J., & Kumar, V. K. (2007). An empirical-phenomenological approach to 
quanitifying consciousness: With particular reference to understanding the nature of 
hypnosis in G. Jamieson (Ed.). Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive 
neuroscience perspective (pp 167–194). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Peterson JB, Rothfleisch J, Zelazo, P.D. and Pihl RO. (1990). Acute alcohol intoxication 
and cognitive functioning. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 51: 114-122. 
156 
 
Petitmengin, C. (Ed.). (2009). Ten years of viewing from within: The legacy of Francisco 
Varela. Exeter, England: Imprint Academic. 
Piccione, C. Hilgard, E.R. & Zimbardo, P.G. (1989). On the degree of stability of measured 
hypnotisability over a 25-year period. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 56: 367-379.  
Proust, J. (2012). Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental agency and self-awareness. Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press. 
Rainville, P., Duncan. G. H., Price, D. D., Carrier, B. & Bushnell, M.C. (1997). Pain affect 
encoded in human anterior cingulate but not somatosensory cortex. Science, 277, 
968–71. 
Ramel, W., Goldin, P., Carmona, P., & McQuaid, J. (2004). The effects of mindfulness 
meditation on cognitive processes and affect in patients with past depression. 
Cognitive therapy and research, 26(4), 433–455.    
Raz, A. (2011). Does neuroimaging of suggestion elucidate hypnotic trance? International 
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 59(3), 363–377. 
Raz, A., & Buhle, J. (2006). Typologies of Attentional Networks. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 7(5), 367–379. 
Raz, A., & Campbell, N. K. J. (2011). Can Suggestion Obviate Reading? Supplementing 
Primary Stroop Evidence with Exploratory Negative Priming Analyses. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 20(2), 312–320. 
Raz, A., Fan, J., & Posner, M. I. (2005). Hypnotic suggestion reduces conflict in the human 
brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 102(28), 9978–9983. 
157 
 
Raz, A., Kirsch, I., Pollard, J., & Nitkin-Kaner, Y. (2006). Suggestion reduces the stroop 
effect. Psychological Science, 17(2), 91–95. 
Raz, A., Landzberg, K. S., Schweizer, H. R., Zephrani, Z. R., Shapiro, T., Fan, J., & 
Posner, M. I. (2003). Posthypnotic suggestion and the modulation of Stroop 
interference under cycloplegia. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(3), 332–346. 
Raz, A., Shapiro, T., Fan, J., & Posner, M. I. (2002). Hypnotic suggestion and the 
modulation of Stroop interference. Archives of General Psychiatry, 59(12), 1155–
1161. 
Rey A. (1964). L’examen Clinique en psychologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
Ridderinkhof, K.R., de Vlugt, Y., Bramlage, A., Spaan, M., Elton, M., Snel, J. & Band 
G.P.H. (2002). Alcohol consumption impairs detection of performance errors in 
mediofrontal cortex. Science, 298, 2209-2211. 
Robbins TW. (2007). Shifting and stopping: fronto-striatal substrates, neurochemical 
modulation and clinical implications. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society: B Biological Sciences 362:917–932. 
Roche, S., & McConkey, K. (1990) Absorption: Nature, assessment, and correlates. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 91-101. 
Roehrs, T. & Roth, T. (2001). Sleep, sleepiness and alcohol use. Alcohol Research and 
Health 25(2): 101-109. 
Rosenthal, D. M. (1986). Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 49, 329–
359. 
Rosenthal, D. M. (2002). Consciousness and higher order thought. In L. Nadel. Macmillan 
encyclopedia of cognitive science (pp. 717–726). Basingstoke, England: Macmillan 
Publishers Ltd. 
158 
 
Rosenthal, D. (2005). Consciousness and mind. Oxford University Press. 
Rounis E, Maniscalco B, Rothwell J, Passingham  RE, & Lau H (2006). Theta-burst 
transcranial magnetic stimulation to the prefrontal cortex impairs metacognitive 
visual awareness Cognitive Neuroscience, 1: 165-175, 
Rubichi, S., Ricci, F., Padovani, R., & Scaglietti, L. (2005). Hypnotic susceptibility, 
baseline attentional functioning, and the Stroop task. Consciousness and Cognition, 
14, 296–303. 
Sahraie, A., Weiskrantz, L., Barbur, J.L., Simmons, S.C.R. & Brammer, M.J. (1997). 
Pattern of neuronal activity associated with conscious and unconscious processing 
of visual signals. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 94,  p. 9406–
9411.  
Salomons, T. V., & Kucyi, A. (2011). Does meditation reduce pain through a unique neural 
mechanism? The Journal of Neuroscience, 31(26), 12705–12707. 
Sangharakshita. (2001). A Survey of Buddhism. Cambridge, England: Windhorse 
Publications. 
Sarbin, T. R., & Coe, W. C. (1972). Hypnosis: A social psychological analysis of influence 
communication. New York, NY: Holt Rinehart and Winston. 
Sayette, A.M., Reichle, E.D. & Schooler, J.W. (2009). Lost in the sauce: The effects of 
alcohol on mind wandering? Psychological Science 20(6): 747-752. 
Scaife, J. & Duka, T. (2009). Behavioural measures of frontal lobe function in a population 
of young social drinkers with binge drinking pattern.  Pharmacolology, 
Biochemistry and Behaviour 93(3):354-62. 
Schneider, W., Eschman, A. & Zuccolotto, A. (2002). E-Prime User’s Guide. Pittsburgh, 
PA: Psychology Software Tools Inc. 
159 
 
Schooler, J.W. (2002). Re-representing consciousness: dissociations between consciousness 
and meta-consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 339–344. 
Schooler, J.W., Smallwood, J., Christoff, K., Handy, T., Reichle, E. & Sayette, M. (2011). 
Meta-awareness, perceptual decoupling and the wandering mind. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 15, 7, 319-216. 
Schjoedt, U., Stødkilde-Jørgensen, J., Geertz, A., Lund, T., & Ropestorff, A. (2011). The 
power of charisma—perceived charisma inhibits the frontal executive network of 
believers in intercessory prayer. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 6(1), 
119-127. 
Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Semmens-Wheeler, R., & Erskine, J. (2009, April). Mindfulness and the myth of control. 
Talk presented at  British Psychological Society Annual Conference, Brighton.  
Semmens-Wheeler, R., & Dienes, Z. (2011, December) Similarities and Differences in 
Meditation and Hypnosis.  Talk presented at the David Waxman Memorial Lecture, 
Royal Society of Medicine, London.  
Shapiro, S.L., Oman, D. & Thoresen, C.E. (2008). Cultivating mindfulness: effects on well‐
being. Journal of Clinical Psychology. 64(7), 840-862. 
Shapiro, D., & Walsh, R. (Eds.) (1980). The science of meditation: Research, theory and 
practice. New York, NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 
Shaw, S. (2006). Buddhist meditation: An anthology of texts from the Pali cannon. New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
160 
 
Shaw, C., Gromala, D. & Song, M. (2010) The meditation chamber: Towards self-
modulation. In Mura, G. (Ed.) Metaplasticity in Virtual Worlds: Aesthetics and 
Semantics Concepts, Hershey, Pennsylvania: IGI Publishing. 
Shor, R. E., Orne, M. T., & O'Connell, D. N. (1962). Validation and cross-validation of a 
scale of self-reported personal experiences which predicts hypnotisability. Journal 
of Psychology, 53, 55–75. 
Sjoberg B.M. & Hollister, L.E.. (1965). The effects of psychotomimetic drugs on primary 
suggestibility. Psychopharmacology, 8, 251-262. 
Slagter, H. A., Lutz, A., Greichar, L. L., Francis, A. D., Nieuwenhuis, S., Davis, J., & 
Davidson, R. J. (2007). Mental training affects distribution of limited attentional 
resources. PLoS Biology, 5(6), 138. 
Smallwood, J. & Schooler, J. W. (2006). The Restless Mind. Psychological Bulletin, 
132(6), 946-958.  
Snyder, T. & Rasmussen, S (2009). Practicing Jhanas – Traditional Concentration. 
Boston: Shambhala Publications. 
Spanos, N. (1986). Hypnotic behaviour: A social–psychological interpretation of amnesia, 
analgesia, and ‘trance logic.’ Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 9, 449–502. 
Spanos, N.P. (1991). A sociocognitive approach to hypnosis. In S. J. Lynn and  
J. W. Rhue (eds.) Theories of Hypnosis: Current Models and Perspectives, pp.324-
361. Guildford Press: New York. 
Spanos, N. P., & Barber, T. X. (1974). Toward a convergence in hypnosis research. 
American Psychologist, (29)7, 500–511. 
161 
 
Spanos, N.P., Brett, P.J., Menary, E.P. & Cross, W.P. (1987). A measure of attitudes 
toward hypnosis: relationships with absorption and hypnotic suggestibility. The 
American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 30(2):139-50. 
Spanos, N., & Gorassini, D. (1999). The Carleton Skill Training Program for modifying 
hypnotic suggestibility: Original version and variations. In I. Kirsch, A. Capafons, 
E. Cardeña-Buelna & Amigó, S. (Eds.). Clinical hypnosis and self-regulation: 
Cognitive-behavioural perspectives. Dissociation, trauma, memory, and hypnosis 
book series (pp. 141–177). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Spanos, N. P. & McPeake, John D. (1975). Involvement in everyday imaginative activities, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31(3), 594-598. 
Spanos, N. P., Rivers, S. M., & Gottlieb, J. (1978). Hypnotic responsivity, meditation, and 
laterality of eye movements. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 566–569. 
Tang Y.Y.,Ma ,Y., Wang, J., Fan Y., Feng, S., Lu, Q., Yu, Q., Sui, D., Rothbart, M.K., Fan, 
M., & Posner, M.I. (2007). Short-term meditation training improves attention and 
self-regulation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 104(43), 17152–17156. 
Taylor, J. (2003). Paying attention to Consciousness. Progress in Neurobiology, 71, 305–
335 
Teasdale, J. (1999). Metacognition, mindfulness and the modification of mood disorders, 
Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 6, 146–155. 
Teasdale, J. D., Moore, R. G., Hayhurst, H., Pope, M., Williams, S., & Segal, Z. V. (2002). 
Metacognitive awareness and prevention of relapse in depression: Empirical 
evidence. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 70, 278–287. 
162 
 
Teasdale, J., Segal, Z. & Williams, M. (2003). Mindfulness training and problem 
formulation. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10(2). 
Tellegen, A. and Atkinson, G. (1974) Openness to absorbing and self-altering experiences 
("absorption"), a trait related to hypnotic susceptibility. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology. 83(3), 268-277. 
Terhune, D., Cardeña, E. & Lindgren, M. (2011). Dissociated control as a signature of 
typological variability in high hypnotic suggestibility. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 20, 727-736. 
Thompson, E. (2006). The neurophenomenology of meditation. In P. Clayton (Ed.) (2006). 
The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion. Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press 
Tobis, I. and Kihlstrom, J. (2010). Allocation of attentional resources in post hypnotic 
suggestion. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 58, 367–
382. 
Travis, F., Haaga, D. A., Hagelin, J., Tanner, M., Nidich, S., Gaylord-King, C. & 
Schneider, R. H. (2009). Effects of Transcendental Meditation practice on brain 
functioning and stress reactivity in college students. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology 71(2), 170–176 
Tsakiris, M. & Haggard, P. (2003). Awareness of somatic events associated with a 
voluntary action. Experimental Brain Research, 149, 439–446. 
Uddin, L., Kelly, A., Biswal, B., Xavier Castellanos, F., & Milham, M. (2009). Functional 
connectivity of default mode network components: Correlation, anticorrelation, and 
causality. Human Brain Mapping, 30, 625–637 
163 
 
Valentine, E. R., Sweet, P. L. G. (1999). Meditation and attention: A comparison of the 
effects of concentrative and mindfulness meditation on sustained attention. Mental 
Health, Religion and Culture, 2, 59–70. 
Van Nuys, D. (1973). Meditation, attention and hypnotic susceptibility: A correlational 
study. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 21, 59–69. 
Varga, K., Németh, Z., & Szekely, A. (2011). Lack of correlation between hypnotic 
susceptibility and various components of attention. Consciousness and Cognition, 
20, 1872–1881. 
Vincent, J. L., Kahn, I., Snyder, A. Z., Raichle, M. E., Buckner, R. L. (2008). Evidence for 
a Frontoparietal Control System Revealed by Intrinsic Functional Connectivity. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 100, 3328–3342. 
Wagstaff, G. F., Cole, J. C., & Brunas-Wagstaff, J. (2007). Effects of hypnotic induction 
and hypnotic depth on phonemic fluency: A test of the frontal inhibition account of 
hypnosis. Revista Internacional de Psicologia y Terapia Psicologica/ International 
Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 7, 27–40. 
Walach, H., Buchheld, N., Buttenmüller, V., Kleinknecht, N. & Schmidt, S. (2006). 
Measuring mindfulness: the Freiburg inventory of mindfulness skills. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 40, 1543–1555. 
Wallace, B. A. (1999). The Buddhist tradition of Samatha: Methods for refining and 
examining consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, 175–187. 
Walsh, R. (1979). Meditation research: An introduction and review.  Journal of 
Transpersonal Psychology, 11, 161–174. 
164 
 
Ward, N.S., Oakley, D.A., Frackowiak, R.S.J. & Halligan, P.W. (2003). Differential brain 
activations for malingered and subjectively 'real' paralysis. Cognitive 
Neuropsychiatry, 8(4), 295-312. 
Wegner, D.M., Schneider, D.J., Carter, S. & White, T. (187) Paradoxical effects of thought 
suppression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 5-13. 
Wegner, D. & Zanakos, S. (1994) Chronic Thought Suppression. Journal of Personality, 
62, 615-640. 
Weissenborn, R. and Duka, T. (2003). Acute alcohol effects on cognitive function in social 
drinkers: their relationship to drinking habits. Psychopharmacology 165(3):306-12. 
Weitzenhoffer, A. M. (1980). Hypnotic susceptibility revisited. American Journal of 
Clinical Hypnosis, 22, 130-146. 
Wendt. P. & Risberg, J. (2001). Ethanol reduces rCFB activation of left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex during a verbal fluency task. Brain and Language 77: 197-215. 
White, R. W. (1942). A preface to a theory of hypnotism. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 36, 477–505. 
Whalley, M. & Brooks, G. (2009). Enhancement of suggestibility and imaginative ability 
with nitrous oxide. Psychopharmacology, 203: 745-752.   
 Williams, P. (2008). Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Oxford: Taylor 
and Francis. 
Wilson, S. C., & Barber, T. X. (1982). The fantasy-prone personality: Implications for 
understanding imagery, hypnosis, and parapsychological phenomena.. In S. J. Lynn 
& J. W. Rhue (Eds.). Theories of Hypnosis: Current Models and Perspective, 
London, England: The Guildford Press. 
165 
 
Woody , E. Z. Bowers , K. S. (1994). A frontal assault on dissociated control. In S. Lynn & 
J. Rhue (Eds.), Dissociation: Clinical and Theoretical Perspectives, Guildford 
Press, New York, USA, pp. 52-79. 
Woody, E. and Sadler, P. (1998). On re-integrating dissociated theories: comment on 
Kirsch and Lynn (1998). Psychological Bulletin, 123: 192–7. 
Woody, E.  & Szechtman, H. (2011). Using hypnosis to develop and test models of 
psychopathology. Journal of Mind-Body Regulation, 1(1).  
Wyzenbeek, M., & Bryant, R. A. (2012). The cognitive demands of hypnotic response. 
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 60(1), 67-80. 
Yapko, M. D. (2011). Mindfulness and hypnosis: The power of suggestion to transform 
experience. New York, NY: Norton. 
Zamansky, H. S., & Clark, L. E. (1986). Cognitive competition and hypnotic behaviour: 
Whither absorption? International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 
34, 205–214. 
Zeidan, F., Gordon, N.S., Merchant, J. & Goolkasian, P. (2010). The effects of brief 
mindfulness meditation training on experimentally induced pain. Journal of Pain, 
11(3), 199-209. 
Zeidan, F., Johnson, S.K., Diamond, B.J., David, Z., & Goolkasian, P. (2010). Mindfulness 
Meditation Improves Cognition: Evidence of Brief Mental Training. Consciousness 
and Cognition, 19, 597-605. 
 
 
  
166 
 
Appendix: Schematic drawing of the finger lifting device (paper 4) 
 
 
 
